





“To Tidy Minds it May Appear Illogical”:  
How the Commonwealth Evolved from an 









presented to the University Of Waterloo 
in fulfilment of the 
thesis requirement for the degree of 












Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2020 
 
© Preston Arens 2020 
ii 
 
Examining Committee Membership 
 
The following served on the Examining Committee for this thesis. The decision of the 
Examining Committee is by majority vote. 
 
 
External Examiner    DR. SARAH STOCKWELL 
      Professor in Imperial & Commonwealth History  
      King’s College London 
 
Supervisor     DR. DAN GORMAN 
      Professor of History 
      University of Waterloo  
 
Internal Member    DR. DOUGLAS PEERS 
      Professor of History 
       University of Waterloo 
 
Internal-external Member   DR. ERIC HELLEINER 
      Professor of Political Science 
      University of Waterloo 
 
Other Member(s) DR. KEVIN SPOONER   
Associate Professor of North American Studies  
and History 








I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including 
any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. 




















The history of the Commonwealth is vast and multifaceted. It touches on myriad fields, actors, 
and eras, and reaches from the local to the global. Amidst the Gordian knot of Commonwealth 
history this thesis is about understanding the organisational history of the Commonwealth on its 
own terms, rather than as a derivative topic of other fields. Building on the premise that the 
Commonwealth today is an international organisation (IO), this thesis argues that the 
Commonwealth transitioned from an imperial club to an international organisation in the 1960s, 
hinging on the creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1965. The creation and subsequent 
growth of the Secretariat was negotiated between the “expansionist” members who viewed the 
Commonwealth as an international organisation and argued for a strong, expanded Secretariat, 
and the “restrictionist” members who opposed Secretariat growth. The Secretary-General and his 
staff were a third group of actors that mediated between the expansionists and restrictionists and 
pursued a vision for the organisation that would appeal to all members. The weight of this 
project rests on case studies in logistics, membership applications, the Rhodesian crisis, and 
Commonwealth technical cooperation. These topics help foreground how the transition from club 
to IO took place. Through these case studies I argue that the management of Commonwealth 
meetings decisively influenced the future of the organisation and was instrumental in the 
expansionists’ vision of the Commonwealth as an IO prevailing by 1970. The debates and 
decisions of Commonwealth meetings are well known, but the process of planning and managing 
those meetings has shaped the evolution of the Commonwealth as much, if not more than the 
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”The more severe international stresses may prove to be from time to time – and there will be 
stresses also in the future – the greater, I suggest, is the need for bridge-building institutions and 
associations to try to resolve them. Our basic need is to learn to share the world.  
You can’t opt out of the planet.” 
 
 




The Commonwealth is one of the world’s largest international bodies with 52 member nations 
representing some 2.4 billion people. It is one of the oldest international entities and 
encompasses a vast diversity of histories, geographies, and peoples. Its members share goals 
such as development, democracy, and peace, and are supported by more than 80 affiliated 
intergovernmental, professional, and civil organisations.
1
  With such a broad scale, the 
Commonwealth itself is difficult to define. Margaret P. Doxey most succinctly describes the 
organisation as “a conglomerate of structured and unstructured official and unofficial 
relationships of a political, economic and cultural nature,” adding that that conglomerate has a 
symbiotic relationship with a physically manifested Secretariat.
2
 Arnold Smith, the 
organisation’s first Secretary-General, reflected that “almost everything about it [the 
organisation] is hard to define for the excellent reason that the Commonwealth itself is hard, or 
indeed impossible to define.”
3
  
Reflecting on her work with the Commonwealth Oral History Project in 2017, Sue Onslow 
variously described the Commonwealth as a diplomatic actor, an institution, an association, and a 
fluid concept, while also juxtaposing the Commonwealth with other international summits, 
organisations, and regional groups.
4
 With these various descriptors, Onslow echoed both the 
accounts of the project participants and an ongoing historiographical discussion about what the 
Commonwealth actually is.  
                                                             
1 “About Us,” The Commonwealth, last modified 2020, http://thecommonwealth.org/about-us.  
2 Margaret P. Doxey, The Commonwealth Secretariat and the Contemporary Commonwealth (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1989), 12. 
3 Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Arnold Smith Fonds, MG 31 E 47, Commonwealth Series, Volume 1, File 8 
“Diary 20-28 Jan 1966,” The Political Use of the Commonwealth: Verbatim Transcript of a lunch-time lecture given 
at the Royal Commonwealth Society on Thursday, 20th January, 1966. 
4 Sue Onslow, “Voices of the Commonwealth: An Oral History of the Modern Commonwealth 1965-2012,” The 
Round Table 106, no. 1 (2017), 47, 50, 51, 57. 
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Discussion aimed at defining the Commonwealth and vignettes (as the one above) describing 
how difficult the organisation is to define have become standard features of Commonwealth 
historiography. These two historiographical features originated in works speculating about the 
future of the Commonwealth in the 1960s and have persisted because the Commonwealth 
continued to change so much through the 20
th
 century. As Lorna Lloyd notes, the interwar years 
were a period of “real, fundamental change” which saw the shift from Empire to 
Commonwealth, only to be followed by a further period of “radical change” from 1945 to 1952.
5
 
Lloyd argues that up to the mid-twentieth century, the Commonwealth had only ever been a 
reflection of transition, rather than stability, and that as a legacy of the British Empire it was “a 
species of international organisation, [though] not a uniquely well-integrated and cosy 
association of a familial kind.”
6
 In her subsequent work on the Commonwealth Office of High 
Commissioner, Lloyd characterises the Commonwealth as having transitioned from a small, 
intimate club in the 1950s to a larger, noisier, less-homogenous association by the 1980s.
7
 
Through these three works, Lloyd echoes the definitional ambiguity outlined by Onslow, noting 
that at different times the Commonwealth could be characterised as something an imperial club, 
a type of an international organisation (IO), or a loose association, depending on the era in 
question and the stance of the historian. Lloyd’s emphasis of change in the Commonwealth 
underscores the need for definitional discussion when studying the history of the organisation, 
but also suggests a basic evolutionary progression from imperial club to either a loose 
international association, or a more formal international organisation.  
                                                             
5 Lorna Lloyd, “Loosening the Apron Strings: The Dominions and Britain in the Interwar Years,” The Round Table 
92, no. 369 (2003), 279; Lorna Lloyd, “Britain and the Transformation from Empire to Commonwealth: The 
Significance of the immediate post-war years,” The Round Table 86, no. 343 (1997): 350.  
6 Lloyd, “Britain and the Transformation from Empire to Commonwealth, 333.  
7 Lorna Lloyd, Diplomacy with a Difference: The Commonwealth Office of High Commissioner, 1880-2006 (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 264.  
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Of the interpretations of Commonwealth evolution exemplified in Lloyd’s works, this thesis 
argues that the Commonwealth evolved from an imperial club to an international organisation 
rather than a loose network or association. The bulk of this project focuses on how that evolution 
took place. However, before further outlining this project, it is worth tracing the origins of these 
definitional debates to better place this project in the wider field of Commonwealth 
historiography. To that end, works by the eminent Commonwealth historian W. David McIntyre 
are particularly useful.  Not only are McIntyre’s works a wealth of information about these 
changes through the history of the Commonwealth, but they can also be used to chart 
historiographical currents since the 1960s. The evolution of McIntyre’s own thinking about the 
Commonwealth is particularly constructive in outlining the definitional conventions of 
Commonwealth history.   
McIntyre’s 1966 book Colonies into Commonwealth was written as many changes in the 
Commonwealth were still unfolding. In that volume McIntyre asked what the Commonwealth 
was in the 1960s, and answered that it was a loose voluntary association of states.
8
 McIntyre’s 
answer echoed both Commonwealth rhetoric and contemporary historians such as the great 
Commonwealth historian Nicholas Mansergh.
9
 Colonies into Commonwealth also responded to 
contemporary public debates about the future of the Commonwealth. McIntyre echoed questions 
raised in works by Australian statesman Lord Casey and British political writer Guy Arnold. 
Both Casey and Arnold sought solutions to the perceived stagnation of the Commonwealth. 
These writers also echoed older definitions of the Commonwealth from the interwar period and 
underscored a concept of the Commonwealth as a voluntary association of nations evolved from 
                                                             
8 W. David McIntyre, Colonies into Commonwealth (London: Blandford Press, 1966), 338-339. 
9 Nicholas Mansergh, The Commonwealth and the Nations: Studies in British Commonwealth Relations (London: 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948), 25; Shridath Ramphal, “The Second Commonwealth of Nations,” The 





 Both Casey and Arnold argued that the Commonwealth was a British 
legacy and that it would need British leadership in order to play any significant role in world 
politics.
11
 Although McIntyre was not prescriptive in his analysis, he agreed with Casey and 
Arnold that as of 1965 the Commonwealth had no clear purpose but that it had great productive 
potential in world politics.
12
 His 1966 work also echoed politico-legal analyses like those by 
John Holmes and S.A. de Smith by noting that traditional Commonwealth commercial, legal, and 
military links had been eroded, but that the flexibility of the Commonwealth was proving to be 
one of its greatest strengths.
13
 In 1966 McIntyre reiterated traditional definitions of the 
Commonwealth, but he also brought his analysis up to the present and incorporated discussion 
from political and legal commentators.  
Published just over a decade later, McIntyre’s next book, The Commonwealth of Nations: 
Origins and Impact (1977) maintained many of the major historical arguments put forward by 
his contemporaries. McIntyre again echoed Mansergh, who had maintained in his 1969 book The 
Commonwealth Experience that the mid-1960s had constituted the climax of decolonisation and 
an age of British disillusionment with the Commonwealth.
14
 In characterising phases of 
                                                             
10 The Rt. Hon. Lord Casey, The Future of the Commonwealth (London: Frederick Muller Limited, 1963), 26; Guy 
Arnold, Towards Peace and a Multiracial Commonwealth (London: Chapman & Hall Ltd, 1964), 79.  
11 Casey, The Future of the Commonwealth 17, 19-20, 26; Arnold, Towards Peace and a Multiracial 
Commonwealth, 20, 24, 78, 143.  
12 McIntyre, Colonies into Commonwealth, 340, 358. 
13  Ibid., 338, 343, 349, 353; John Holmes, “The Impact on the Commonwealth of the Emergence of Africa,” 
International Organization 16, no. 2 Africa and International Organization (Spring 1962), 293, 301; S.A. de Smith, 
The New Commonwealth and its Constituents (London: Stevens & Sons, 1964), 36; See also:. W.B. Hamilton, 
Kenneth Robinson, and C.D.W. Goodwin , eds. A Decade of the Commonwealth, 1955-1964 (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1966), vi;  John Holmes, “The Commonwealth and the United Nations,” in A Decade of the 
Commonwealth, 1955-1964, eds. W.B. Hamilton, Kenneth Robinson, and C.D.W. Goodwin (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1966), 364. 
14 Nicholas Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, Volume Two: From British to Multiracial Commonwealth, 
Revised Edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 188.  
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Commonwealth evolution he characterised 1966-69 as a phase of disillusionment.
15
 McIntyre 
also agreed with J.D.B. Miller’s 1974 iteration of the Survey of Commonwealth Affairs in which 
the latter emphasised the importance of changing relationships between Commonwealth 
members through the 1960s as a key theme of the organisation’s overall evolution.
16
  
However, in 1977 McIntyre also further developed an idea he had first put forward in 1966. In 
particular, he maintained that the formation of the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1965 was the 
most significant development in the history of the modern Commonwealth. He elaborated that 
the formation of the Secretariat had ushered in the modern Commonwealth by providing a centre 
for many disparate aspects of Commonwealth affairs.
17
 This contrasted with Miller’s 
interpretation which held that the formation of the Secretariat was significant as a centrifugal 




McIntyre’s focus on the role of the Commonwealth Secretariat echoed more political works like 
those by Tom Soper, B. Vivekanandan, and Derek Ingram, which focused on the operations and 
future of the Commonwealth and maintained that the Commonwealth had fully evolved from an 
imperial club to a voluntary international association.
19
 These authors still maintained that the 
Commonwealth was a voluntary association born of empire but their works focused on the 
                                                             
15 W. David McIntyre, The Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and Impact, 1869-1971 (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1977), 449-450. 
16 J.D.B. Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Expansion and Attrition, 1953-1969 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1974), 412-417; McIntyre, The Commonwealth of Nations, 7.  
17 McIntyre, Colonies into Commonwealth, 353; The Commonwealth of Nations, 6, 471.  
18 Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, 416-417. 
19 Tom Soper, Evolving Commonwealth (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1965), 121; B. Vivekanandan, “The 
Commonwealth Secretariat,” International Studies 9, no. 3 (July 1967): 301; Derek Ingram, The Commonwealth at 
Work (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1969), 14; McIntyre, The Commonwealth of Nations, 4, 7. 
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“machinery” of the Commonwealth and the practical workings of the Secretariat.
20
 Such political 
analyses opened the door to new interpretation s of the Commonwealth. Drawing on De Smith’s 
1964 argument that the Commonwealth was a loose knit international organisation with certain 
unique characteristics, in 1971 M. Margaret Ball introduced a “study of the Commonwealth of 
Nations as an International organization rather than an inquiry into decolonization as it pertains 
to the British Empire.”
21
 In her book, The “Open” Commonwealth, Ball posited that the 
Commonwealth was no longer a constitutional organisation as it had been in the past and was 
now an international organisation “of a traditional sort.”
22
 Ball noted that recent advances in 
political science were moving away from older definitions of international organisations 
(requiring that such organisations have a constitution, for example), and instead emphasising 
international systems and subsystems. With a systemic definition based on well-defined 
operational mechanisms, she argued that the Commonwealth could be considered an 
international organisation.
23
 Much of Ball’s work was descriptive and described the operations of 
the Commonwealth with a new definitional lens, but her overriding conclusion was that the 
Commonwealth was not an exclusive organisation and would likely develop along the lines of 
other international organisations.
24
 Ball’s arguments reflected Secretary-General Arnold Smith’s 
view that the Commonwealth was a complementary rather than exclusive organisation, and she 
made a compelling analytical case for the Commonwealth as an IO.
25
 
                                                             
20 Vivekanandan, “The Commonwealth Secretariat,” 323; Ingram, The Commonwealth at Work, 1, 14, 20; see also: 
Andrew Walker, The Commonwealth: A New Look (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1978), 2. 
21M. Margaret Ball, The “Open” Commonwealth (Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 1971), v. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 33.  
24 Ibid., 201, 246. 
25 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 2, File 10 “Diary June 1967,” Notes for address by Mr. Arnold Smith, 
Commonwealth Secretary-General, to the Annual Conference of the Commonwealth Press Union, Marlborough 
House, London, 13 June, 1967.  
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The Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and Impact, reflects the influence of political scientists 
on McIntyre through the 1970s. By 1977, his work differed from other historical works like 
those by Mansergh and Miller by shifting focus away from the United Kingdom in favour of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat. For example, while in 1974 Miller’s work focused on the 
Secretariat’s impact on the Commonwealth Relations Office through the 1960s, McIntyre 
focused on the Secretariat’s impact on Commonwealth relations more broadly and afforded more 
attention to the hitherto overlooked administrative needs of the Commonwealth.
26
 While 
McIntyre himself did not argue that the Commonwealth was an international organisation, he 
embraced Ball’s argument that the Commonwealth was an “open” organisation and he felt that 
her characterisation aptly described the “return of realism” he proposed took place in 
Commonwealth relations between 1969 and 1971.
27
 In the 1970s McIntyre’s work was shifting 
to reflect a broader interest of political analysts of the workings of the Commonwealth (and the 
Commonwealth Secretariat in particular) in its own right, rather than as an extension of British 
imperial history.  
In his 1991 work The Significance of the Commonwealth, McIntyre more fully accepted the work 
of political analysts. In contrast to contemporary imperial historians like L. J. Butler, who 
continued to assert that the Commonwealth was a voluntary association, McIntyre himself 
argued that with the establishment of the Secretariat the Commonwealth had become an 
international organisation.
28
 He noted that the Commonwealth “has a symbolic head, an agreed 
membership, a Secretariat and Secretary-General, principal and subordinate organs and agencies, 
budgets, a legal personality, diplomatic privileges and immunities. Through an impressive series 
                                                             
26 McIntyre, The Commonwealth of Nations, 454.  
27Ibid., 456, 473.  
28 L.J. Butler, Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World (London: I.B. Taurus & Co., 2002), 188. 
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of declarations, it has well publicized purposes and principles” although it still did not have a 
charter.
29
 McIntyre echoed M. Margaret Ball’s argument from 20 years prior and restated his 
ongoing argument that the formation of the Secretariat was “the single most important landmark 
in the evolution of the Modern Commonwealth.
30
  
The shift in McIntyre’s thinking between 1977 and 1991 reflected changes in the field of 
imperial and Commonwealth history, but also developments in political science. As noted by 
David Fieldhouse in 1984, imperial history was undergoing a period of fragmentation with more 
attention being paid to national histories within the former British Empire.
31
 While Fieldhouse 
asserted that there was still much to be studied in “the ‘area of interaction’ between the 
component parts [namely center and periphery] of imperial systems,” he nonetheless bemoaned 
the fragmentation of the field and asked whether it could be put together again.
32
  McIntyre 
continued to produce some of the most authoritative historical research on the Commonwealth, 
but he also incorporated the ideas of non-historians who argued that the Commonwealth was an 
IO.
33
  For example, in The Significance of the Commonwealth McIntyre discussed the works of 
Stephen Chan and A.N. Papadopoulos, two former Secretariat staff members whose works 
focused on the Secretariat itself.
34
 Like McIntyre, Papadopoulos maintained that the Secretariat 
was of central importance to the Commonwealth, and sought to document the workings of 
                                                             
29 W. David McIntyre, The Significance of the Commonwealth, 1965-90 (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 
vii, 4. 
30 Ibid., 8.  
31 David Fieldhouse , “Can Humpty-Dumpty be put Together Again? Imperial History in the 1980s,” The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 12, no. 2 (1984), 10.  
32 Ibid., 11. 
33 See for example, McIntyre’s engagement with works by Michael O’Neill who argues that Commonwealth-as-IO 
was fact as of the 1980s. See: Michael O’Neill, “Militancy and Accommodation: The Influence of the Heads of 
Government Meetings on the Commonwealth, 1960-1969,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12, no. 3 
(1983), 211; Michael O’Neill, “Continuity without Consensus: the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings, 
1971-81,”' in Commonwealth in the 1980’s: Challenges and Opportunities, eds. A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1984): 185-224; McIntyre, The Significance of the Commonwealth, 273. 





 Works by Stephen Chan were even more influential on McIntyre’s 
argument of the Commonwealth as an IO. In his 1988 book, The Commonwealth in World 
Politics, Chan made a strong case that structurally, the Commonwealth had evolved into an IO.
36
 
Chan further developed these arguments the following year. Citing the International Law 
Commission’s definition of an international organisation, he argued that the Commonwealth had 
become an IO by the mid-1980s. According to the International Law Commission, an 
international organisation had “a distinct international personality and an ability to take 
independent initiatives on behalf of its members and in its own name.”
37
 This definition was the 
basis for Chan’s unambiguously titled article “The Commonwealth as an International 
Organisation,” in which he explored how the Commonwealth as an organisation functioned in its 
relations with South Africa.  
McIntyre’s 1991work also heavily relied on Margaret P. Doxey’s thoroughly detailed account of 
the formation of the Commonwealth Secretariat.
38
 Rather than a strictly historical account, 
Doxey sought to fill gaps in both the historical and international relations literature by making 
the case for the Commonwealth as an IO. Such an analysis, she hoped, would serve as a basis for 
more constructive comparisons between IOs (including the Commonwealth) in the field of 
political science.
39
 McIntyre’s 1991 characterisation of the Commonwealth as an IO directly 
                                                             
35 See: A.N. Papadopoulos, Multilateral Diplomacy within the Commonwealth: A Decade of Expansion (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1982).  
36 Stephen Chan, The Commonwealth in World Politics: A Study of International Action, 1965-1985 (London: Lester 
Crook Academic Publishing, 1988), 15. 
37 Stephen Chan, “The Commonwealth as an International Organization: Constitutionalism, Britain and South 
Africa,” The Round Table 78, no. 312 (1989), 393; Giorgio Gaja, “Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations: Introductory Note,” Audiovisual Library of International Law, last modified 9 December, 2011, 
https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ario/ario.html; Michael Palliser also argues that by the mid-1980s the Commonwealth 
had undergone a fundamental change, although Palliser asserts that the Commonwealth was more of a regional 
organisation than anything else. See: Michael Palliser, “Diplomacy Today,” in The Expansion of International 
Society, eds., Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 378. 
38 See: McIntyre, The Significance of the Commonwealth, 270-291.  
39 Doxey, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 4-5. 
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echoed Doxey’s own conclusion that even though it lacked a charter the Commonwealth had a 
“basic set of traits which bring it well within the definition of an international organisation.”
40
 
Much of Doxey’s work was descriptive (much like M. Margaret Ball’s 1974 book), and focused 
on the structure and functions of the Secretariat, and related to McIntyre’s own interest in the 




The influences evident in The Significance of the Commonwealth reflected a sense of crisis in 
imperial history during the 1980s, but also reflected that advances in imperial and 
Commonwealth history were taking place in other academic fields and disciplines.
42
 Throughout 
his career McIntyre remained in-tune with contemporary political analyses and incorporated 
them into his historical works. In 1966’s Colonies into Commonwealth, McIntyre advanced his 
analysis of Commonwealth history to include the formation of the Commonwealth Secretariat 
which had only occurred the year before. In the 1980s he remained attuned to political analyses 
that were exploring new perspectives on the history of the Commonwealth, including the 
argument that it was an international organisation.     
Up to the turn of the millennium McIntyre continued to reflect both historiographical trends, and 
influences from political science. In his 1998 book on British decolonisation he again argued that 
the Commonwealth had evolved into a multilateral international organisation.
43
 In 1998 and 
2000 he wrote two further articles respectfully expounding on the Canadian and British roles 
                                                             
40 Ibid., 5; McIntyre, The Significance of the Commonwealth, 4. 
41 Doxey, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 42, 134; McIntyre, The Significance of the Commonwealth, 52, 56. 
42 Dane Kennedy, “The Imperial History Wars,” Journal of British Studies 54 (January 2015), 7-8.  
43 W. David McIntyre, British Decolonization, 1946-1997: When, Why and How did the British Empire Fall? (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 119. 
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creating the Secretariat. 
44
 Yet McIntyre’s arguments about the Commonwealth as an IO were 
scaled back in his 2001 work A Guide to the Contemporary Commonwealth. In this book 
McIntyre took a more general approach and argued that “in the broad historical perspective, the 
Commonwealth changed, during the middle third of the century, from being a small, white, 
imperial club to a large multicultural, multilateral, international association.
45
 The shift from his 
previous stronger assertions that the Commonwealth was an international organisation again 
reflected the trend in the literature on the Commonwealth, including ambivalence over the future 
of the Commonwealth and the functions of imperial history.  
McIntyre’s shift to a looser definition of the Commonwealth coincided with historiographical 
developments of the 2000s. Dane Kennedy has described the historiographical developments of 
this period as the “imperial history wars,” denoting a protracted, transatlantic debate about the 
nature and use of British imperial and Commonwealth history.
46
 These debates were closely tied 
to British and American politics and often pitted celebrants of empire against critics and those 
pursuing the “new imperial history” which injected postcolonial theory, sex and gender, and 
cultural interpretations into the field of British imperial and Commonwealth history. Antoinette 
Burton’s 2003 work After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and Through the Nation , for 
instance, emphasised the Imperial Turn as “the accelerated attention to the impact of histories of 
imperialism on metropolitan societies in the wake of decolonization, pre- and post-1968 racial 
struggle and feminism in the last quarter century.”
47
 The new imperial history and the imperial 
history wars answered David Fieldhouse’s 1984 question by showing that the Humpty Dumpty 
                                                             
44 See: W. David McIntyre, “Britain and the Creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat,” The Journal of Imperial 
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fragments of imperial history could be put together again, and could even be marshalled into a 
role in contemporary politics.
48
  
Reflecting on these developments in 2007, S.R. Ashton felt that “Imperial and Commonwealth 
history continues as a thriving subject but historians of the Commonwealth as an idea, a 
movement or an organisation are nowadays rather thin on the ground. It seems as if David 
McIntyre has been a lone torch-bearer for several years.”
49
 Ashton’s observation, and 
McIntyre’s somewhat vague description of an international association in 2001 brings to mind 
Lloyd’s varied descriptions of the Commonwealth a species of IO or some sort of association.
50
 
As imperial histories again took centre stage in the first decade of the 2000s, such definitional 
uncertainty became a more prominent feature of Commonwealth histories. For instance, David 
Armstrong argued in 2001 that the Commonwealth had most certainly become an 
intergovernmental organisation with the formation of the Secretariat, but that it was not clear 
what kind of intergovernmental organisation it was or whether it still had any sort of purpose.
51
 
Armstrong elaborated on this uncertainty in a collaborative book project with Lorna Lloyd and 
John Redmond in 2004 by citing the Commonwealth as an example of an intergovernmental 
organisation that had lived past its original purpose.
52
  
Yet Armstrong, Lloyd, and Redmond otherwise excluded the Commonwealth from their broad 
theoretical study of international organisations. Other writers that decade agreed that the 
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Commonwealth was some sort of IO, but that its original purpose was tied to the British Empire. 
James Mayall characterised the Commonwealth as an IO that was a “happy accident” borne of 
the dying embers of the British Empire.
53
 Former Secretariat staffer Krishnan Srinivasan also 
argued that the Commonwealth was designed by Britain to ease the loss of empire and 
speculated that without British leadership it would fade away.
54
 S.R Ashton also focused on 
British Government perspectives of the Commonwealth during the 1960s in particular and 
agreed, as many authors had done in the 1960s, that British interest and engagement was central 
to the history of the Commonwealth.
55
 
The historiographical landscape in the past decade thus includes a wide variety of topics with 
comparatively little focus on the Commonwealth as an institution or organisation. Contemporary 
works echo their predecessors like Mansergh or Miller by connecting Commonwealth history to 
the history of the British Empire, although with much less Whiggish conclusions. For example, 
Carl Watts’ 2012 study on Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence reasserted the case 
for the Commonwealth as an IO, but did so in dialogue with developments in Rhodesia.
56
 Works 
published in 2019 by Johnathan Fennel and by Richard T. Ashcroft and Mark Bevir respectively 
focus on Commonwealth military forces during the Second World War, and the theory and 
practice of multiculturalism in the postwar Commonwealth.
57
 While these works contribute to 
Commonwealth history, they do so in relation to other themes, case studies, and topics under the 
                                                             
53James Mayall, “Introduction” in The Contemporary Commonwealth: An Assessment, 1965-2009, ed. James Mayall 
(London: Routledge, 2010), 3. 
54 Krishnan Srinivasan, The Rise, Decline and Future of the British Commonwealth (Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 1, 107, 159-160. 
55 Ashton, “British Government Perspectives,” 7. 
56 See: Carl Peter Watts, Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence: An International History (Houndmills, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
57 Jonathan Fennell, Fighting the People’s War: The British Commonwealth Armies and the Second World War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Richard T. Ashcroft and Mark Bevir, eds. Multiculturalism in the 




broad umbrella of imperial and Commonwealth history. Philip Murphy’s most recent book, The 
Empire’s New Clothes, is perhaps one of the only recent books on the history of the 
Commonwealth as a standalone topic. Even so, as Murphy’s title suggests, this work is in 
dialogue with the Commonwealth’s imperial origins and the contemporary implications of how 
those origins are remembered and represented today.
58
 
Although the debates of the imperial history wars have produced “intense and immensely 
productive engagement in the history of British imperialism” in the past two decades, the 
resurgent attention given to the British Empire’s place in history clearly corresponds with a 
decrease in histories about the Commonwealth in its own right.
59
 McIntyre’s own works have 
shifted focus to case studies under the umbrella of imperial and Commonwealth studies rather 
than focusing on the Commonwealth as a topic unto itself.
60
 Saul Dubow and Richard Drayton’s 
forthcoming edited volume Commonwealth History in the Twenty-First Century actively adopts 
“oblique de-centred, approaches to Commonwealth history” and “focusses less on the 
Commonwealth as an institution than on the relevance and meaning of the Commonwealth to its 
member countries and peoples.”
61
 
Organisational histories of the Commonwealth are particularly rare as they fall at the intersection 
of history and political science. As Edward Ingram argued in 1997:”[w]hereas political scientists 
(standing aloof from the material they propose to organize) theorise first and then illustrate the 
theory, historians usually plunge in, then try to explain where they are, what is going on, and 
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how they might explain what they have seen. Sometimes they turn to the political scientist for 
help, but whenever they do, they place themselves at risk of catching the disease of backward 
projection.”
62
 The methodological difference between historians and political scientists are clear 
in the arguments that influenced David McIntyre’s bibliography over the past 60 years. Works 
by political scientists tracing the Commonwealth backwards from the present have generally 
concluded that the Commonwealth is an IO, whereas historians tracing the history of the British 
Empire have generally maintained that the Commonwealth is some sort of association (per its 
original definition).  
The differences between these disciplinary stances and how they have been incorporated into 
definitional debates about the Commonwealth are important contextual referents for this study. 
Like Murphy or Ashcroft and Bevir, this thesis traces a single theme through Commonwealth 
history. However, rather than responding to contemporary political debates about the 
Commonwealth as Murphy does, this project responds to the definitional questions exemplified 
by Onslow and Lloyd and evident through McIntyre’s bibliography. Of the various potential 
definitions of the Commonwealth (including an imperial club, a type of IO, a voluntary 
association, a diplomatic actor, an institution, and a fluid concept), I agree with McIntyre’s 1991 
assessment and Carl Watt’s more recent case that the Commonwealth evolved into an 
international organisation.
63
 Of the features of an IO observed by McIntyre, Doxey, Chan, and 
Ball since 1971, the Commonwealth maintains “a symbolic head, an agreed membership, a 
Secretariat and Secretary-General, principal and subordinate organs and agencies, budgets, a 
legal personality, diplomatic privileges and immunities… [and] well publicized purposes and 
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 In a sense verifying M. Margaret Ball’s 1971 prediction, the Commonwealth has 
continued to develop along the lines of other traditional international organisations.
65
 In 2013, 
the Commonwealth adopted its own charter, thus resolving the central definitional caveat about 
the Commonwealth’s status as an IO.
66
 In the most basic sense, the abductive reasoning of the 
classic duck test applies. If it looks, functions, and is structured like an international organisation, 
it is probably an international organisation.  
Classifying the Commonwealth as an international organisation is more than a point of 
historiographical nomenclature. The idea of the Commonwealth-as-IO helps address the 
aforementioned lack of dedicated studies on the Commonwealth itself. Rather than a derivative 
topic of political science, the history of the British Empire, decolonisation, or members’ national 
histories, the Commonwealth-as-IO begets a focus on the development of the organisation itself. 
By focusing on the organisational history of the Commonwealth this project draws from the 
interdisciplinary methods outlined by David McIntyre and Carl Watts. McIntyre’s work draws 
from literature in political science and incorporated the most from political science in the wake 
of an ostensive slump in imperial and Commonwealth history in the 1980s. Watts more 
intentionally emphasises his combination of traditional international history and IR theory.
67
 In 
both cases these authors source valuable analytical frameworks from political science while 
grounding their work in historical perspective so as to avoid the “disease” of backward 
projection characterised by Ingram.     
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Beyond the premise that the Commonwealth today is an IO, this study focuses on how the 
evolution from imperial club to international organisation took place. In doing so, this thesis 
builds on McIntyre and Watts’ approaches, and adds a new dimension to traditional histories of 
the Commonwealth in the 1960s.  
This project expands on McIntyre’s focus on the centrality of the Commonwealth Secretariat by 
focusing on the practical formation of the Secretariat. McIntyre has extensively detailed the 
decision making process behind the Secretariat and the major contours of its formation. This 
thesis goes further to look at the practical administrative details that shaped the Secretariat’s 
formation and the Secretariat’s subsequent expansion and management of Commonwealth 
meetings. Ultimately, this project focuses on the administrative management of the 
Commonwealth and how administrative details influenced the shape of the Commonwealth as 
much as the major events of the day.  
This project also echoes several methodological tools employed by Carl Watts. Watts asserts that 
the Rhodesian crisis constitutes a single case study that can be analysed from multiple theoretical 
perspectives, including international relations theory. He notes however, that at a domestic level, 
there is room for further research on how bureaucratic politics affected the Rhodesian crisis as it 
unfolded through the 1960s and 70s.
68
 This thesis is not centred on interstate relations, nor does 
it wholly focus on the Rhodesian crisis. However, it echoes Watts’s use of case studies to 
illuminate Commonwealth history. Both the Rhodesian crisis and projects of Commonwealth 
cooperation are recurring case studies through this thesis. While this project focuses on 
bureaucratic politics, it differs from Watts’ inter-state framework by asserting the 
Commonwealth Secretariat was an actor in bureaucratic politics in its own right. Thus, beyond 
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domestic bureaucracies, this work responds to Watts calls for further research by highlighting the 
role of the Secretariat in keeping Commonwealth members engaged with one another during the 
early stages of the Rhodesian crisis.   
The Commonwealth may be “hard, or indeed impossible to define” but the definitional debates 
about the nature and origin of the organisation are a productive avenue for exploring imperial 
and Commonwealth history and the history of international relations and organisations.
69
 By 
engaging in these debates, this study complements the existing literature by shedding new light 
on the administrative history of the Commonwealth. In a broader sense this thesis also echoes the 
works of Mark Mazower, Zara Steiner, and Patricia Clavin, who explore the origins of postwar 
international organisations in the imperial context of the early to mid-twentieth century.
70
 This 
study complements theses authors’ work in two main ways. 
First, by tracing the evolution of the Commonwealth from an imperial club to an international 
organisation, this study more firmly links the imperial context of the early twentieth-century with 
the formation of a postwar international community. The Commonwealth is perhaps the only 
international organisation to have undergone such an evolution without significant rupture and 
linking it to the wider history of international organisations highlights a historical connection 
useful to understanding the origins and evolution of the postwar international system.  
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Second, the lens of administrative history adds a further layer of depth to the study of 
international organisations. This project underscores how organisational evolution occurred 
through the day-to-day management of Commonwealth affairs, and demonstrates that even new, 
small member states could exert considerable influence through managerial politicking, and that 
as the Commonwealth Secretariat bureaucracy grew it became an international relations actor in 
its own right. By contributing to longstanding discussions about the nature and origins of the 
Commonwealth, I hope this project will prove useful to scholars interested in both the history of 
the Commonwealth, and the history of international relations and organisations.  
In order to emphasise the organisational history of the Commonwealth, this project relies as 
much as possible on centrally produced Commonwealth records in three main repositories. Prior 
to 1965, Commonwealth materials were produced and managed by the Commonwealth Relations 
Office (CRO), and were intermingled with documents for British eyes only. These records are 
housed in the British National Archives at Kew. Sources produced by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat itself are patchy prior to 1969 when the Secretariat was staffed to the point of 
maintaining its own archives. The Commonwealth Secretariat Library and Archives keep these 
records at Marlborough House, Westminster. During the formation of the Secretariat itself, the 
first Commonwealth Secretary-General, Arnold Smith, reliably kept copies of Commonwealth 
documentation which are now housed with his personal papers at Library and Archives Canada 
in Ottawa. Taken together these sources provide considerable coverage of the Secretariat’s early 
organisational activities and are the core of this project. 
Many of the documents in the aforementioned collections are Western sources drafted by 
Western officials and administrators. While many of these materials stress the perceptions of 
non-Western Commonwealth members, there are clear limitations to the source base. That being 
20 
 
said, this thesis contends that the formation of the Commonwealth Secretariat at the behest of the 
newer, non-Western members helped democratise the operations of the Commonwealth. These 
members trusted the Secretariat to operate in their interests as members, as opposed to British 
management of Commonwealth operations. In consequence, while recognising the limits of these 
materials, for the purposes of this project I take Secretariat-produced documents to more 
accurately represent the stance of former colonies.   
Outline 
This thesis is essentially an administrative history that demonstrates how the Commonwealth 
transitioned from an imperial “club” to an international organisation. Its 12 chapters are 
organised into two parts which hinge on the formation of the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1965. 
By using 1965 as a turning point, I agree with David Armstrong and David McIntyre that the 
formation of the Secretariat was the moment the Commonwealth became an international 
organisation.
71
 Thus, contrary to conventional interpretations of Commonwealth history, the 
beginning of the “modern” Commonwealth was not the London Declaration of 1949 (which 
facilitated South Asian membership after decolonisation).
72
 While the London Declaration was 
an important step in the evolution of the organisation, it did not fundamentally change how the 
Commonwealth functioned. The membership of activist Afro-Caribbean members and small 
states like Cyprus (1960) arguably had more impact on the workings of the Commonwealth.
73
 
However, it was the formation of the Secretariat at the behest of new Afro-Caribbean members 
that changed both the structure and operation of the Commonwealth. These changes marked the 
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transformation of the Commonwealth into an international organisation and thus marked the 
beginning of the modern Commonwealth.  
Part one sets the stage for the transformation of the Commonwealth by tracing the values, 
structures, and actors involved in the formation of the Secretariat. Chapter One looks at the 
mutually constituted values and structures of the Commonwealth up to the late 1950s and 
demonstrates that the London Declaration modified, but did not significantly alter the operation 
of the organisation in the 1950s. Rather, it was African decolonisation and the subsequent 
Commonwealth membership of these new nations that precipitated real change. Chapter Two 
analyses the origin of the Secretariat idea and argues that the vision and activism of African 
members was decisive in the formation of the Secretariat. These members saw the 
Commonwealth as an international organisation and pursued structural changes to match their 
vision. How various members received the Secretariat proposal created two main camps 
(expansionists and restrictionists) among the membership.
74
 Chapter Three shows how the 
process of planning the Secretariat consolidated the aforementioned camps among the members. 
The planning process also brought problems with British management of Commonwealth 
administration to the fore, and foreshadowed conflict between the new Secretariat and the British 
Government. Chapter Four shows how Secretary-General Arnold Smith developed his own 
vision of the Commonwealth that encompassed both expansionist and restrictionist visions of the 
organisation. This chapter demonstrates that Smith and the Secretariat had agency in the debates 
over the direction of the organisation. Smith’s own vision of the Commonwealth and the 
Secretariat’s role both as a mediator between members and an oppositional force to the British 
Government shaped the transition period of the late 1960s.    
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Before outlining the second part of this project, here it isworth noting some definitional 
conventions. Officials in the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) once concisely described 
the two camps discussed in Chapter Two as “expansionists” and “restrictionists.”
75
 This 
characterisation referred to these groups’ respective views on the scope of the proposed 
Secretariat. The restrictionists included the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India. 
These members opposed a strong Secretariat (albeit for differing reasons) and sought to maintain 
the club-like status quo of the 1950s. The expansionists included the growing cadre of newer 
members and Canada. This group advocated for a strong Secretariat and viewed the 
Commonwealth as an international organisation. 
These categories complicate the existing historiography on the Commonwealth as they do not 
match the familiar paradigm of the Old Commonwealth versus the New Commonwealth. The 
exchanged places of India and Canada frustrate the Old versus New Commonwealth binary, just 
as it prevents the use of labels such as the Third World or Global South among the expansionists. 
Nor do these categories support definitions like the “postwar” or “1949” Commonwealth. The 
departure of Burma in 1948, the Irish Free State in 1949 (Newfoundland joined Canada in 1949 
as well), and the eventual departure of South Africa in 1960 frustrate these temporal and regional 
definitions. Among the South Asian members who joined following the London Declaration, the 
Governments of Pakistan and Ceylon sided with the expansionists, while India remained in the 
restrictionist camp.  
Owing to these complexities, for the purposes of this project I retain the CRO’s characterisations. 
Because it represents a relatively constant finite group, unless otherwise indicated, I use the term 
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“restrictionist” or “restrictionist camp” as described above. Among the expansionist group, I 
generally differentiate between the Canadian Government and the “new” or “newer” members. 
The latter group, centred in the Global South, provided the vision for the Commonwealth as an 
international organisation, while the Canadian Government was instrumental in supporting and 
advocating for that vision. The term “expansionist” refers to both Canada and the newer 
members. 
The second part of this dissertation explores how the Commonwealth was transformed from an 
imperial club to an international organisation. That transformation was negotiated between the 
expansionist and restrictionist groups, as well as between the British Government and the 
Secretariat. Chapter Five traces the logistical and administrative formation of the Secretariat 
from 1964. At its core, the practical implementation of the Secretariat involved transferring long 
held administrative functions from the British Government to the new Secretariat. While the 
British Government was generally unenthusiastic about the Secretariat, outright opposit ion was 
concentrated in the governmental departments that had the most traditional authority to lose. The 
management of Commonwealth membership applications was also negotiated between the 
Secretariat and the British Government. Chapter Six details how the formation of the Secretariat 
called into question British management of membership applications.  
Of the Secretariat’s proposed functions, servicing Commonwealth meetings was the most 
important. Consultation during meetings was the “lifeblood” of the organisation, and servicing 
meetings was the most practical way for the Secretariat to impact the evolution of the 
Commonwealth in the widest range of areas (including political and socio-economic affairs). 
Chapters seven through twelve cover a range of case studies in the Secretariat’s management of 
Commonwealth meetings. Chapters seven through nine cover the three Prime Ministers’ 
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Meetings between 1965 and 1969, and focus on meeting logistics, the Rhodesian crisis, and 
proposals for Commonwealth cooperation. These case studies illustrate how meetings were 
central to the expansion of the Secretariat, as well as the push and pull between the expansionists 
and restrictionists, and between the Secretariat and the British Government. Chapter 10 looks at 
the development of Commonwealth Law and Health Ministers’ Meetings and traces the 
expansion of the Secretariat’s responsibilities to include other ministerial meetings. Chapters 11 
and 12 focus on the management of economic meetings (Finance Ministers’ Meetings in 
particular), and trace the establishment of the Commonwealth Technical Assistance Programme. 
These chapters show how the newer members’ vision for the organisation was facilitated by the 
Secretariat and implemented through the Secretariat’s management of Commonwealth meetings. 
The debates and major decisions taken at Commonwealth meetings are well documented. This 
project shows that the management of those meetings was as, if not more important to the future 





Chapter One: Commonwealth Values 
“What matters most, in shaping history are such intangibles as attitudes, values, intuitions, 
motivation, faith. It is in this field that the Commonwealth operates.”
76
 This was the impression 
of Arnold Smith as he settled into his role as the first Commonwealth Secretary-General in the 
spring of 1966. Smith’s emphasis on the intangibles underpinning the Commonwealth reflects 
the importance of those values as the Commonwealth underwent significant changes through the 
1960s. Intangible values were foundational for the Commonwealth. Those values served both as 
aspirational ideals and measures to define and govern the organisation. The transformation of the 
Commonwealth from an imperial association to an international organisation involved 
reinterpreting those values to better suit the vision of the membership regarding what the 
organisation was, and what it should be.        
Commonwealth Values and Structure to 1949 
The values and structures of the early Commonwealth were a product of British imperial 
thought. The six Colonial and Imperial Conferences held between 1887 and 1911 set the basis 
for the idea of the Commonwealth and were couched in terms of imperial patriotism and loyalty 
to the Crown.
77
 The meetings were an occasion for the leaders of the self-governing (white) parts 
of the Empire to discuss matters of common concern in an informal, fraternal setting. In 1897 the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies even rejected the idea of hosting a formal conference so that 
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meetings would keep their personal character, and friendly conversation could occur without the 
subject matter being forced.
78
 Within this informal setting, members could discuss and build 
consensus for joint proclamations or actions rather than voting on such measures. Reflecting on 
the broad scope of discussion at the 1897 meeting, the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
concluded that “undoubtedly the greatest, the most important, and at the same time the most 
difficult of all the subjects which [the meeting] could consider [wa]s the question of the future 
relations, political and commercial, between the self-governing Colonies and the United 
Kingdom.”
79
 Although it was only the third Colonial Conference, by 1897 the themes of 
informal exchange of views on matters of common interest, loyalty to the Crown, and the need 
for better consultative machinery as the self-governing colonies evolved were already prominent. 
These themes were framed in terms of showing the world “the strength, the power, the resources, 
and the loyalty of the British Empire.”
80
 Although the Commonwealth was still not a formally 
defined entity, the above values stressed membership based on imperial loyalty and action based 
on imperial consultation. These values  were also prescriptive in how member consultation 
should be carried out.   
The First World War precipitated a more concrete definition of the Commonwealth that began to 
move beyond the club-like atmosphere of the pre-war meetings. The war was a time of 
unprecedented imperial cooperation but also of unprecedented demands on the self-governing 
Dominions. The idea of the Commonwealth underscored the utility of practical cooperation 
between the self-governing parts of the Empire, while simultaneously expressing the Dominions’ 
reservations about the extent to which they were willing to cooperate in imperial ventures 
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without consultation. Thus, while delegates at the Imperial War Conference of 1917 voiced their 
patriotism and unanimity in prosecuting the war and increasing imperial cooperation, it was with 
the stipulation that reform was needed.  
In 1917 Dominion representatives argued that the shape of imperial consultations “should be 
based upon full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial 
Commonwealth, and of India as an important portion of the same.”
81
 While all parties agreed to 
defer constitutional reform until after the war, the Dominions were no longer willing to 
automatically follow Britain into war, and expected the constitutional changes necessary to 
guarantee their autonomy. At the same time, calls for constitutional reform did not negate the 
abstract ideals of the British Empire. The First World War was the high-water point of the new 
imperialism and all parties wished to consolidate the practical benefits of heightened wartime 
cooperation. 
Pursuant to wartime calls for reform and subsequent discussions at the 1921 and 1923 Imperial 
Conferences, the 1926 Imperial Conference appointed the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee 
under the direction of Lord Arthur Balfour. The Committee’s purpose was to advise imperial 
leaders on the workings of the Empire so that they might develop a legal basis for the anticipated 
constitutional reforms.
82
 However, pre-war imperial cooperation had been conducted as informal 
gatherings emphasising imperial fraternity, patriotism, and loyalty. Pre-war meetings also 
included only the self-governing parts of the Empire, tacitly excluding all non-white 
representatives and certainly not including Indian representatives “as an important portion of the 
                                                             
81 TNA: Cabinet Office [CAB] 32/1/1, Imperial War Conference 1917: Minutes of Proceedings and Papers Laid 
before the conference, 1917. 





 In order to describe inter-imperial relations, the Committee needed to disentangle 
concrete legal measures from the intangible imperial values that had shaped pre-war meetings.  
The Committee’s 1926 report focused on the principles of inter se and external relations for 
different parts of the British Empire, but in exploring those relations, the discussion returned to 
common values. The Balfour Report noted that the Empire could not support a united 
constitution because of its wide geographic spread and the diverse histories of its constituent 
parts.
84
 This included members such as South Africa and Ireland who did not fit the mould of 
Anglo-Saxon fraternity, and India, which had already been identified as a represented, but 
distinct quasi-member. Glossing over these complexities, the report asserted that the British 
Empire had a tendency toward equality and self-governance, and so every self-governing 
member was master of their own destiny.
85
 This characterisation failed to note that the Irish Free 
State had recently gained self-governance through a costly war for independence. The report also 
noted that per the Imperial War Conference, India held an “important position…in the British 
Commonwealth,” but that India’s position had been defined in the 1919 Government of India 
Act and would therefore not be considered in detail by the Committee.
86
  
Despite these omissions, the Balfour Report served to highlight the initial values of the 
Commonwealth. It emphasised the self-governing Dominions and the values of loyalty and 
freedom. Within the ad hoc structure of the British Empire, the Commonwealth was thus made 
up of autonomous communities, equal in status, in no way subordinate to each other in domestic 
or external affairs. Members were freely associated, and united by their common allegiance to 
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the Crown (which rendered Britain primus inter pares).
87
 Those values were both abstract 
guiding principles in British imperial thought as well as a tool to define and govern the 
organisation. In this sense, as Balfour noted in 1926, the Commonwealth “bears no real 
resemblance to any other political organization which now exists or has ever yet been tried.”
88
   
The 1926 report explained that the British Empire’s tendency to promoting freedom was because 
it was not founded on negation, but on “positive ideals.” The Committee claimed that “[f]ree 
institutions are its life blood. Free co-operation is its instrument. Peace, security, and progress are 
among its objects.”
89
 While each self-governing member (Dominion) would remain the sole 
judge of the degree to which they would cooperate, the Committee felt that this would not 
undermine common cause. The recommendations of the report were that the emergent 
Commonwealth would need flexible machinery, and that interpersonal contact between member 
prime ministers should be fostered to supplement Imperial Conferences.
90
  
The 1926 report (published as the Balfour Declaration the same year) set the definitional 
foundation of the Commonwealth. According to the Balfour Declaration, the Commonwealth 
was a free association of historically and geographically diverse autonomous and equal states 
within the British Empire. While united by common allegiance to the Crown, they shared a 
commitment to “positive ideals” such as free institutions, free cooperation, peace, security, and 
progress, which could be facilitated with flexible machinery and frank interpersonal 
communication between heads of government.
91
 The report echoed the pre-war values-based 
rhetoric of loyalty, personal contact, free discussion and cooperation. Those values were meant 
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to serve as both unifying ideals, and foundational principles for the structural realities of the 
Commonwealth.  
The Inter-Imperial Relations Committee was unable to express the legal basis of the 
Commonwealth without referring to pre-war imperial values. The separation of values and legal 
principles was more successfully achieved in the 1931 Statute of Westminster. The Statute 
contained none of the values-based language of the Balfour Declaration. Rather, the document 
focused entirely on the constitutional development of the Dominions, and defined the 
Commonwealth based on the members’ legal relationships between each other and the Crown, as 
described in the Balfour Declaration.
92
 The Statute gave substance to Dominion autonomy by 
affirming that British legislation would no longer automatically apply to the Dominions. The 
Statute also affirmed by omission the exceptional status of India.
93
 
The Statute of Westminster was a foundational document that is widely cited as the formal origin 
of the (Old) Commonwealth.
94
 The Commonwealth itself considers the 1931 Statute as a key 
point in the origins of the organisation, second only to the London Declaration of 1949. The 
latter is cited in the organisation’s online history as the beginning of the “modern” 
Commonwealth.
95
 The London Declaration accepted Indian, Ceylonese, and Pakistani 
independence and membership, as well as India’s decision to become a republic and remain in 
the Commonwealth. The Declaration also shifted the role of the Crown from constitutionally 
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 After 1949, the British Monarch was the symbolic head of the 
Commonwealth, with the Crown itself a symbol of member cooperation.
97
  
The Statute of Westminster and the London Declaration dealt entirely with legal aspects of the 
Commonwealth. This legal focus was warranted, as self-government and relationship with the 
Crown were the basis for Commonwealth membership. The London Declaration marked a 
significant conceptual shift in the Commonwealth by making possible the membership of non-
white, non-monarchies (though with a token nod to the Crown as head of the organisation). 
However, self-government and a relationship with the Crown were based on the explicit 
assumption of a shared commitment to “positive ideals” and the implicit assumption of 
whiteness. The London Declaration modified the legal relationships outlined in the Statute of 
Westminster in order to accommodate the realities of decolonisation in South Asia. However, the 
London Declaration did not address the values-based rhetoric that informed those legal structures 
in the first place.
98
 
The London Declaration created the multiracial Commonwealth but not the modern 
Commonwealth. Through the 1950s much of the organisational status quo remained the same. In 
the latter half of the 1950s, international opinion was increasingly hostile to colonial empires.
 99
   
The 1955 Bandung Conference and the 1956 Suez Crisis respectively built and bolstered 
anticolonial solidarity and resentment, as well as opposition to Cold War politicking in 
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international fora like the UN.
100
 The context of these international developments underscored 
the need for change in the operations of the Commonwealth, but did not fundamentally alter the 
day to day functioning of the organisation. The core of the Commonwealth was still the older, 
predominantly white Dominions, which remained loyal to the British Crown and aligned with the 
United Kingdom on most policy decisions (with the exception of the Irish Free State, which left 
the Commonwealth in 1949). India had always been represented at Commonwealth meetings in 
its former capacity as a quasi-member. With the decision to become a republic and remain in the 
Commonwealth, and with a certain wariness of British policies, India remained a member of 
distinct status. For the time being the new Dominions of Pakistan and Ceylon retained their ties 
to the British Monarchy as they postured in regional politics with India. The British Government 
continued to plan Commonwealth meetings and to distribute correspondence and information on 
behalf of the membership. So while the London Declaration was an important legal 
development, it changed very little of the practical day-to-day operations of the Commonwealth. 
Adapting Commonwealth Values in the 1950s 
The Statute of Westminster and the London Declaration addressed the legal aspects of 
Commonwealth evolution and opened the door to a wider, multiracial membership. However, 
neither measure addressed the set of values that underpinned those legal structures. 
Consequently, in the early 1950s the Commonwealth could no longer claim the unity of purpose 
and vision it had asserted (with significant oversights) in the first half of the twentieth-century. 
Although the functions of the organisation did not significantly change, through the 1950s there 
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was a concerted effort to reinterpret the values-based rhetoric of the early Commonwealth to 
better reflect and attempt to give purpose to the new, multiracial organisation.
101
  
President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, John Holmes, noted in 1962 that “the 
Commonwealth has always developed by adjusting to circumstances and concocting its theory 
retroactively.”
102
 In order to adapt Commonwealth values to the legal adjustments of the London 
Declaration, Commonwealth prime ministers made the most significant effort to reinterpret 
Commonwealth values at the 1951 Prime Ministers’ Meeting. The 1951 meeting was the first 
after the London Declaration and was the most immediate opportunity to link the organisation’s 
legal basis with its stated values. In addition to the traditional communique, the meeting 
produced a separate Leaders’ Declaration (the first of its kind). The 1951 communique and 
Leaders’ Declaration reprised the language of the Balfour Declaration to define the purpose of 
the postwar Commonwealth.  
In the most general sense, the Prime Ministers echoed the Balfour Declaration by asserting that 
the Commonwealth was foremost committed to pursuing world peace by fostering understanding 
and cooperation, providing security from aggression, and promoting social and economic 
development.
103
 Where Balfour described the geographical breadth and diverse histories of the 
Commonwealth, the 1951 Declaration outlined that the Commonwealth represented nearly one 
quarter of the world’s population on all continents, and elaborated that such diversity included 
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men of many different races, traditions, and creeds.
104
 In 1926 Lord Balfour concluded that the 
Commonwealth bore no resemblance to any other political organisation, past or present.
105
 The 
1951 Declaration also asserted the uniqueness of the Commonwealth and claimed that because of 
its diversity, the organisation was “singularly well constituted to enable it to study and in some 
measure comprehend the vexed questions which beset the world.” The “special knowledge” 
afforded by Commonwealth diversity lent a “special sense of responsibility” to its members that 
was undergirded by a deep faith in the existence of justice in the world.
106
 
The 1951 Leaders’ Declaration was largely an exercise in ideational continuity. The prime 
ministers re-asserted almost verbatim the Balfour Declaration’s claims of Commonwealth 
uniqueness, belief in positive ideals, commitment to free consultation, and joint pursuit of peace, 
security, and progress. The notable exception in 1951 was the prime ministers’ increased 
emphasis on Commonwealth diversity, and a corresponding de-emphasis on loyalty to the 
Crown. This rhetorical shift brought the professed values of the Commonwealth back into line 
with the organisation’s structure, which now afforded full membership to non-white countries. 
The unique diversity of the Commonwealth (rather than loyal, Anglo-Saxon fraternity) was now 
the core tenet that gave substance to the organisation’s claim to champion broader liberal values 
like peace, security, and progress.  
The reconciliation of the Commonwealth’s professed values with its newly multiracial structure 
conformed to postwar realities, but did not alter the basic operations of the organisation in the 
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1950s. The “free consultation” of the Commonwealth was still planned and orchestrated by the 
British Government. The Old Commonwealth continued to support British Cold War policies 
under the banner of a shared commitment to peace, security and progress.
107
 The new South 
Asian members also conformed to pre-existing roles. After partition, Pakistan and Ceylon 
aligned more closely with the Western Bloc as they vied with India in regional politics. In 
Consequence, Pakistan and Ceylon did not upset the status quo of Commonwealth operations.  
Under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru India pursued its own role and spearheaded 
Commonwealth projects in conventional and nuclear disarmament, as well as combatting poverty 
and racism which Indian representatives saw as the causes of international strife.
108
 However, the 
role of India as a distinct member was already long-established. India had been represented as a 
quasi-member since the First World War. Divergent Indian priorities fit the mould of India as a 
distinct member, and tensions between India and its neighbours as well as with apartheid South 
Africa were not enough to overturn broad Commonwealth consensus. For instance, arguments 
between Delhi and Pretoria over the rights of Indians in South Africa had been a feature of 
Commonwealth relations since before the First World War. Those tensions were not new, and 
the lack of resolve between India and South Africa was justified as a difference of opinion 
between Commonwealth members. Such differences even buttressed the organisation’s claims to 
diversity, which held that members need not agree on everything in order to discuss and 
cooperate in matters of common concern.  
This continued organisational status quo was reflected in subsequent statements by the 
Commonwealth prime ministers. The communique of the 1953 Prime Ministers’ Meeting 
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repeated the value of interpersonal contacts between heads of governments, and in all of its 
resolutions pursued peace, security, and economic progress.
109
 The same communique extolled 
the unity of the Commonwealth despite varying interests, circumstances, and differing 
approaches to major world problems.
110
 The 1955 communique again described the 
Commonwealth as a unique association representing all quarters of the globe, many races, 
religions, and peoples, deriving strength from its diversity, yet sharing a common outlook. It was 
an organisation of free and equal members cooperating in the pursuit of peace, liberty, and 
progress. The 1956 communique repeated these themes and again underscored the value of frank 
interpersonal contacts between leaders, in spite of divergent approaches to world problems.
111
 
The official view of the Commonwealth that decade was “the blessed culmination of the virtues 
of the Empire, [and] the triumph of its good instincts over its errors.”
112
  
Despite this rosy official view, the racial hierarchy of the British Empire, which held Asians 
above Blacks (both in Africa and the Caribbean) remained intact. As Frank Gerits notes, Asian 
leaders harboured a certain degree of condescension towards Africa based on their western 
education and the relative lag of decolonisation and development between Asia and Africa. Such 
paternalism affected African engagement in South-South cooperative projects after the 1955 
Bandung Conference and illustrated the persistence of imperially informed racial stereotypes.
113
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The persistence of racial stereotypes even in efforts to promote postcolonial solidarity 
highlighted the imperially-informed Commonwealth status quo of the 1950s.    
The organisational continuity of the Commonwealth in the 1950s belies the significance of the 
London Declaration as the beginning of the modern Commonwealth. The Commonwealth was 
built on intangible values that both define and govern the organisation, yet the organisation’s 
foundational documents (The London Declaration and the Statute of Westminster) did not reflect 
the mutually constitutive nature of the Commonwealth’s values and structure. John Holmes 
correctly identified the Commonwealth modus operandi when he observed that the organisation 
adapted its operations and retroactively updated its theory. However, this characterisation fails to 
note that the operations of the Commonwealth were originally based on theoretical values. The 
failure of Commonwealth leaders to recognise that the values and structures of the 
Commonwealth were mutually constituted meant that updating either facet independently was 
doomed to fail.  
The interdependence of values and structures was clear through the constitutional development 
of the early Commonwealth. Although in 1926 the Committee on Inter-Imperial Relations could 
not describe the structure of the Commonwealth in isolation from its purported values, the 1931 
Statute of Westminster disregarded the values outlined in the Balfour Declaration while setting 
the legal basis of the Old Commonwealth. The London Declaration of 1949 attempted to update 
the legal structure of the Commonwealth as laid out in the Statute of Westminster and also did 
not account for the values that informed the 1931 Statute. The 1951 Leaders Declaration then 
attempted to update Commonwealth values based on the new legal structure of the 1949 London 
Declaration. However as illustrated in Figure One, the London Declaration was based on legal 
principles that had been mutually constituted with the values laid out in the 1926 Balfour 
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Declaration in the first place. As such, the 1951 Leader’s Declaration slightly shifted the rhetoric 
of Commonwealth values, but did not greatly alter the theoretical composition of the 
organisation.   
 
  
Figure One: Showing the expressed values (top row) and structures (bottom row) of key 
Commonwealth documents.  
The ease with which the values and legal structures of the Commonwealth were adapted to the 
realities of South Asian independence indicates the lack of ideational change inherent in that 
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process. Although the concept of a multiracial Commonwealth had technically been 
implemented, the shift required minimal conceptual work. That conceptual work involved 
relabelling the parameters of membership and the role of the monarchy. However, the central 
place of the monarchy and emphasis on Commonwealth diversity and consultation in the pursuit 
of positive ideals remained the same. The adaptation of Commonwealth values and structures in 
this period changed nothing about the practical operation of the organisation. Consequently, the 
Commonwealth maintained a status quo through most of the 1950s and accomplished very little 
as an organisation during that decade.
114
 Substantive organisational change required the 
simultaneous reconsideration of both values and structures. Such a wholesale change was not 
possible until the racial hierarchy of the British Empire was more concertedly challenged by 
African decolonisation, and the administration of the Commonwealth was removed from British 
control.  
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Chapter Two: The Secretariat Idea 
 British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan famously described African nationalism as a “wind of 
change.” That wind propelled African decolonisation which in turn, dominated Commonwealth 
politics for the following decade and precipitated the simultaneous reconsideration of the values 
and structure of the Commonwealth.
1
 Majority black member states in Africa, and later the 
Caribbean, saw the utility of salvaging what they could from old imperial networks including the 
Commonwealth. However, unlike the South Asian members that joined in the late 1940s, Afro-
Caribbean members had not been represented in the original organisation. States formerly 
comprising British India gained full Commonwealth membership as the culmination of decades 
of quasi-membership.
2
 In contrast, Afro-Caribbean states gained membership as a direct outcome 
of decolonisation often in tandem with majority rule and membership in other international 
organisations. These newer members did not consider Commonwealth membership to be the 
culmination of an evolutionary process but an indication of their status as independent states. In 
consequence, Afro-Caribbean members challenged the Anglo-centric and racially hierarchical 
structure of the organisation and reinterpreted Commonwealth values as akin to the guiding 
principles of other international organisations. The debates around the formation of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat illustrate the challenges to both the values and structure of the 
organisation issued by the newer members in the 1960s.
3
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The idea of a Commonwealth Secretariat was as old as the concept of the Commonwealth itself 
but did not lead to any concrete measures until the 1960s. Advocates for imperial federation, 
such as the Round Table movement called for closer, more centrally administered imperial 
cooperation in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century. The eventual functions of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat were more specifically outlined in a 1905 British proposal for an Imperial Council, 
which included an ancillary permanent commission with a secretariat. A similar Australian 
proposal in 1907 called for a secretariat to coordinate Imperial Conferences and to work closely 
with the Dominions which felt they were being neglected under the broad scope of the Colonial 
Office.
4
 The Canadian Government also took a great deal of initiative in developing the concept 
of the Commonwealth in the interwar period, but none of these measures produced a Secretariat.
5
 
The status quo of Commonwealth operations continued through the 1950s with the British 
Government performing secretarial functions on behalf of the membership.  
The structure of the Commonwealth was not challenged until after the first African member 
(Ghana) joined in 1957.
6
 Ghanaian Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah was an activist. Nkrumah 
considered Ghanaian independence as the product of a hard-won pressure from below. He 
pursued socialist policies and put Ghana on the path to becoming a republic in 1960.
7
 A leading 
Pan-Africanist, Nkrumah saw potential in the Commonwealth but considered the organisation 
secondary to African unity.
8
 More so than India, which already had a distinct place in the 
Commonwealth, the Ghanaian Government under Nkrumah would not abide a Commonwealth 
that was largely operating as it had since the First World War. The London Declaration had 
opened the door for Ghanaian membership but had not changed the operation of the 
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 Ghanaian membership precipitated a reassessment of the values and structures of 
the Commonwealth that culminated with the formation of the Commonwealth Secretariat in 
1965.  
In the interim, the membership and activism of African states (Ghana in 1957 followed by 
Nigeria in 1960) highlighted the racial hierarchy inherent in the Commonwealth’s values and 
structures, and problematised British administration of the organisation. How the 
Commonwealth responded to these challenges set the basis for expansionist and restrictionist 
approaches to the Secretariat when it was proposed in 1964.
10
 In the most immediate case, 
Ghanaian membership in 1957 and Nigerian membership in 1960 helped push South Africa to 
leave the Commonwealth. Through the 1950s, South Africa had joined with other 
Commonwealth leaders in expressing support for the rhetorical values of peace, security, and 
progress fostered by Commonwealth diversity and consultation. However, the South African 
Government remained averse to colonial independence and expanded Commonwealth 
membership.
11
 The escalation of apartheid increasingly put the Union of South Africa at odds 
with other members. South Asian members were committed to combatting racism and the other 
Old Commonwealth members were increasingly embarrassed by their association with South 
Africa. Tensions had always existed between South Asian members and South Africa, but these 
had not been enough to upend the status quo in the 1950s.  
African membership helped alter the status quo of racial relations within the Commonwealth. As 
Kwame Nkrumah later recalled, at the 1960 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting “the 
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Union of South Africa and the whole subject of apartheid came under heavy fire.”
12
 At the Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting the following year, Nigeria was also represented, and added to the strength of 
anti-apartheid sentiment in the Commonwealth. In 1961 “In light of the views expressed on 
behalf of other member Governments and the indications of their future intentions regarding the 
racial policy of the Union Government he [Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd] had decided to 
withdraw his application for South Africa’s continuing membership of the Commonwealth as a 
republic.”
13
 The membership and activism of majority Black African states added weight to 
South Asian antiracism at a time when support for South Africa was waning among the rest of 
the Old Commonwealth. Ultimately, African membership helped preclude South Africa from 
remaining a member long enough to participate in the Secretariat discussions. 
Restrictionists 
The restrictionist group of Commonwealth members (Australia, India, New Zealand, and the 
United Kingdom) had diverse motives for attempting to limit the scope of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat. However, restrictionist members shared an aversion to the changes brought about by 
African membership in the Commonwealth. African decolonisation and Commonwealth 
membership upset the status quo of Commonwealth operations and set precedence for the rapid 
expansion of the organisation in the 1960s. Commonwealth membership more than doubled 
between 1957 and 1964, with the vast majority of the new members from Africa and the 
Caribbean.
14
 These changes affected the restrictionist members’ engagement with the 
organisation. The restrictionist members were uncomfortable with rapid, wholesale change. 
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While they were willing to tweak the operations of the Commonwealth they resisted an 
independent, capable Secretariat.  
The Australian Government supported South Africa’s bid to remain in the Commonwealth in 
1961 and resisted the growth of the Secretariat because it challenged the racial hierarchy of the 
organisation. Such challenges threatened Australian immigration policy vis-à-vis Asia, as well as 
Australia’s own colonial policies in its mandate territories. In the wake of South Africa’s 
departure, the British Government encouraged Australians to reconcile with the new shape of the 
Commonwealth. British officials argued that retaining connections with former colonies could be 
beneficial to both Britain and the rest of the Old Commonwealth.
15
 However, while Canberra 
recognised signs of change, when the Secretariat was proposed in 1964 Australia still preferred 
the “old Anglo-Saxon club” and had deep misgivings about the idea of a multiracial-
Commonwealth, the expansion of the Secretariat, and later, about the new Secretary-General 
personally.
16
 Canberra consistently argued for a small Secretariat with no executive powers that 
could serve only as a clearing house for information to supplement the club-like atmosphere of 
the Commonwealth. In the consultations prior to the establishment of the Secretariat, Australian 
officials explicitly stated that the Commonwealth was not like the United Nations and should not 
be built along the lines of other international organisations.
17
 When the Secretariat was 
established, Australian officials consistently coordinated with the British Government to try to 
keep the Secretariat in check.  
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The restrictionist stance of the Australian Government reflected a deep discomfort with non-
white Commonwealth membership. By mid-1966 Australia had in some capacity opposed every 
major Commonwealth initiative including the expansion of the Secretariat and Commonwealth 
efforts to push for a settlement in Rhodesia (see chapters eight and nine). Secretary-General 
Arnold Smith bemoaned Australian opposition to the ideal of a multi-racial Commonwealth in a 
letter to his brother in June 1966. Smith went so far as to call the Australian Foreign Minister 
Paul Hasluck a “rather stupid reactionary” and expressed his sincere hope that the recent 
retirement of Robert Menzies would result in some change in Australian policy.
18
 In January 
1967 however, Australian antipathy to the Commonwealth remained so entrenched as to become 
excessive even to the British Government. British officials sympathized with Australian unease 
about the Secretariat but argued that Smith’s goodwill with newer Commonwealth members 
could be used to Britain’s own advantage, and therefore they advised the Australian government 
to maintain good terms with the Secretariat.
19
 By 1968, officials in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) described Australian dislike of Smith, the Secretariat, and the 
African members as “widespread and almost pathological,” and increasingly unhelpful.
20
 Of the 
remaining Old Commonwealth members, Australian officials held on to an imperially informed 
concept of the Commonwealth longer than any other member, including Britain.  
In contrast, the Indian Government’s lukewarm reception of the Secretariat was due to wariness 
of external oversight. Having borne the brunt of second class membership in the early decades of 
the Commonwealth, Indian representatives were cautious about any development in the 
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Commonwealth that might suggest British domination by other means.
21
 Much of Jawaharlal 
Nehru’s campaign in 1949 was based on justifying Commonwealth membership to a skeptical 
Indian Constituent Assembly. Perhaps more so than the old Dominions, India was determined to 
ensure its sovereignty in any dealings with the Commonwealth. Nehru was clear that the 
Commonwealth would not impose any limits on Indian sovereignty and that India would remain 
a member because membership was directly beneficial to India and the causes which she wished 
to promote internationally.
22
 More specifically, the Commonwealth was a means to promote 
Indian leadership in the Non-Alignment Movement, including proposals for conventional and 
nuclear disarmament.   
Indian officials echoed Commonwealth values of free consultation, diversity, and organisational 
flexibility but did so with prescribed limits. For example, India opposed the notion that the 
Commonwealth might serve as a tribunal to settle member disputes, as this would give the 
organisation authority above member sovereignty and threaten external intervention in the 
Kashmir dispute with Pakistan.
23
 As the idea of the Commonwealth Secretariat emerged, Indian 
officials aligned more closely with Old Commonwealth leaders than with newer members. In 
Secretary-General Smith’s estimation, “India…wished to see the Secretariat largely as a clerical, 
non-active, inexpensive organisation with no say in political matters.”
24
 The Indian Government 
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opposed any notion of voting or rigid organisational governance and proposed cost saving 
measures that would further reduce the Secretariat’s capacity for political action.
25
   
A cautious and pragmatic approach to the Commonwealth enabled India, particularly under the 
vision of Nehru, to find something to be salvaged in the organisation.
26
 By remaining in the 
Commonwealth, India would not be isolated and would derive benefits from the association.
27
 
As part of his concept of one-worldism, Nehru believed that breaking up international 
associations was foolhardy. He argued that any type of international association that espoused 
discussion, understanding, and cooperation was beneficial for the world and was in the interest of 
peace. Addressing the Constituent Assembly in May 1949 Nehru argued that “it is better to keep 
a co-operative association going which may do good in this world rather than break it. To not use 
such an association would be a loss. Rather, he advocated breaking up the “evil parts” of the 
organisation or anything that would stifle its members.
28
 Nehru’s vision for the Commonwealth 
maintained many of the core tenets set out in the Balfour Declaration but institutionalised a 
certain wariness of external oversight.
29
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The stance outlined by Nehru and carried forward through the 1960s ironically brought Indian 
and Australian stances toward the Secretariat into line. While Australian opposition to a strong 
Secretariat was informed by a commitment to maintaining the white Anglo-Saxon club of old, 
Indian opposition was based on resisting external influence in Indian affairs, and benefitting 
from the Commonwealth as a diplomatic network. Both stances were borne of the Old 
Commonwealth and responded to regional concerns, yet both supported the pre-Secretariat status 
quo set out in 1949.     
Of the restrictionist camp, the Government of New Zealand was the most apathetic about the 
prospect of a Secretariat.
30
 In a broad sense, New Zealand officials were averse to major changes 
in how the Commonwealth was run. Wellington had opposed the reorganisation of the Colonial 
and Commonwealth Relations Offices in the 1950s and in 1964 greeted the idea of the 
Secretariat “without enthusiasm.”
31
 However, the New Zealand Government also saw valuable 
ties in the Commonwealth beyond those with Britain and thought it best to make the most of 
connections with African members.
32
 The Secretariat was also a useful channel to posture in 
regional politics vis-à-vis Australia, which wished to impose strict conditions on the Secretariat. 
Wellington feared that without getting involved in the formation of the Secretariat, the 
organisation might be given a mandate that would not be conducive to New Zealand’s interests.
33
 
Wellington also feared losing representation in favour of Australia in the proposed regional-
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based working group to discuss the Secretariat’s formation.
34
 In early consultations New Zealand 
officials supported the Secretariat in a lukewarm fashion and focused on the need for a better 
defined role for the Secretary-General and a clearer budget.
35
 This support was not from a 
particular sense of enthusiasm for the Secretariat, but for Wellington’s desire to make the most of 
its international connections, to make sure New Zealand’s voice was heard, and to posture vis-à-
vis Australia in its own regional sphere. Moving forward, however, the Government of New 
Zealand passively opposed the expansion of the Secretariat, largely by echoing British arguments 
against a strong Secretariat.  
British concerns about a central Secretariat were reinforced by the experience of decolonisation 
and the Commonwealth’s expanding membership in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Nkrumah’s 
activist approach to the Commonwealth (and Ghanaian international relations more generally) 
alarmed Macmillan’s conservative government, which increasingly considered Nkrumah to be a 
threat to British interests.
36
 Macmillan himself came to dread Commonwealth meetings as he 
anticipated how “troublesome” they would be.
37
 The Conservative government’s concerns over 
the Commonwealth, decolonisation, and the British economy culminated in an “audit” of the 
Empire in 1957 which included financial cost-benefits of colonies, and a review of colonies’ 
eligibility for Commonwealth membership.
38
 The 1957 audit and subsequent discussions 
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between various departments in the British Government encouraged both generalised and 
departmental resistance to the idea of a Commonwealth Secretariat.  
On the heels of the 1957 audit, by 1959 officials in the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) 
recognised that the Commonwealth was effectively an international organisation of independent 
states, though without a secretariat or constitution. The CRO saw itself as an “International 
Secretariat” for the Commonwealth that performed the functions of a secretariat at the members’ 
behest, in addition to furthering the United Kingdom’s interests through bilateral relations with 
the Commonwealth.
39
 However, the CRO had originally been conceived as a diplomatic rather 
than administrative department and CRO officials views of their own department went beyond 
the secretarial services they provided.
40
 Above all, the CRO saw itself as acting as the conscience 
of the Commonwealth, inviting the members to consult on matters of mutual concern. Sir Henry 
Lintott in the CRO argued that “[a]ll this we do, I think, only indirectly as a U.K. interest. It is, of 
course, a U.K. interest to hold the Commonwealth together, but I think that to a large extent, we 
are exercising the functions which a good Secretary-General of an international organisation 
would perform in the interests of the organisation as a whole.”
41
 While this was a clear conflict 
of interest, in 1959 the CRO estimated that most of the Commonwealth would prefer that the 
CRO continue to perform these functions rather than there be any notion of direct leadership in 
the Commonwealth, thus continuing past informal methods.
42
  
Lintott was correct in assuming the majority of Commonwealth members supported the CRO’s 
role as a surrogate secretariat. The organisational status quo had remained unchallenged until the 
admission of Ghana as a full member in 1957. Yet by 1959, apart from South Africa, Ghana was 
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still the only independent African member and remained outspoken on issues of both policy and 
principle.  However, the CRO’s assessment was a defensive measure. The wider Macmillan 
ministry was keen to shed Britain’s colonial commitments in light of increased scrutiny of 
colonial affairs at both Commonwealth and United Nations gatherings, and the low cost-
effectiveness of colonies per the 1957 audit. Following this logic, Sir Norman Brook in the 
Cabinet Office argued that the sharp distinction between British dependencies and 
Commonwealth membership (to which they were entitled upon independence) should be 
reduced, so as to dissociate Britain from its colonial reputation while maintaining the 
Commonwealth as a vehicle for British influence. The merger of the Colonial Office (CO) and 
the CRO would ease this differentiation by removing the word “Colonial” from the 
governmental apparatus, all the while producing economies in Britain’s diplomatic budget.
43
 
Officials in the CRO countered that the Commonwealth approved of the CRO’s coordinating 
functions, and that to force a merger would offend the Commonwealth by lumping together 
colonies and full Commonwealth members. CRO officials argued further that a merger of the CO 
and CRO would reduce services available to the Commonwealth by overworking either the 




Because changes in the operation of the Commonwealth threatened the existence of the CRO, 
CRO opposition to the idea of the Secretariat was persistent and intensified after the decision to 
form the Secretariat was taken in July 1964. CRO obstructionism was even more vehement as 
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Harold Wilson’s more pro-Commonwealth Labour government came to power in October of that 
year.
45
 British policy under both the Conservative and Labour Parties was cautious towards the 
Commonwealth and did not support a large, independent Secretariat.
46
  
British officials feared that with a strong Secretariat, the Commonwealth could become an 
executive organisation dominated by former colonies. Such an organisation might become a 
pressure group against U.K. policy on anything from decolonisation to increased aid and better 
terms for trade.
47
 A similar process with voting blocks of former colonies in the United Nations 
had already produced a great deal of pressure on European colonial powers, and the British 
Government was anxious to prevent a similar situation in the Commonwealth.
48
 The notion that 
the Commonwealth was becoming in the eyes of its members much like any other international 
body was worrisome for British officials. For H.L.M Oxley in the CRO, the Commonwealth was 
“…an association of States but in no sense an organisation…” He elaborated that “The 
Commonwealth Secretariat will, no doubt, have some similarity to the Secretariat of the U.N. or 
of other international bodies but this, I suggest, would be because it is to be a Secretariat not 
because it is to serve the purposes of a number of States.”
49
 Following the decision to establish 
the Secretariat in July 1964, the British Government considered the possibility of developing 
countries dominating the Secretariat as a “serious danger” and resolved, while not appearing to 
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For differing reasons, the governments of Australia, India, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom had a vested interest in maintaining the Commonwealth status quo. That status quo had 
been established in both the values and structures of the Old Commonwealth and was affirmed 
with minor changes in 1949. The expansion of Commonwealth membership and the idea of the 
Secretariat challenged the status quo and pitted the restrictionists against fellow Commonwealth 
members with an interest in a more robust, activist Secretariat.  
Expansionists 
Although they also differed in their motives, the expansionist group shared a vision of the 
Commonwealth as an international organisation and supported a strong, activist Secretariat. The 
growing numbers of African and Caribbean members saw the Commonwealth as one of many 
IOs through which they could pursue their own goals.
51
  Of the postwar members the 
governments of Pakistan and Ceylon supported a more robust Secretariat. These states were both 
establishing new governments after receiving independence and Dominion status in 1947 and 
1948 respectively. The Commonwealth could give these states a sense of international legitimacy 
in addition to providing valuable diplomatic contacts to help train and finance their nascent 
diplomatic corps.
52
 Perhaps more importantly, a strong Secretariat beholden to the membership 
would help promote their interests without reliance on either Britain or India.  
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Pakistani engagement with the Commonwealth was shaped by regional politics such as the 
Kashmir conflict. The Government of Pakistan supported a politically active Secretariat that 
would intervene in member disputes.
53
 In October 1965 the United Kingdom High 
Commissioner in Pakistan noted that there was a feeling of disappointment in the Pakistani 
Government when the Commonwealth did not step into the Kashmir conflict that year, even if it 
was beyond the agreed scope of the Secretariat.
54
 Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake of Ceylon 
was also a vocal supporter of Secretariat expansion. Senanayake hoped that a strong Secretariat 
would facilitate greater multi-lateral Commonwealth consultation like the Colombo Plan.
55
 Close 
coordination with the Secretariat was so important to Senanayake that when he fell ill in London 
in April 1966, he cancelled all of his appointments including a luncheon with the Queen, but 
insisted on meeting with Secretary-General Arnold Smith. Smith recalled that they met in 
Senanayake’s bedroom where the latter was sitting in his pyjamas by an electric fire. The two 
spoke of Commonwealth affairs for some forty minutes before Smith took his leave.
56
 The 
Secretariat was an important institution for both Pakistani and Ceylonese officials, who 
consistently supported Secretariat expansion. 
Similar to the pragmatic self-interest of Pakistan and Ceylon, the Canadian Government 
increasingly approached the Commonwealth as an international organisation that could further 
Canadian political goals. Canadian officials supported many of the new members’ initiatives and 
were instrumental in supporting the formation of the Secretariat. Canada was the only member of 
the Old Commonwealth to oppose South African re-entry into the Commonwealth in 1961. John 
Diefenbaker’s Conservative government was initially hesitant to oppose apartheid given 
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Canada’s own poor record of race-relations. However, Diefenbaker was personally committed to 
promoting the concept of Human Rights, which he saw a means of opposing communism in the 
context of the Cold War. Canadian opposition to renewed South African membership responded 
to domestic calls for action against apartheid, and encouraged better relations with potential 
allies in the emerging Third World.
57
 Canada’s lack of colonies (the only old Dominion to not 
have any) and security in the Americas also gave the Canadian Government more leeway to view 
decolonisation with detachment, and to reimagine Canada’s role in world politics.
58
 For Lester 
Pearson’s subsequent Liberal government (beginning in April 1963), supporting the newer 
members’ vision for the Commonwealth was an avenue to build support for Canada’s emerging 
identity as a middle power and “honest broker” in international politics.
59
 The image of the 
Commonwealth as an international organisation rather than an Englishmen’s club also appealed 
to the French Canadian population which had never shared the old bond of British kinship.
60
 For 
both domestic and foreign policy reasons across party lines, the Canadian Government supported 
the Secretariat from the beginning. 
The Secretariat Decision 
Among the expansionist camp, the newer Afro-Caribbean members were the most active 
proponents of the Commonwealth Secretariat. For these members, a Secretariat would help 
democratise the functions of the Commonwealth and make the organisation a more effective tool 
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for promoting their interests abroad. By challenging the status quo of the 1950s the newer 
members espoused a vision of the Commonwealth that functioned like other international 
organisations where former colonies had more successfully advocated for their interests.  
Apart from the inspiration of the United Nations, the proposal for the Commonwealth Secretariat 
itself was informed by Kwame Nkrumah’s own experience in the formation of the Organization 
for African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Nkrumah recalled that the basis for the OAU had been largely 
outlined by the Monrovia Group at a meeting in Lagos in 1962.  
The conference agreed upon a whole new complex machinery for inter-African 
co-operation. It included a semi-permanent council of ministers, a biennial 
representative assembly, and a permanent secretariat of the African and 
Malagasy states. Among resolutions passed were those calling for a 
development bank, a private investment guarantee fund, an organization for 
health, labour and social affairs, an educational and cultural council, and certain 




Many of the 1962 Lagos resolutions had precedents in the UN, and were later echoed in 
Commonwealth initiatives supported by the newer members. The newer members supported 
similar initiatives in the UN, the OAU, and the Commonwealth. Each of these organisations had 
a different membership base, and initiatives focused on socio-economic development benefitted 
newly independent countries the most.
62
 However, developing members’ ability to derive benefit 
from the Commonwealth depended on the independent operation of the organisation. The 
eventual formation of the Secretariat was motivated by newer members’ rejection of the CRO’s 
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role administering the organisation.
63
 For those newer members, building a Secretariat to take 
over Commonwealth administration from the British Government was the first step to pursuing 
both political and socio-economic initiatives in the Commonwealth.  
Drawing on his experience with the OAU, Kwame Nkrumah tabled the idea for a 
Commonwealth Secretariat at the 1964 Prime Ministers’ Meeting. Trinbagonian Prime Minister 
Eric Williams formally proposed Nkrumah’s suggestion, which was heavily supported by the 
Afro-Caribbean members.
64
 These leaders were frank about their vision for the organisation. 
During the proceedings, Duncan Sandys, the British Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary, 
gave a speech about the progress of decolonisation which soon-to-be Secretary-General Arnold 
Smith remembered as “...pure Britannia nutrix, the proud mother who had nursed her infants to 
strength and independence.”
65
 In response to Sandys’ speech, Dr. Banda of Malawi asserted 
Now come, Mr. Chairman, let’s be frank with each other. You British have not 
been as pig-headed as other imperialists. You have recognised in time what is 
inevitable, and accepted it gracefully. That is your greatness, and we honour you 
for it. But it has not been all voluntary. There’s been a significant element of 
persuasion, and many of us here have been among the persuaders… He then 




Smith later recalled that the session ultimately resolved in good humour.
67
 However, the point 
was clear that just as Commonwealth membership changed there was an expectation that its 
machinery would also change.
68
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Discussion at the 1964 Prime Ministers’ Meeting of what the Secretariat machinery would look 
like produced a variety of proposals. There was a general consensus that the Secretariat should 
serve all members equally, be based in London, have a small competent staff, be headed by a 
Secretary-General, and should be financed by pro-rata cost sharing.
 69
  However, the functions of 
the Secretariat remained unclear. A central suggestion for the role of the proposed Secretariat 
was that it should be responsible for servicing Commonwealth meetings in addition to preparing 
agendas and background papers.
 
Newer members argued that the Secretariat should be a 
coordinating body for development aid and technical assistance. A central Secretariat could 
match member requests for aid and assistance with available funding from other, more developed 
members and support the implementation of aid programmes.
70
 Another possible role for the 
Secretariat was as an information clearing house for factual reports and statistics about external 
political affairs and world economic developments. The prime ministers agreed that the efforts of 
the Secretariat should be complemented by the formation of a Commonwealth Foundation to 
coordinate non-governmental Commonwealth projects (though this would be developed 
separately from the Secretariat).
71
   
Officials in the CRO were apprehensive about the influence of the newer members. The CRO 
response as reported to the Cabinet Committee on Defence and Oversea Policy is worth quoting 
in full. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
68 TNA: CAB 148-7, Commonwealth Secretariat: Memorandum by the Commonwealth Relations Office, 30 July, 
1964; Vivekanandan, “The Commonwealth Secretariat,” 302; Holmes, “The Impact on the Commonwealth of the 
Emergence of Africa,” 295. 
69 TNA: CAB 148-7, Commonwealth Secretariat: Memorandum by the Commonwealth Relations Office, 30 July, 
1964.  
70 Ibid. 
71 TNA: FCO 141/14126, Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office on Commonwealth Secretariat 
to Commonwealth Governments, 18 September, 1964. For the full proposal on the shape of the Commonwealth 
Foundation, see: TNA: CAB 148/43, Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 1965: Commonwealth 
Foundation, 28 May, 1965.  
59 
 
It is clear that some, if not all, of the African Governments see the 
Commonwealth not so much as something special, but as one of the various 
international and regional organisations to which they belong. Their inclination 
will be to mould the Commonwealth into the same pattern as they are 
accustomed to in these other organisations. If we have a Commonwealth 
Secretariat dealing with the agenda for meetings the question will arise whether 
the inclusion of a particular item is to be decided by majority vote. Moreover 
some of the African Governments may wish to turn the proposed Secretariat to 
their own use and to control it by pressure group tactics in order to secure 
changes in policy to their benefit. Even if the Secretariat starts in a modest way, 
pressures may progressively develop to use it as an executive organ to carry out 
the resolutions of the majority and to make recommendations. Such tendencies 
will have to be resisted firmly from the start, and it must be made clear that what 
we envisage is, in effect, an information bureau which would analyse, collate 
and edit information and would have the responsibility of preparing objective 
reports based on the facts. This would need to be carefully reflected in the terms 




In the meantime, British officials advocated that the details of the Secretariat’s structure and 
function be deferred to a dedicated working party. A small working party could be influenced by 
the CRO which was still responsible for convening Commonwealth meetings. In contrast, the 
proposals for what the Secretariat would do reflected the newer members’ vision for a Secretariat 
similar to other international organisations. Because the structures and values of the 
Commonwealth were intrinsically linked, the newer members’ vision for the organisation was 
also reflected in the values espoused by the Commonwealth prime ministers in 1964.  
In their communique announcing the proposed Secretariat, Commonwealth leaders still echoed 
the early iterations of Commonwealth values outlined in the Balfour Declaration. Because of its 
diversity in population, history, and geography, the prime ministers considered the 
Commonwealth to be a “unique experiment in international co-operation.”
73
 The prime ministers 
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also echoed the 1951 Leaders’ Declaration by noting that the Commonwealth also included 
diverse races, colours, and creeds which provided a cross-section of the world itself and was an 
unparalleled opportunity for international co-operation.
74
 None of these points were new. The 
1964 Communique differed in its increased emphasis on racial politics, and styling the 
Commonwealth as an international organisation.  
The importance of racial issues in world politics had been a theme in Commonwealth 
communiques through the 1950s, but conspicuously grew once Afro-Caribbean states began 
joining the Commonwealth in greater numbers. In 1964, the assembled prime ministers 
recognised combatting racism was central to supporting world peace and economic development. 
The older Commonwealth goals of peace, security, and progress, were now contingent on 
combatting racism. This ideational commitment would have been hardly possible in the 1950s, 
but by the mid-1960s was bolstered by Afro-Caribbean membership. Former colonies’ success in 
advocating for decolonization in the UN General Assembly (resulting in the UN Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples n 1960, and the formation of the 
Special Committee on Decolonization in 1961) emboldened newer members to pursue similar 
aims in the Commonwealth.    
The 1964 communique outlined a vision of the Commonwealth as an international organisation 
working in conjunction with other international bodies. The communique emphasised 
Commonwealth support for the UN in upholding the UN Charter, peacekeeping, negotiating 
nuclear disarmament, and in economic measures like the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The traditional 
calls for better Commonwealth machinery and communication between Commonwealth leaders 




were supplemented by the proposal for a Commonwealth Secretariat. The proposed Secretariat 
would facilitate better consultation in addition to being a visible symbol of Commonwealth 
cooperation. The Secretariat was to be, like the Crown, a symbol of “the spirit” of the 
Commonwealth.
75
 Expanding on the potential role of the Secretariat and largely echoing the 
Monrovia Group’s 1962 Lagos resolutions, the 1964 communique also included statements on a 
diverse range of Commonwealth initiatives including: development projects, administrative 
training, educational cooperation, satellite communications, convening a Commonwealth 
Medical Conference, the work of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, and the 
establishment of the Commonwealth Foundation.
76
  
The input of the newer members built on rhetorical precedents in Commonwealth communiques 
and statements, but demonstrated a new vision for the organisation. That vision echoed newer 
members’ experiences in other international organisations where they had pursued their national 
goals with some success. Although the Commonwealth was a distinct forum, leaders of the 
newer members sought to adapt the Commonwealth to be more in-line with other international 
organisations. The formation of a Secretariat was the first step to applying structural best-
practices from other organisations to the Commonwealth. The Secretariat would, in turn, help 
democratise the operations of the Commonwealth and better enable newer members to derive 
benefit from Commonwealth membership.
77
  
The degree to which the newer members supported the formation of a Secretariat was decisive. 
In May 1965 the British Government conducted a follow-up survey asking members whether 
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they agreed in principle to the proposals to establish a Secretariat, and the proposals on the 
position of Secretary-General. Australia, India, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom 
supported these principles with significant reservations. In contrast, all other members (including 
Canada) supported the Secretariat either without reservation, or with concerns that the proposal 
had not gone far enough. Many of the newer members worried whether the terms and powers of 
the Secretariat would be sufficient to accomplish its mandate and competitively attract high 
quality staff.
78
 The survey results were decisively in favour of newer, developing members’ 
vision of the Commonwealth as an international organisation.
79
    
The foundational documents of the Secretariat reflect the vision of the expansionist groups 
(newer members and Canada) for a larger Secretariat, as well as British-led efforts to restrict the 
scope of the Secretariat.
80
 Just as the 1964 communique focused more heavily on race and 
coordination with the UN, the 1965 communique further emphasized these themes in addition to 
hailing the UN as essential to world peace and pledging both support and loyalty to UN efforts.
81
 
The 1965 communique most heavily reflected newer members’ views of what the 
Commonwealth was and what it should be. The Agreed Memorandum that set out the parameters 
of the Secretariat was, in contrast, more visibly affected by British-led restraining tactics and 
“played down the idea that the Commonwealth should behave like an international 
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 For example, the memorandum described the new Secretariat as a body that 
would serve a membership that represented many races and points of view, and that it should be 
built to facilitate exchange of opinions in a “friendly, informal, intimate atmosphere.”
83
 
However, the preamble went on to state that the Commonwealth was not a formal organisation, 
would not encroach on member sovereignty, would not require collective decisions or actions, 




Such rhetorical to and fro maintained the core definition of Commonwealth values, and 
accommodated the expansion of those values as envisioned by the newer members. To reiterate, 
those values described a free association of historically and geographically diverse autonomous 
and equal states with the Crown, and now the Secretariat, as symbols of their cooperation. They 
shared a commitment to “positive ideals” such as free institutions, free cooperation, peace, 
security, and progress, which could be facilitated with flexible machinery and frank interpersonal 
communication between heads of government. By this time, combatting racism, and working 
with other international associations, as requisite to the pursuit of those goals was a well-
entrenched addition to the values set. As David McIntyre states, “virtue was always made a 
necessity, and the Commonwealth was transformed.”
85
 However, the wording of the Agreed 
Memorandum left room for interpretation based on both expansionist and restrictionist visions of 
the organisation.  
                                                             
82 Chan, “The Commonwealth as an International Organization,” 397-398.  
83 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting 1965: Agreed Memorandum on the Commonwealth Secretariat 
(London: HMSO, 1965), 2.  
84 Ibid. 
85 McIntyre, “Canada and the Creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat, 1965,” 754. 
64 
 
The leaders of newer member states continued to evoke the values based rhetoric of familial ties, 
shared history, diversity, and consultative practices that set the Commonwealth apart in the 
international sphere. In a broad sense, these members considered the Commonwealth to be a 
useful free-association of sovereign states that would listen to their concerns and benefit 
themselves and others.
86
 However, those members’ interpretation of long-held Commonwealth 
values reflected a vision of the Commonwealth as an international organisation, rather than a 
Commonwealth club. In a conversation with Arnold Smith several months after the formation of 
the Secretariat, the Ugandan High Commissioner noted that his country was “always under 
pressure at OAU meetings that the Commonwealth is a neo-colonialist association controlled by 
Britain. Now we have a Secretariat to demonstrate that this is not so.”
87
  
The creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1965 helped bring the organisation into line 
with other international organisations and was a crucial development for the newer members. 
The Secretariat helped democratise the operations of the Commonwealth and better enabled the 
newer members to derive benefit from the organisation. Dudley Senanayake’s insistence on 
seeing the Secretary-General while ill, or the Secretary-General being invited to new members’ 
state occasions alongside the heads of other organisations like the OAU and the UN, spoke to the 
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Chapter Three: Planning and Implementation 
Between the 1964 decision to create the Secretariat and its formal beginnings in 1965, the 
differing perspectives of Commonwealth members more firmly coalesced into the expansionist 
and restrictionist camps. The restrictionist members in general and the United Kingdom in 
particular attempted to limit the scope of the Secretariat idea, but were consistently countered by 
members supporting an expanded Secretariat. The consolidation of these camps set the landscape 
for the practical formation of the Secretariat over the subsequent years.   
1964 Planning 
With the decision to establish a Secretariat in July 1964, the Commonwealth prime ministers 
resolved to meet again the following summer. In the meantime, the prime ministers asked the 
British Government to organise a working party to flesh out the details of the Secretariat 
proposal. The organisation of the working party demonstrated the very problem with British 
administration of the Commonwealth when the British Government sought to restrict member 
participation in the working group under the guise of providing secretarial services.     
For the reasons outlined in the previous chapter, the British Government desired to keep any 
feature of a centralised Commonwealth Secretariat small and unassuming. Backed by the 
Australian Government, the British proposed that the working party be based on regional 
representation. Under the British model, the working party would have eight members: one for 
Canada, one for the Caribbean, one each for East and West Africa, two for South East Asia, one 
of Australia and New Zealand, and one for the United Kingdom itself.
1
 A similar working party 
had been established at the Prime Ministers’ Meeting in May 1960 to discuss Commonwealth 
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The British preference for a regionally-based working party fit the mould of older imperial 
conferences with an intimate club-like atmosphere. A smaller working party would keep 
Commonwealth consultations manageable, while also conforming to the wider pattern of what 
Michael Collins has called the “federal moment.”
3
 This federal thinking informed British 
attempts (largely under the Conservative party) to create colonial federations as alternatives to 
nation-states. By avoiding decolonisation through nation-states, British policy-makers sought to 
deemphasise national sovereignty among British colonial possessions. Promoting federalist 
models had long been used as tools to foster imperial unity, and maintain a British sphere of 
influence among former colonies.
4
 However, with the disaggregation of British India upon 
decolonisation, the recent failure of both the West Indies Federation and the Central African 
Federation (1962 and 1963 respectively), and the ongoing talks to remove Singapore from the 
Malay Federation, regional tensions remained high among Commonwealth members. British 
efforts to promote regional representation were met with suspicion and opposition. As the 
December deadline to create the working party drew near, British planners were faced with 
increasing worries about representation from throughout the Commonwealth.  
Representational concerns broadly aligned to regional tensions across the Commonwealth. The 
governments of Ceylon and the Malay Federation refused representation by any other regional 
government. These members feared Indian domination of the Southeast Asian regional group. In 
the context of rising tensions in Kashmir, both Indian and Pakistani officials wished to appoint 
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 The Government of New Zealand resented the likely de facto 
appointment of an Australian representative and the Australian Government expressed 
disappointment that as “senior members” Australia and New Zealand were not both entitled to 
representation.
6
 In Africa, the Government of Malawi protested that the division of Africa into 
Eastern and Western regions would not accurately represent Central African problems and 
perspectives, and the British felt increasingly embarrassed over the input of North Rhodesia 
(soon to be Zambia), to which papers about the Secretariat had accidentally been circulated prior 
to Zambian independence.
7
 Trinidadian and Jamaican officials were in a row about Caribbean 
representation and the governments of Nigeria and Ghana both wished to appoint their own 
nominees.
8
 Kwame Nkrumah summed up these worries in a letter to Sir Douglas-Home, stating 
that he “…consider[ed] that while this kind of arrangement may have worked satisfactorily in the 
past with regard to other Commonwealth problems, the question of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat is so important that each Commonwealth country should be represented at these 
initial discussions.” He noted that while this would mean a larger working party, it would resolve 
the question of representation and allow the party to begin its work.
9
 
British officials consulted their traditional allies in the Old Commonwealth and were surprised to 
find that the older members roundly supported individual member representation in the working 
party.  The governments of Australia and New Zealand both wanted separate representation, and 
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the Canadian Government, (while guaranteed a representative in any case) agreed with the 
prevailing sentiment that all members should be represented.
10
 The British Government 
ultimately conceded the issue of regional representation. Apart from the lack of support from 
traditional Commonwealth allies, the 1964 British elections also influenced this concession. 
Harold Wilson’s Labour government came to power in October 1964 and did not share the 
Conservative predilection to maintaining regional blocs. The Wilson ministry quickly relented on 
the issue of regional representation. However, within the British Government, the CRO remained 
the central organising body and was thus in control of the procedures to establish the 
committee.
11
 Officials in the CRO drafted lists of their preferred nominees (pro-British and/or 
passive candidates) and circulated these to other British governmental departments in order to 
exert maximum influence on the composition of the working group. One such list noted that 
while serving as a representative in the Canadian delegation at the 1964 Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting Arnold Smith had shown himself to be too enthusiastic about the prospect of a 
Secretariat and thus, the CRO “should prefer not, repeat not to have Arnold Smith” represented 
on the working party.
12
  
However, British officials recognised that they must not appear to be overtly shaping the form of 
the working party. CRO staff had detailed discussions about how to manage the image they 
presented to the public. In anticipation of the December 1964 establishment of the working party 
as well as during the working party’s subsequent meeting in January of 1965, the British 
Government wished to avoid the impression that Britain was running the meeting. The News 
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Department of the CRO recommended that the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs 
avoid any interviews with the press prior to the convening of the working party. Instead they 
advised short, general press statements and footage of other Commonwealth leaders arriving in 
London to de-emphasise the United Kingdom’s role in the proceedings.
13
 This was a fine line to 
navigate as the British were keenly aware that no Commonwealth press facilities yet existed and 
they were more or less free to mould the image of the Commonwealth proceedings presented to 
the public. Ultimately while the CRO loaned press facilities and staff to the working party for the 




The Labour government relented on regional representation and the CRO wished to avoid 
allegations of meddling in the proceedings. However, British opposition to a strong Secretariat 
spurred alternative means of limiting the Secretariat, all the while trying to maintain the 
appearance of impartiality.
15
 In addition to trying to influence nominations for Commonwealth 
representatives, the CRO advocated to distribute responsibilities for the coordination of trade, 
finance, and technical affairs within the new Commonwealth structure. This approach would 
keep the Secretariat decentralised and leave many of these areas under British influence.
16
 In a 
similar sense CRO staff sought to ensure that checks were in place “…to contain the efforts of 
the high-level personage who would have to be found to head the Secretariat.”
17
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Concerns about the scope and function of the proposed Secretariat dominated the working 
party’s January meeting. Australian and Ceylonese officials echoed British concerns about the 
possibility of the Secretariat acquiring executive authority and so infringing on the sovereignty 
of members, while Pakistani representatives countered that the Secretariat’s potential role in 
international affairs was being too heavily restricted.
18
 African members’ strong support for a 
Secretariat involved in aid and development coordination was opposed by British and Australian 
representatives.
19
 The rest of the Old Commonwealth was surprised at Canadian support of 
African members and opposition to limits on the Secretariat’s functions.
20
  
The working party reached consensus on a general programme setting out the Secretariat’s 
mandate. Members agreed that the Secretariat’s purpose would be “…to serve them by 
facilitating and promoting consultation on matters of common concern.”
21
 In providing that 
service the Secretary-General should be non-partisan, abstain from policy recommendations, and 
consult with members on all decisions.
22
 Within these guidelines, the Secretariat would prepare 
and disseminate factual information on world political and economic affairs as well as organise 
and service Commonwealth meetings.
23
 Any other possible functions for the Secretariat were 
deferred pending a review of existing intra-Commonwealth organisations.
24
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The meeting took a definite step in the direction of the democratised Commonwealth envisioned 
by the newer members and appeared to strike a balance between “expansionists” and 
“restrictionists.”
25
 Then Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend reflected that if the Secretariat could be 
contained within the limits set out by the working party it would best serve the British 
Government to support it. He noted however, that “…in doing so, we shall, of course, be taking 
the first formal step of an administrative kind along the road which leads away from the concept 
of the United Kingdom as the mother country…and towards the new concept that all the 
members of the Commonwealth are entitled to an equal say in matters of Commonwealth 
concern. This is quite a significant thing to do!”
26
  In spite of British reluctance, the formation of 
the Secretariat moved the Commonwealth to a basis informed by the input of the newer 
members.  
January to June 1965 Consultation 
At the behest of the working party the British Government circulated the pursuant documents for 
consideration by member states. In May 1965, the CRO sent a subsequent survey to all 
Commonwealth governments asking whether they agreed to the proposal to establish a 
Commonwealth Secretariat, and the requirements for hiring a Secretary-General as laid out by 
the working party.
27
 While all member governments agreed in principle, many of them raised 
issues they felt warranted further discussion. Such comments largely echoed the deliberations to 
date and most were tabled at the next Prime Ministers’ Meeting in June 1965. 
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Foremost among the concerns brought up in the consultations of spring of 1965 was the selection 
and appointment of a Secretary-General. Both the hiring process and the role itself were essential 
to the formation of the Secretariat but remained ill-defined. As in the January meeting, the 
restrictionist group (Australia, India, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) reiterated concerns 
about the Secretariat acquiring executive powers. The Australian Government more specifically 
articulated that they did not wish to see the Commonwealth Secretary-General equated with the 
United Nations Secretary-General as the latter possessed real executive authority and required a 
large expert staff. In light of British estimations that many of the newer members saw the 
Commonwealth as an international organisation like any other, this was a valid concern for the 
older members who wished to keep the Secretariat small and unobtrusive.
28
  
While most members agreed that the role of Secretary-General needed to be further defined, their 
concerns about the role itself were quite different. The expansionist group (newer members and 
Canada) were more concerned with the calibre of person required to take the job of Secretary-
General. Tanzanian officials for example, wondered whether hiring based on nomination and 
curriculum vitae alone were enough to appoint such an important officer and suggested that 
interviews with Commonwealth High Commissioners be incorporated into the hiring process. 
The Government of Malta echoed Tanzanian thinking and suggested that for a role as important 
as Secretary-General the appointment should be delayed until after the establishment of the 
Secretariat. The delay would allow time to better establish what the role of Secretary-General 
would entail. Maltese officials further suggested that a group of senior Commonwealth High 
Commissioners be selected to guide and mentor the Secretary-General for a time after his 






 Pakistani officials noted with concern that the limits to the Secretary-General’s 
functions seemed “unduly severe” and the Canadian Government wondered if too many 
restrictions might dissuade desirable candidates. Ugandan officials went one step further and 
questioned whether the terms laid out for hiring a Secretary-General were attractive enough to 
entice a suitably high-calibre candidate at all.
30
  
Newer members with Canadian support were less concerned about restricting the role of 
Secretary-General and more concerned with the quality of the candidate. This focus on quality 
led the expansionists to advocate for more rigorous hiring practices, more attractive terms of 
employment, and fewer restrictions on the Secretary-General’s role. Their vision of the 
Secretary-General was not a passive liaison officer to keep the Commonwealth running 
smoothly, but an active, high-calibre representative that would advocate for the members.  
While questions about the Secretary-General were clearly split between the expansionists and 
restrictionists, questions about associated costs were more widely shared. Indian, Canadian and 
New Zealander officials noted that the financial arrangements for the Secretariat were as yet ill-
defined and would require further discussion.
31
 Zambian officials felt that the proposed salary 
scale of the Secretariat was somewhat high but recognised the need to attract good quality staff at 
competitive rates.
32
 The governments of Sierra Leone, Malawi, and the Gambia took issue with 
the proposed schedule of member contributions. These governments argued that as it stood the 
pro-rata scale of cost sharing was unrealistic based on the size of their respective economies. 
They argued that additional contribution brackets be added to the scheme and looked forward to 
discussing further details at the Prime Ministers’ Meeting in June.  







The issue of cost prompted Indian officials to raise another issue for further discussion in their 
response to the survey. As a means of saving overall Commonwealth costs, the Indian 
Government proposed that provision be made for the Secretariat to absorb a number of smaller 
existing Commonwealth organisations such as the Commonwealth Education Liaison Unit 
(CELU) and the Commonwealth Economic Committee (CEC).
33
 Indian concerns were centred 
on keeping central Commonwealth organisation small, manageable, and inexpensive. Kenyan 
officials also felt that other Commonwealth organisations might be absorbed into the new 
Secretariat. The Kenyan Government argued that the consolidation of Commonwealth 
organisations should be a gradual process initiated after the Secretariat was self-sufficient.
34
 This 
would also ensure that proper consultations could be carried out with the staff of existing 
Commonwealth bodies, which were apprehensive about the prospect of amalgamation (for 
example see Chapter 11). In contrast to the Indian position, the Kenyan stance on consolidating 
Commonwealth organisations was to ensure the long-term strength and sustainability of the 
Secretariat.  
Newer members’ views on the practical aspects of setting up the Secretariat did not always align, 
but they shared a commitment to a strong Secretariat working for the members. Ghanaian 
officials for example, noted that in the discussions to date, little had been mentioned about the 
location of the Secretariat and any subsequent meetings. For their part, the Ghanaians believed 
that the Secretariat and future meetings should be in London. As most Commonwealth members 
maintained High Commissioners in London and the city hosted a wide variety of diplomatic 
organisations and infrastructure, this would be a practical cost saving measure for Ghanaian 
diplomacy. Zambian officials however, welcomed the idea that even with a London-based 





Secretariat, future conferences and meetings would rotate throughout the Commonwealth.
35
 
Meeting rotation would mean less predictable costs but would bring more attention to political 
issues throughout the Commonwealth as leaders traveled beyond London. In the context of a 
deteriorating political situation in neighbouring Rhodesia and African members’ push to reduce 
the Anglo-centricity of the Commonwealth, such heightened attention would be of practical 
benefit to Zambia, and the newer members. Although they differed on where meetings should be 
held, both Ghanaian and Zambian arguments were based on ensuring that the operation of the 
Secretariat would be of practical benefit to members.  
In response to the CRO survey, member governments raised a broad array of questions 
concerning the establishment of the Secretariat but agreed that such details could be discussed at 
the next Prime Ministers’ Meeting.
36
 Members’ responses demonstrated the restrictionists’ 
preoccupation with controlling the scope of the new Secretariat. These members evoked the 
club-like status quo of the Old Commonwealth and the 1950s and cautioned against a large 
Secretariat with executive functions. In contrast, the expansionist members supported a more 
robust Secretariat and raised practical concerns about the quality of staff, location, consultation, 
and financial contributions expected from the membership. 
June 1965 
The questions raised during the spring 1965 consultations were brought to a second officials 
meeting from June 14-16, 1965, immediately before the next Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting.
37
 The June officials’ meeting focused on editorial revisions to the draft memorandum 
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on the Secretariat that was to be submitted to the prime ministers the following week. However, 
the meeting also foreshadowed debates on the implementation of the Secretariat by considering 
two consistent problems in Commonwealth history: cost and colonies.    
The problems of cost and colonies were not resolved in 1965. While several smaller, less 
developed members raised concerns about the scale of their budget contributions, the meeting 
agreed that the pro-rata system would remain as defined by the January meeting for the time 
being. Contributions could be reviewed by the prime ministers in the future. The officials 
meeting also articulated that those members who still had responsibility for dependencies 
(Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) would continue to act on behalf of their 
dependencies. However, the meeting stipulated that those members should circulate any 
materials relevant to their dependencies and might arrange for colonial representation at certain 
meetings or sessions on an ad hoc basis.
38
 Both of these issues were central concerns of the 
newer, developing members and foreshadowed recurrent themes in the early operations of the 
Secretariat.  
The June 1965 Prime Ministers’ Meeting was largely focused on the developing crisis in 
Rhodesia, but after some discussion approved the formation of the Secretariat.
39
 The Agreed 
Memorandum which set the basis for establishing the Secretariat changed very little from the 
principles drafted that January notwithstanding some key clarifications. The limits on the 
Secretariat’s role vis-à-vis partisanship and investigating colonial affairs were more concretely 
defined.
40
 In the economic sphere, the possibility of the Secretariat coordinating development 
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projects and absorbing existing Commonwealth economic organisations was acknowledged with 
the provision that any initiatives in that direction did not obstruct existing bilateral agreements.
41
 
The immediate tasks of the Secretariat were collecting and disseminating information, taking 
over the functions of the Commonwealth Liaison Committee performed by the CRO and 
organising Ministerial Meetings.
42
 A small independent committee was mandated to conduct a 
review of all intra-Commonwealth organisations prior to the Secretariat taking on any further 
functions.
43
 The pro rata scale of contributions was also formalised with a minimum 1.5 and 
maximum 30 percent contribution of the Secretariat’s budget, although the prime ministers 
recognised that this scale would require periodic adjustment.
44
  
The June meeting also addressed the question of nominating a Secretary-General. Members 
could submit nominees which would need to be accepted by the wider group (though how this 
would be agreed upon had not been defined), as well as released from their current postings 
should they be elected. The terms of the position itself had remained the same since January with 
a tacit assumption that the first Secretary-General would be from the Old Commonwealth. The 
British delegation recognised that a British nominee would be inappropriate as first Secretary-
General but the remainder of the Old Commonwealth put forward nominees. The governments of 
Canada and New Zealand nominated their own diplomats, Arnold Smith and Alistair McIntosh 
respectively. While two Australians working for the UN in Africa were nominated by African 
states, Robert Menzies disapproved and in an apparent bid to counter African preferences instead 
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nominated Ceylon’s Director-General of External Affairs, Gonville Sextus Peiris.
45
 S.C.A 
Forster of Sierra Leone and Pakistan’s Ghulam Ahmed were also nominated by their respective 
countries.
46
 British staff in the CRO continued to oppose Smith’s nomination as “…apart from 
anything else he would be far too much of an activist…”
47
 However, the position of the 
Secretary-General was of especial interest to developing countries and Smith enjoyed a good 
deal of popularity among the African members, particularly after their own nominees were not 
supported by Australia.
48
   
At the eleventh hour Ahmed withdrew and the day before the vote both Peiris and McIntosh’s 
candidacies were withdrawn by their home governments.
49
 The British delegation nonetheless 
heavily debated Smith’s candidacy and searched for other last minute alternatives, even going so 
far as to suggest that a retired British colonial governor serve as interim Secretary-General until a 
better selection procedure could be established.
50
 Smith’s internationalist views and activist 
approach to the Commonwealth ran counter to the restrictionists’ desire for a passive, pro-British 
Secretary-General. These same characteristics made Smith a popular choice with the newer 
members. The Commonwealth did not typically operate on the basis of voting, but discussion on 
appointing a Secretary-General dragged out to the point that a vote was called for out of 
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exasperation. Of the remaining candidtates, Smith received 18 of 20 member votes, which was 




Smith threw himself into the role of Secretary-General with considerable energy and by all 
accounts, took his role as a servant of all Commonwealth members very seriously.
52
 On August 
10, prior to embarking for Britain, Smith lunched with eight heads of Commonwealth missions 
to the United Nations in New York to introduce himself and take soundings of their positions and 
concerns vis-à-vis their governments’ engagement with the UN.
53
  
Arriving in Southampton on August 17 at 08:00, Smith was met by Don Abbey, the acting 
Administration Officer of the Secretariat who had been seconded from the CRO until such time 
as the Secretariat could hire its own staff. With the aid of a protocol officer to clear his affairs 
through customs, Smith discussed the setting up of the Secretariat with Abbey on the train to 
London and began work shortly after his arrival in the city, although the Secretariat’s formal life 
was not slated to begin until the first week of September.
54
 The next day Smith began addressing 
Singapore’s application for Commonwealth membership (see Chapter Six).
55
 He also started 
preliminary correspondence for the recruitment of the deputy secretary general of administration 
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52 Smith and his personal assistant arrived at Marlborough House to begin work on August 30 (The start of the first 
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Office of the Secretary General.” Commonwealth Oral History Project June 24, 2013. Last updated May 10, 2014. 
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and international relations and met with the High Commissioner for Ceylon to discuss 
nominations for the economic deputy Secretary-General. The same day he met with Sir Neil 
Pritchard, who was acting as head of the CRO to discuss preliminary questions regarding the 
setting up of the Secretariat, including the issue of membership consultation.
56
  
On August 19, in addition to having further discussions about the appointment of deputy 
secretaries, Smith formally introduced himself to the Commonwealth membership.
57
 In an 
introductory letter to each of the Commonwealth High Commissioners he concluded: “I rejoice 
at the opportunity which this appointment gives me to try to serve equally the interest of all 
member Governments of the Commonwealth. In taking up my duties in London I particularly 




Smith built his Commonwealth connections quickly, but he was also soon in conflict with 
various British Government departments as he attempted to organise the logistics of the 
Secretariat. The Secretary-General’s role, as per the Agreed Memorandum, was in part based on 
maintaining “the unwritten conventions which have always determined those processes” of 
Commonwealth cooperation.
59
 The vagueness of the Agreed Memorandum was a product of the 
restrictionist group, and the British Government in particular.
60
 This left a degree of interpretive 
leeway in members’ approach to the Secretariat, which characterised Secretariat engagement 
with the British Government during the practical implementation of the Secretariat.   
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Chapter Four: Arnold Smith 
Few people made a more concerted effort to navigate differing visions of the Commonwealth 
than Arnold Smith, the first Commonwealth Secretary-General. Smith realised that the 
Commonwealth was unlikely to make a mark on the international scene without active leadership 
from the Secretariat.
1
 Himself a committed internationalist, Smith worked to build a vision of the 
organisation that could be supported by all members. 
Balancing the various perspectives of the Commonwealth was increasingly difficult as 
membership ballooned in the 1960s. Even with comparably fewer members in 1964, Smith 
recalled that as a member of the Canadian delegation at the 1964 Prime Ministers’ Meeting, he 
had not realised the full scope of the organisation.
2
 However, Smith already had a broad resume 
that gave him the diplomatic skill to navigate the complexities of the Commonwealth. Smith had 
worked in various capacities for the British and Canadian Governments in Estonia, Egypt, and 
the USSR. He had held positions at a number of universities and various international bodies 
such the Atomic Energy Council and the United Nations. He had also served as an International 
Truce Commissioner in Cambodia and Indochina.
3
   
Smith understood that his post was an ambiguous one and was “hard to define for the excellent 
reason that the Commonwealth itself [wa]s hard, or indeed impossible to define.”
4
 Smith noted 
that the lack of a concrete definition of the Commonwealth was good for its adaptability. 
However, it was clear that to effectively lead the organisation he needed to create a more 
                                                             
1 Murphy, The Empire’s New Clothes, 32.  
2 Smith, Stitches in Time, 6. 
3 TNA: DO 194/66, Communique: Commonwealth Prime Minsters’ Meeting, Commonwealth Secretariat, 
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cohesive vision for the organisation.
5
 During his first months as Secretary-General Smith 
developed a concise summary of the Commonwealth which loosely defined the organisation, 
elucidated its functions and utility, and outlined its potential role in international politics. Smith 
honed his definition of the Commonwealth through hundreds of speeches and soon referred to it 
as “the usual gospel.”
6
  
Smith’s vision of the modern Commonwealth was a unique association made up of sovereign 
nations from every race and continent, every size, and every level of economic development, in 
contrast to “once upon a time” when the Commonwealth was “essentially a rich man’s, white 
man’s club.”
7
 In the face of major world problems such as development, race relations, bloc 
politics, neo-isolationism, and narrowing national horizons, Smith styled the Commonwealth as 
one of many instruments that could promote international understanding and cooperation. By 
promoting consultation between members which might not otherwise meet in person, the 
uniqueness of the Commonwealth was more relevant and more useful than it ever had been.
8
 The 
unique composition and consultative practices (as opposed to voting) of the Commonwealth 
contrasted to the impersonal structure of the UN and region or issue specific organisations like 
the OAU, Organization of American States (OAS), NATO, or SEATO. Smith echoed the older, 
values-based definitions of the Commonwealth as well as the new emphasis on diversity and 
international purpose. He denied that the organisation was an imperial afterthought and told a 
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progressive story of organisational evolution. The core of Smith’s “gospel” was a clear, 
accessible vision of the organisation that could be delivered to all manner of audiences.
9
 
Smith’s vision of the Commonwealth ironically both affirmed and belied Lord Balfour’s claim 
that the organisation depended not on negation but on positive ideals.
10
 Smith echoed the 
“positive ideals” of Commonwealth diversity, shared history, free cooperation, and uniqueness in 
the international sphere. Yet he also worked hard to negate “false images” of the Commonwealth 
including: the insinuation it was a kith-and-kin concept that lost meaning beyond the old Anglo-
Saxon club; that the organisation was an imperial relic or colonial hangover; that it was a placebo 
to ease the loss of empire in Britain; or that it was a multi-racial, but toothless debating society 
that was all talk and no action.
11
 He instead argued that the organisation had grown organically 
as the result of pragmatic and often improbable decisions. While the Commonwealth was a 
product of the history of the British Empire, it was not a logical or inevitable outcome and to see 
it that way was to fundamentally misunderstand it. Smith went so far as to say that it was “only 
the blind who see in the Commonwealth the Emperor’s new clothes.” Treating the 
Commonwealth as a relic of the past, Smith argued, would be a self-fulfilling prophecy that 
could reduce the organisation to a giant farce.
12
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Rather than an imperial afterthought, Smith argued that the Commonwealth concept was a means 
by which former colonies could retain the benefits of association with Britain without the 
subordination and disadvantages of imperial rule. This idea was the result of self-interested 
calculation that succeeded in the Old Commonwealth and set the stage for the modern 
organisation.
13
 Borrowing from a pragmatic Nehruvian interpretation of the Commonwealth, 
Smith argued that members chose to remain by evaluating “what they will get out of it, in the 
way of aid opportunities, trade opportunities, and diplomatic knowledge and friendships; and of 
what they can put into it, using it as one of the channels whereby they can influence the thinking 
of others, and thus play a part in shaping international outlooks that will determine the future of 
our world.”
14
 Rather than backward looking nostalgia or sentimentality, the Commonwealth had 
always been the product of hard-headed, forward-looking calculation, and that by remaining in 




The progressive arc of Smith’s vision for the organisation acknowledged but did not overstate 
the Commonwealth’s imperial origins, praised the pragmatism of later members, and emphasised 
the potential of the contemporary organisation. He saw a “special relevance” in the 
Commonwealth that more than its previous iterations could “make a real contribution to the 
progress of humanity.”
16
 He often reiterated that the Commonwealth was not a product of 
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imperial nostalgia and decline but of principled, forward-looking statesmen.
17
 “At this level” 




The linchpin of Smith’s vision for the organisation was the concept of the Commonwealth as an 
“instrument.” The concept of an instrument reflected organisational utility and members’ agency 
in how that instrument was used. Smith suggested that the Commonwealth was one of many 
instruments in members’ diplomatic toolkits. He actively compared the Commonwealth to other 
international bodies such as the UN and OAU and argued that the Commonwealth should 
complement, not compete with member involvement in other international groups.
19
 The 
instrument concept was a catch-all term that incorporated differing visions of the 
Commonwealth.
20 
As an instrument the Commonwealth could be idealistic yet practical, unique 
yet only one form of international machinery. It could draw on shared traditions without 
succumbing to neocolonialism.
21
 The organisation could be progressive without subscribing to 
Marxist, Whig, or Non-Aligned visions of progress. Smith variously described the 
Commonwealth as an instrument to help increase understanding and practical cooperation on an 
international scale, an instrument for world politics, an instrument for applied social geography, 
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an instrument for development and aid, an instrument for fighting neo-isolationism, an 
instrument to bridge regional and trans-regional politics, and an instrument for political dialogue 
across the lines of race and region and across economic levels.
22
 While these were all vaguely 
progressive uses for that instrument, they did not consign the Commonwealth to a particular 
political camp. Above all Smith saw the Commonwealth as “an instrument for all its members to 
help shape the future” that would be what they made it to be.
23
 
In addition to better defining the Commonwealth, Smith also worked to defend his vision of the 
organisation. In the spring of 1966 for instance, a racially-charged editorial in the Toronto Star 
falsely accused Smith and the Secretariat of spreading extremist ideas and training Black 
Africans to commit terrorist acts in Rhodesia. Smith and his lawyers threatened legal action for 
libel. The paper ultimately withdrew the text and issued a formal apology.
24
 Smith carefully 
monitored and defended the Commonwealth image he sought to embody. His personal files, 
much more than the records of the Secretariat itself, are filled with press reports and extensive 
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records of world leaders’ impressions and statements about the Commonwealth. As he noted in 
his diary in 1966 the “usual gospel” about the Commonwealth was one he “believe[d] in”.
25
      
Smith’s belief in the Commonwealth and advocacy for its use as an international instrument 
supported his popularity with the newer, Afro-Caribbean members and eventually earned the 
begrudging respect of British officials. In 1968 Smith’s British counterparts in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office reflected that Smith remained “a passionate believer in the multi-racial 
Commonwealth.” He saw the Secretariat as “having a powerful co-ordinating role in the 
economic, educational, medical and social fields within the Commonwealth, and has 
occasionally trodden heavily on toes both in this country and other Commonwealth countries in 
pursuing this role. There is no doubt, however, that his actions spring from a firm conviction of 
the value of the Commonwealth.”
26
 Smith was a believing internationalist but balanced his 
idealism with realism.
27
 His vision for the organization balanced future purpose and past history, 
as well as varying member perspectives into a coherent, accessible package. Smith placed that 
vision into the context of international issues that challenged the membership to make the best 
use of the Commonwealth as an instrument. As Secretary-General, Smith promoted and tried to 
embody a vision of the Commonwealth that could be supported by all members. 
Smith’s efforts were generally successful. The older restrictionist members were receptive to the 
traditional values-based language of the Balfour Declaration though they resented Smith’s 
activism in building the Secretariat along the lines of an international organisation. More 
important to the future of the Commonwealth, Smith’s ideas resonated with the newer 
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expansionist members. Smith’s concept of the Commonwealth as one international instrument 
among many was a clear step away from the organisation’s beginnings as an imperial club and 
did not put Commonwealth membership at odds with other international organisations. British 
representatives struggled with the idea that the Commonwealth could be a complementary 
organisation. Much to Smith’s frustration, British officials frequently juxtaposed Commonwealth 
engagement with “competing ties” to other international efforts like the European Economic 
Community (EEC), the OAU, and American defence initiatives.
28
 Newer members, particularly 
in Africa, were wary of perceived neocolonialism and sought benefits from multiple international 
organisations. Commonwealth membership was important to these members but they would not 
tolerate the old status-quo of a racially hierarchical, Anglo-centric Commonwealth.
29
 If the 
organisation continued to be administered by Britain and if Commonwealth membership 
precluded participation in other international bodies, there would be little to distinguish 
Commonwealth membership from colonial control. Smith’s efforts to build a robust, independent 
Secretariat and his insistence on the utility of the Commonwealth as a complementary 
international instrument reassured newer members and encouraged their ongoing engagement 
with the Commonwealth through the 1960s.  
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Part One Conclusion 
This section established the background for the more detailed analysis in part two of how the 
Commonwealth transitioned into an international organisation. The mutually constituted values 
and structures of the Commonwealth outlined in Chapter One demonstrate that the London 
Declaration modified, but did not significantly alter the operation of the organisation in the 
1950s. African decolonisation and subsequent Commonwealth membership precipitated real 
change. Chapter Two analysed the origin of the Secretariat idea and showed how the vision and 
activism of African members was decisive in the formation of the Secretariat. These members 
saw the Commonwealth as an international organisation and pursued structural changes to match 
their vision. How various members received the Secretariat proposal created two main camps 
(expansionists and restrictionists) among the membership. Chapter Three detailed how the 
process of planning the Secretariat solidified the aforemented camps among the members. The 
planning process also brought problems with British management of Commonwealth 
administration to the fore, and foreshadowed the conflict between the new Secretariat and the 
British Government. Chapter Four showed how Secretary-General Arnold Smith developed his 
own vision of the Commonwealth that encompassed both expansionist and restrictionist visions 
of the organisation. This chapter demonstrated that Smith and the Secretariat had agency in the 
debates over the direction of the organisation. Smith’s own vision of the Commonwealth and the 
Secretariat’s role both as a mediator between members and an oppositional force to the British 
Government shaped the transition period of the late 1960s. Taken together, these chapters show 
the ideational and argumentative basis for the transformation of the Commonwealth to its 
modern iteration as an IO. This section also identified the key actors and tensions that 
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characterised that transitions (restrictionists versus expansionists, and the Secretariat versus the 







The Agreed Memorandum that laid out the scope and functions of the Secretariat was 
purposefully vague. The memorandum was a rhetorical balancing act between two distinct 
visions of what the Commonwealth was and how it should function. The restrictionist group 
preferred the Commonwealth status quo of the 1950s and sought to keep the Secretariat small 
and weak. The expansionist group saw the Commonwealth as an international organisation and it 
pushed for a strong Secretariat with a broad mandate. The struggle between the expansionists 
and the restrictionists for what the Commonwealth should be shaped the debates surrounding the 
Secretariat’s mandate. The implementation of that mandate was in turn negotiated between the 
Secretariat and the British Government. This section explores how these struggles were 
manifested in debates about Secretariat logistics, the Secretariat’s role processing 
Commonwealth membership applications, and the Secretariat’s role organising high-level 
meetings from 1965 to 1969. Taken together these debates shaped the Commonwealth as it 




Chapter Five: Practical Considerations: Logistics 
Establishing the Secretariat in 1965 was a considerable challenge for Arnold Smith and his staff. 
This challenge was characterised by struggles between the Secretariat and various British 
departments for the necessary assistance and authority to create a functional Secretariat.
1
 The 
historically ad hoc nature of British foreign, Commonwealth, and imperial policy left British 
departments with different stakes in administering the Commonwealth. The practical logistics of  
housing, hiring, finance, immunities and privileges, and protocol, were all contested to varying 
degrees by the restrictionist British Government. Opposition to the Secretariat was greatest when 
the departments involved had the most traditional authority to lose. Such opposition was chiefly 
based in the CRO which had provided secretarial services to the Commonwealth since its 
formation in 1947.   
Housing 
In the most practical sense Arnold Smith had to stake out the Secretariat’s place in London. 
Queen Elizabeth II had made Marlborough House available as a Commonwealth Centre in 1959, 
and the CRO had henceforth managed the site. In the lead-up to the Secretariat’s formation, the 
Commonwealth working party recommended that the Secretariat take up offices in Marlborough 
House in Westminster. The working party stipulated that the Secretariat should have priority 
over the other Commonwealth organisations already occupying the site.
2
 In 1965 Marlborough 
House contained the offices of the Commonwealth Economic Committee (CEC) and the 
Commonwealth Education Liaison Unit (CELU). Per the Agreed Memorandum, both the CEC 
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and CELU were under review for potential amalgamation into the Secretariat. CEC staff were 
particularly concerned for the future of their jobs pending the review (see Chapter 11) and 
expressed their desire to remain in their existing offices.
3
 The CRO used its existing control of 
the building and leveraged CEC concerns in a bid to limit the growth of the Secretariat.  
As Secretariat staff began to work in Marlborough House they were assigned offices in the 
house’s upper levels and wings. This was initially a practical measure while the central part of 
the house was renovated through mid-1965.
4
 However, CRO officials attempted to permanently 
keep Secretariat offices in more remote corners of the building rather than giving the Secretariat 
priority over existing CEC offices. Smith made the case that while certain sections of the 
Secretariat could be housed in remote offices, the senior officers and their personal staff should 
be housed on the main floor of the central building. The placement of the senior offices was both 
a matter of form and a practical measure to ensure senior staff would be close to the main halls 
and meeting rooms. Smith felt that it was important to the members of the Commonwealth that 
the Secretariat be taken seriously and while he had to fight for central office space, the CRO 
ultimately relented.
5
   
Staff 
Pressure for the CRO to cooperate with the housing needs of the Secretariat was increased as the 
number and diversity of Secretariat staff grew. Arnold Smith’s vision for the organisation 
involved wide recruitment from throughout the Commonwealth. A diversely staffed Secretariat 
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would increase members’ stake in the organisation and reflect the Commonwealth’s claim to a 
unique degree of diversity.  
Hiring permanent staff was one of the most pressing imperatives in the early days of the 
Secretariat. The Secretariat began in September 1965 with only the Secretary-General, his 
personal assistant, and two staffers on loan from the British Diplomatic service. The Secretary-
General had the authority to appoint junior staff at his own discretion and could choose senior 
staff from panels of names submitted by member governments.
6
 In the meantime, Smith was 
starting from scratch.  
Smith enjoyed some support from the British Government in terms of junior staff. David 
Muirhead, Head of Her Majesty’s Diplomatic Service Personnel Department and George Wigg, 
the British Accountant General, recognised that Smith “…may well become very much of a ‘one 
man band’” without assistance. At Smith’s request both the diplomatic service and the 
Accountant General’s Office approved extended secondments for junior staff. The Accountant 
General’s Office also handled the accounting and paid out Secretariat salaries until sufficient 
staff could be trained for the Secretariat to manage its own internal affairs.
7
 Seconded staff and 
services were provided at no cost to the Secretariat with salaries being paid by their home 
departments and the additional workload of the Secretariat’s accounting being deemed too small 
to burden Whitehall’s own accountants.
8
 Smith also had assistance from two diplomats on loan 
from the Canadian Government whom he found “indispensable” during the first few months of 
his appointment.
9
 Smith was grateful for this early help and in his personal notes questioned how 
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he would have got along without the help of these staff. In particular Smith appreciated loaned 
staffers’ knowledge of organisational and governmental protocols in London, and their general 
knowledge of Commonwealth affairs. Smith drew on their expertise in tandem with the personal 
connections he was forging throughout the Commonwealth.
10
  
In contrast to the genuine assistance of the Accountant General’s Office, the CRO was 
accommodating as a means of continuing their influence over the operations of the 
Commonwealth. Not only did the CRO loan staff and facilities to the nascent Secretariat but it 
also pushed for one of its own staff to be hired as Secretariat political officer. Smith and David 
Muirhead (head of personnel for the British Diplomatic Service) agreed that hiring a CRO officer 
for the post would appease the CRO. However, they noted that CRO politicking must only be 
tolerated for so long as the department was slated to be amalgamated with the Foreign Office.
11
 
In the meantime the bulk of British opposition to the Secretariat was concentrated in the CRO.
12
    
Despite an early reliance on the British Government, Smith did his best to hire staff from 
throughout the Commonwealth and to pursue alternative channels for filling the ranks of the 
Secretariat.
13
 “There could be no question of a CRO in disguise.”
14
 During his early rounds of 
introductory visits to the various Commonwealth High Commissioners in London, Smith not 
only discussed their vision for the future of the organisation but also asked for advice on 
potential staff members.
15
 While the Agreed Memorandum called for junior staff such as typists, 
clerks, and drivers to be recruited locally in London as a cost saving measure, Smith also wrote 
to the High Commissioners asking for their recommendations for these junior positions and 
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whether their offices or consulates had junior staff who might be interested in working for the 
Secretariat. Smith attempted to assert the Secretariat’s independence from the British 
Government by incorporating the broadest possible spectrum of Commonwealth personnel 
within the financial imperative to locally hire junior staff.
16
 By seeking the assistance of all 
Commonwealth members to find diverse junior staff already in London, the Secretariat would be 
less susceptible to British attempts to fill the Secretariat ranks with either their own staff, or staff 
from other restrictionist governments (like Australia or New Zealand).  
The first week of September 1965 Smith addressed the important question of hiring two deputy 
Secretaries-General. This was both to distribute the workload among himself and his small staff, 
and to ensure continuity of leadership during his planned trips through the Commonwealth to 
become better acquainted with the membership. The two deputies would look after economic 
affairs, and international affairs and administration respectively. The former was hired for a 
three-year term and the latter for a five-year term staggered with the Secretary-General’s own 
five-years. Smith himself proposed staggered terms to ensure a degree of continuity among the 
Secretariat’s senior staff as the composition of the Secretariat changed over time.
17
 In the interim 
Smith also suggested that the deputies be recruited from Africa and Asia so that the senior-most 




Ghanaian Amishadai Larson (Yaw) Adu was nominated as political and administrative deputy in 
August. While Adu was the only nominee for this position there was widespread approval of his 
appointment among Commonwealth High Commissioners. Adu had served in the Gold Coast 
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Colonial Administrative Service and had a distinguished record in the Ghanaian Civil Service 
after independence. His experience as Secretary-General of the East African Common Services 
Organization and as a Regional Representative of the UN Technical Assistance Board gave him 
a wealth of experience and a strong reputation among both expansionist and restrictionist 
members.
19
 The candidates for the economic deputy were T.E. Gooneratne of Ceylon and Sen 
Gupta from India. The Commonwealth High Commissioners met on October 7, 1965 to finalise 
offers of appointment for both positions. During the discussions, India withdrew the candidacy 
of Sen Gupta for economic deputy in order to achieve unanimity. Sen Gupta was later offered an 
alternative senior position as head of the Commonwealth Secretariat’s Economic Department.
20
 
Unlike Arnold Smith’s appointment in June, Adu and Gooneratne were approved as Deputy 
Secretaries-General without concerted opposition from Britain and without resorting to a vote.
21
 
The ease of these appointments underscores that British opposition to Smith’s appointment was 
based on his personal activism and vision for the organisation, rather than his position as 
Secretary-General per se.  
Both deputies began work as soon as possible. Adu assisted with the organisation of Smith’s 
African tour that November, even though Adu was not slated to take his post until January 1966. 
Gooneratne began to plan the Commonwealth Trade Officials Meeting with the assistance of the 
British Government which was set to take place less than a fortnight after his arrival in London. 
Gooneratne and Sen Gupta also managed the growth and daily running of the Secretariat while 
Smith travelled in the autumn of 1965.
22
 As per the mandate of broad hiring practices laid out in 
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the Agreed Memorandum, the three senior-most Secretariat staff were from three different 
continents within the Commonwealth and would therefore represent the broadest range of 
member perspectives at the highest level.  
In contrast to the senior-most positions, hiring junior Secretariat staff went slowly. In its first 
year of operation the Secretariat did not even meet its initial hiring budget.
23
 Some of this delay 
was due to CRO staff members obstructing the hiring process in the Commonwealth Finance 
Committee. Smith recalled that in May 1966 Robert Walker, Head of the CRO’s Commonwealth 
Policy and Planning Department (who sat on the Finance Committee as a British representative) 
insisted that he did not have the authority of the British Government to approve hiring additional 
Secretariat staff. Because the Commonwealth was based on building consensus rather than 
voting Smith inquired how the Finance Committee could function if its members could neither 
vote nor wield the authority to work towards a consensus.
24
 Smith eventually convinced the 
committee to approve additional hires but in the meantime had to ask contract staff to stay with 
the Secretariat for several extra weeks to cover the gaps in Secretariat personnel.
25
    
Finance 
Robert Walker’s delay of the Finance Committee’s deliberations on Secretariat hiring was part of 
a wider pattern of British obstructionism in the early financial management of the Secretariat. 
The Commonwealth prime ministers appointed the Commonwealth Finance Committee in June 
1965 to oversee the Secretariat budget and manage Secretariat finances until the Secretariat itself 
was able to hire and train its own accounting staff. For the first year of the Secretariat the 
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committee collected and disbursed Secretariat funds, oversaw expenditures, authorised changes 
to the Secretariat budget, and drew up financial rules and regulations in collaboration with the 
Secretary-General.
26
 In theory the committee would operate as a transparent body comprised of 
the Commonwealth High Commissioners, the Secretary-General, and representatives of the 
British Treasury. However, the committee was fluid because both the Secretary-General and the 
High Commissioners could be represented by other senior Commonwealth staff in the event of 
scheduling conflict. The centrality of the committee in London made attendance more 
convenient to British officials who had the greatest ability to maintain consistent representation. 
The central role of the Treasury in the committee also facilitated British obstruction to 
Secretariat growth.  
Financial foot dragging by the British Treasury delayed the establishment of the Secretariat in 
the first place. In order to expedite the establishment of the Secretariat Smith repeatedly 
requested that the Secretariat funds held by the Treasury be available before his arrival in 
London on August 17, 1965.
27
 Without consulting the Commonwealth Finance Committee, the 
Treasury refused to distribute the funds until September when the Secretariat technically began 
operations. Treasury officials then further delayed into September owing to a bank holiday, and 
even then only released half of the Secretariat’s funding for the first year.
28
  
By controlling the Secretariat purse strings and not consulting with the wider Finance 
Committee, Treasury officials slowed the initial growth of the Secretariat. Yet by December 
1965 both the Treasury and the CRO were calling for the Secretariat to provide a detailed budget 
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for the next fiscal year.
29
 The Secretariat had not yet prepared a budget. By the end of 1965 the 
Secretariat had not finished hiring general or financial staff. Nor had the Secretariat received the 
second installation of its initial budget. Treasury officials justified the demand for a complete 
budget as necessary if the Treasury was to advocate for the Secretariat in the British Parliament. 
However such demands were more likely a means to pressure Secretariat staff. Internally, British 
officials felt that a “system of financial control” should be instituted over all Secretariat 
activites.
30
 By obstructing the development of the Secretariat’s financial capabilities and 
pressuring its existing staff, Treasury and CRO officials sought to weaken the Secretariat and 
keep it dependent on British administration. The extent to which pressure over the 1966-67 
Secretariat budget was a British tactic was clear in the consultations of the Finance Committee 
(which included representatives of the Secretariat and the wider membership including 
expansionists). When Smith raised the topic of the Secretariat budget with the committee, the 
group remained flexible and considerate of the Secretariat’s still-growing capacity. The 
Secretariat submitted its final budget for 1966-67 at the end of the fiscal year in April 1966, and 
the Finance Committee accepted and reviewed it without issue.
31
   
Immunities and Privileges 
Divergent expectations between the expansionists and restrictionists also animated discussion 
over the immunities and privileges given to the Secretariat. Diplomatic benefits were more 
highly contested within the British Government as they affected more departments and had 
greater implications for the status of the Secretariat. Many departments retained an Anglo-centric 
view of the Commonwealth and considered it an association grounded in the Empire rather than 
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an international organisation. The presumption that the Commonwealth was not an IO meant that 
in British thinking the new Secretariat did not fit into any of the pre-existing categories of 
organisations that were normally accorded diplomatic privileges and immunities.
32
 British 
Government departments shared a restrictionist approach to the Secretariat. However, the British 
approach to diplomatic benefits was disjointed and marked by conflicting departmental views of 
the Commonwealth’s place in British diplomacy. Lengthy internal debates about the degree and 
type of benefits the Secretariat should receive ultimately led to a compromise between relevant 
departments. That compromise showed the influence of expansionist Commonwealth members 
and reflected that the organisation functioned as an IO. 
Differing ideas in British departments about whether the Secretariat should receive diplomatic 
benefits depended on the degree of traditional authority those departments held vis-à-vis the 
Commonwealth. The Treasury for example, was defensive about Secretariat funds and worked 
with the CRO to delay the initial operations of the Secretariat. However, Treasury officials also 
recognised that the Secretariat functioned as a senior international organisation and supported 
full diplomatic privileges for Secretariat staff.
33
 Because Treasury officials did not oversee 
diplomatic immunities and privileges they were willing to concede that the Secretariat operated 
as an IO. In contrast, CRO officials were defensive about Secretariat infringement on the CRO’s 
traditional role performing secretarial functions for the Commonwealth. The CRO argued that 
Secretariat staff should not receive diplomatic benefits as those benefits would suggest that the 
Secretariat was an independent executive body. In keeping with CRO opposition in other areas, 
CRO officials felt that any immunities and privileges afforded to the Secretariat should be given 
on an ad hoc basis that would not risk setting any precedents about the status of the Secretariat as 
                                                             
32 TNA: DO 211/42, File Note about Draft Paper on Immunities and Privileges, 8 July, 1964. 





 For officials in the domestically-oriented Home Office, the question of Secretariat 
immunities and privileges raised the spectre of increased Commonwealth costs. Home Office 
representatives argued that existing Commonwealth bodies such as the CELU or CEC (which 
were largely staffed by Britain) had successfully functioned without such benefits and there was 
no reason to afford them to the Secretariat.
35
 Because Commonwealth administration had 
traditionally been performed by British staff without diplomatic benefits, the notion that the 
Commonwealth operated outside the British Government both challenged traditional thinking in 
the Home Office and raised questions about Commonwealth costs.  
Officials in the Foreign Office (FO) were also uncertain of the Commonwealth’s place in 
international relations. With the rapid changes of decolonisation the British diplomatic service 
was dealing with repeated departmental mergers at home and a profusion of new IOs abroad. 
Senior members of the FO wished not only to exert some control over these new IOs but also to 
limit the benefits afforded to them. Such benefits risked making the diplomatic service appear a 
financial drain to Parliament thus jeopardising the FO’s own funding and encouraging further 
departmental reorganisation. In a bid to slow the growth of IOs and stem diplomatic costs, FO 
staffers even drafted an international memorandum on the need to limit immunities and 
privileges for international organisations.
36
  
Achieving consensus between British departments about the degree and type of immunities and 
privileges to give the Secretariat involved challenging British departments’ traditional authority 
and assumptions about the Commonwealth. Each department was defensive and sought to put the 
burden of Commonwealth costs on another British department. For example, the Foreign Office 
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opposed allocating benefits through income tax exemptions or legal immunities as they did not 
wish to set any precedents for the Commonwealth or any other international organisation.
37
 
Officials in the FO instead supported benefits via concessions in duties and customs. These 
suggestions drew the ire of the Chancellor of the Exchequer who felt that the FO suggestion 
disproportionately burdened the Exchequer rather than distributing diplomatic benefits more 
evenly between customs, income tax, and legal immunities.
38
 In a similar sense, Wilson’s 
Cabinet wished to limit privileges and immunities to only the Secretary-General and perhaps his 
two deputies at most. Other concerned British departments agreed that benefits should be limited 
to a maximum of six to eight senior Secretariat staff, but were concerned about backlash from 
other Commonwealth members if these were only given to the Secretary-General.
39
 The CRO 
had the most traditional authority to lose and either opposed or sought to lessen schedules of 
immunities and privileges drawn up by other departments. Later, CRO officials even tried to 
claw back concessions already given to the Secretariat.
40
  
British departmental concerns over traditional authority and cost were exacerbated by pressures 
from the expansionist Commonwealth members. The expansionist view of the Commonwealth as 
an international organisation shaped the FO proposal that ultimately set the basis for Secretariat 
immunities and privileges. The FO feared parliamentary scrutiny over diplomatic benefits but 
was also concerned with maintaining good international relations. Because Commonwealth 
members held sway in the UN and thus affected broader British diplomacy, it was also in the 
FO’s departmental interest to facilitate Commonwealth relations. In consequence FO officials 
                                                             
37 TNA: DO 211/42, Minute from W.A.B. Hamilton to Sir Neil Pritchard, 8 April, 1965. 
38 TNA: DO 211/42, Minute from W.A.B. Hamilton to Mr. Walsh Atkins, 2 April, 1965. 
39 TNA: DO 211/42, Minute from M.J. Williams to Mr. Hamilton, 5 January, 1965; TNA: DO 211/42, Minute from 
W.A.B. Hamilton to Mr. Minogue, 14 January, 1965. 
40 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 1, File 3, Record of Conversation between Lord Beswick (CRO) and Arnold Smith, 
30 November, 1965. 
104 
 
proposed a compromise between British departments to give the new Secretariat a limited degree 
of immunities and privileges without according comprehensive diplomatic benefits. 
Although the FO proposal was meant to limit the immunities and privileges given to Secretariat 
staff it was an important step toward recognising the Commonwealth as an international 
organisation. The restrictionist tone of the FO proposal appealed to other British governmental 
departments but was also designed to appease newer Commonwealth members. Developing 
member states attached dual importance to diplomatic benefits which they saw as an important 
indicator of status as well as an important cost saving measure for their small diplomatic 
departments.
41
 The FO proposed that duty free petrol, liquor, and tobacco might be afforded to 
senior Secretariat officers in addition to customary diplomatic privileges such as immunity from 
traffic laws and financial provision for Secretariat staff moving to the UK. Internally FO officials 
noted that such benefits were relatively inexpensive diplomatic benefits that would also assist 
Secretariat staff in the transportation and hospitality needed to facilitate Commonwealth 
meetings.
42
 After some internal debate, the British Government also resolved to offer some tax 
exemptions to Secretariat staff based on tiered distinction between the senior and junior 
Secretariat staff.
43
 A schedule of immunities and privileges acceptable to the various British 
departments as well as to the Commonwealth membership was eventually codified in the 
Commonwealth Secretariat Act of 1966.
44
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The most significant outcome of the internal British debates on Commonwealth immunities and 
privileges was that the schedule of benefits proposed by the FO was modeled on benefits given 
to United Nations officials. The newer members had persistently called for British officials to 
grant diplomatic privileges and immunities to the Secretariat as befitted a senior international 
organisation. Some newer members even raised the issue directly with the British Government 
through personal channels. Representatives from Sierra Leone inquired why customary 
immunities for traffic offenses had not been included for junior Secretariat staff and Jamaican 
representatives pressed the British directly for Secretariat staff to receive full diplomatic 
treatment regarding income tax.
45
 The tiered schedule of benefits outlined in the Commonwealth 
Secretariat Act was a compromise. The act did not go as far as some newer members wanted and 
many British departments considered the act to go beyond all precedents for the treatment of 
international organisations. However, the act did allow the British Government to demonstrate 
understanding to the Commonwealth, so as not to “dash their hopes” about the new 
Commonwealth structure.
46
 More importantly, the Commonwealth Secretariat Act represented a 
shift in British treatment of the organisation. By modelling Commonwealth immunities and 
privileges on the UN and accommodating the expansionist vision for the organisation British 
officials began to more formally treat the Commonwealth as an international organisation.
47
 The 
role of the Foreign Office in brokering a compromise between defensive British departments also 
suggested a closer association of the Commonwealth with the Foreign Office in British thinking 
and foreshadowed the merger of the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices in 1968.   
Protocol 
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The conceptual shift between the Commonwealth-as-club and the Commonwealth-as-IO that 
shaped British debates over immunities and privileges also had implications for systems of 
protocol and form. British departments used to an Anglo-centric, imperially based concept of the 
Commonwealth were resistant to changes in Commonwealth protocols. The newer, expansionist 
members expected that protocols be changed to reflect the Commonwealth’s status as an 
international organisation rather than an appendage of the British Government. Issues of protocol 
had important symbolic ramifications and were chiefly opposed by British officials that either 
resented or did not understand the implications of such protocols.  
Tensions over procedural questions began almost as soon as the Secretariat was established. In 
September 1965 Smith wrote to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson as part of a circular query 
to all Commonwealth Heads of Government regarding Singapore’s application for 
Commonwealth membership. The Prime Minister’s reply became the subject of a series of 
internal correspondence between the CRO and the Prime Minister’s Office. While the British 
considered a reply sent by a lesser secretary beginning with the formal, yet frosty “Sir, I am 
directed…” They concluded that this might be too stiff of a brush-off for the new Secretary-
General. They decided instead to avoid the question of official wording and reply to Smith in a 
semi-official form. Not only did this avoid the potential problem of how to officially respond to 
the Secretary-General but it “…would [also] be in line with the policy of trying to direct Mr. 
Smith to transact his business with Under-Secretaries and not exclusively with Ministers and the 
Private Offices.
48
 The Agreed Memorandum governing the Secretariat stipulated that the 
Secretary-General should have access to member Heads of Government but elaborated that 
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members could specify the appropriate channels of communication.
49
 British policy on 
communication with the Secretary-General was a specific interpretation of the Agreed 
Memorandum that reflected the British view that Smith should be treated as a lesser diplomatic 
official rather than the head of a senior international organisation.   
Smith was aware that he was facing a well-entrenched system of protocols and worked with 
good humour to carve out the position of the Secretary-General. In his personal notes for August 
25, 1965, he wrote that he had teased Mr. Shannon of the Economic Section of the CRO by 
asking whether Shannon would call on Smith at Marlborough House for a meeting they had 
arranged that week. Smith noted that while he was happy to call at the CRO, Shannon had 
“seemed astonished” by this suggestion. When they met, Smith elaborated that he would not 
always call on the CRO and that in future, CRO staff would sometimes be expected to come to 
Marlborough House to call on the Secretary-General.
50
 Smith explained that this was both the 
expectation of the Commonwealth members and proper procedure for a large international 
organisation. As with the question of immunities and privileges, matters of protocol had strong 
symbolic value to the newer members. It was important to demonstrate that the Secretariat was 
not beholden to the British Government. 
The newer members’ vision of the Commonwealth as an international organisation was also 
clear in other symbolic matters of form like the Secretary-General’s honorific title. Several 
newer members suggested that the Secretary-General might be called “his excellency” like the 
UN Secretary-General.
51
 Those members felt that the honorific was an important signifier of the 
Secretary-General’s standing and a reasonable feature for a large international organisation. 
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British officials opposed the use of “excellency” but were largely alone in this view and 
recognised that openly opposing the honorific could damage their standing in the 
Commonwealth. While privately indignant, British officials ultimately decided to choose their 
battles based on major issues of principle and relented on the issue of honorifics.
52
 The 
Australian Government shared British misgivings about the honorific title to the point that 
Canberra initiated correspondence with Whitehall on what could be done to prevent the use of 
“excellency.” While sympathising with the Australian view British officials argued that dealing 
with the Secretariat was a question of tactics rather than principle. Because open confrontation 
would rally newer members to the Secretariat, British officials preferred to engage with Smith 
personally through unofficial channels. By using unofficial channels they could avoid using the 
new title without appearing difficult to the other members.
53
 British officials advised the 
Australian Government to do the same and relent on small matters and in order to keep Smith in 
close personal touch, rather than at arm’s length as an enemy.
54
 Rather than risking conflict with 
the newer members and the Secretariat, in both figurative and literal terms the British 
Government conceded that the Secretary-General could have a seat at the table.
55
 
Despite these early concessions, British thinking abut the Secretariat was slow to acknowledge 
the Secretariat’s status as a senior international organisation rather than a subordinate British 
project. For instance, in 1965 British protocol for ceremonial occasions was adapted to include 
the Secretary-General. Henceforth, British policy for ceremonies was to treat the Secretary-
General with the same formalities as a Commonwealth High Commissioner, but not as the head 
of an IO.  However, as late as March 1969 the recently formed Foreign and Commonwealth 
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Office (FCO) invited each of the Commonwealth High Commissioners to the Prince of Wales’ 
investiture and forgot to invite the Secretary-General. When the error was discovered the FCO 
issued an invitation to Arnold Smith and apologised that they had used the wrong distribution 
list. In this case, a diplomatic list excluding the Secretary-General from ceremonial occasions 
had survived four years and two departmental mergers in the British diplomatic service. Smith 
had specifically requested to be included on such diplomatic lists in December 1965 and treating 
the Secretary-General the same as High-Commissioners for ceremonial occasions had also been 
British policy since 1965.
56
 The survival of an exclusionary diplomatic list for such occasions 
attests to how the idea of the Commonwealth as a lesser organisation was entrenched in the 
British “official mind.”     
Discussions about protocol for communication, meetings, title, and ceremony illustrate the 
degree to which British officials resisted changing protocols regarding the Commonwealth. In 
each of these instances British officials wished to treat the Secretary-General without special 
privileges, or with formalities befitting a Commonwealth High Commissioner rather than the 
head of an international organisation. This resistance was both a manifestation of British 
restrictionism towards the Secretariat and a reflection of the difficulties British officials had 
accepting the idea of the Commonwealth as an IO. In contrast, the newer members saw the 
Secretary-General as a senior international figure and a representative of their own interests. 
Those members felt that protocols should reflect the status of the Commonwealth as an IO and 
anything less would trivialise the Commonwealth organisation. The newer, expansionist 
members so strongly advocated for those protocols that the British Government relented rather 
than risk friction with other Commonwealth members.   
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The process of arranging Secretariat logistics was shaped by differing visions for the future of 
the organisation. The newer members who viewed the Commonwealth as an international 
organisation consistently advocated for housing, staff, finance, diplomatic immunities and 
privileges, and protocols commensurate with the standards of other international organisations 
such as the UN. Those logistics were negotiated in turn between the Secretariat and various 
British departments.
57
 British engagement with the Secretariat was characterised by deep 
institutional conservatism and a widespread difficulty conceiving of the Commonwealth as 
anything other than a British entity. Difficulties between the Secretariat and British Government 
departments were often as much due to the British inability to recognise the Commonwealth as 
an IO as they were due to overt obstruction. Obstructionism was concentrated in departments 
which had the most traditional authority to lose. As Secretariat logistics were negotiated with 
different British departments, the British Government made concessions that indicated that the 
Secretariat was an international organisation. While there was no unified recognition of the 
Commonwealth as an IO, the establishment of the Secretariat shifted British engagement with 
the organisation onto a footing that better reflected newer members’ vision for the 
Commonwealth.  
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Chapter Six: Membership 
Introduction 
In theory the early Commonwealth was bound together by imperial loyalty and fraternity. After 
the Second World War the monarchy became the symbolic head of the Commonwealth and 
organisational diversity was increasingly emphasised as a central feature of the organisation. 
However, the adaptation of Commonwealth values and structures outlined in Chapter One left 
many older features of the Commonwealth unchallenged until Afro-Caribbean decolonisation 
began in earnest. The responsibility for processing applications for Commonwealth membership 
was a role assumed by the British Government. Whitehall had never been challenged in this area, 
and the processes surrounding Commonwealth membership had not changed since 1949. British 
Officials in the Colonial Office (CO) and CRO maintained an imperially-informed, Anglo-
centric concept of how the membership process should function.  
To former colonies and those on the eve of independence, British involvement in processing 
Commonwealth applications undermined the integrity of the Commonwealth. Newer members 
accepted that the British Government might submit membership applications on behalf of 
colonies under the same rules of sovereignty that applied in the UN. However, they objected to 
the British Government processing membership applications. Newer members sought to 
delineate the application and consultation processes between the British Government and the 
Secretariat in order to make the Commonwealth more like other international organisations.       
Processing applications for Commonwealth membership was the first major operational 
challenge for the Secretariat in the fall of 1965. A largely informal process, acceptance as a 
Commonwealth member was determined by simple consultation with the existing membership. 
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The process to become a Commonwealth member was tied to colonial independence. The British 
viewed colonial policy as a domestic matter and therefore an issue of sovereignty. The processes 
of independence and membership applications had historically been handled in the same British 
departments and there was no clear distinction between where domestic matters ended and where 
Commonwealth matters began. Because the CRO had hitherto provided secretarial services to 
the Commonwealth there had been no particular need to differentiate between these processes. 
However, for the newer members who viewed the Commonwealth as an international 
organisation, it was imperative that the operations of the Commonwealth be clearly separated 
from British colonial administration. As with the logistics of setting up the Secretariat, questions 
about Commonwealth membership were negotiated between a proprietary British Government 
and the activist Secretariat. The former was supported by the restrictionist group which shared 
British concerns about Secretariat infringement on member sovereignty. The latter was supported 
by the newer, expansionist members who wanted to retrieve Commonwealth administration from 
the murky processes of British policy.  
Newer members’ suspicions about how the British handled Commonwealth applications were 
raised in the context of the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples and aligned to their calls for imperial accountability and transparency in 
the international sphere. Suspicions of British intentions were also based on a record of British 
attempts to control Commonwealth membership leading up to the formation of the Secretariat. 
As the Commonwealth grew in the early 1960s the British Government in general, and the CRO 
in particular, attempted to leverage questions of membership to maintain traditional procedures. 
Maintaining the status quo would give more power to the British Government and justify the 
continued existence of the CRO. As it became clear that African membership would upset the 
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Commonwealth status quo, CRO officials proposed ways to limit and control Commonwealth 
membership as African decolonisation accelerated.      
The Commonwealth of the 1950s was an Anglo-centric, racially hierarchical organisation. As 
detailed in Chapter Two, African decolonisation set in motion the changes that led to the birth of 
the modern organisation in 1965. However, prior to the formation of the Secretariat, the CRO 
attempted to forestall changes in Commonwealth membership procedures. In 1953, CRO 
officials recommended denying automatic membership to newly independent states. Instead the 
CRO proposed a tiered membership model including ranking by area, population, or national 
wealth.
1
 Such a system would prevent the Commonwealth from becoming so egalitarian that it 
would be able to exert pressure on British policy and would prevent the bloc politics that small 
former colonies were using in the UN General Assembly. However, the CRO proposal reached 
an impasse in the wider context of the Cold War. Whitehall feared that a tiered and exclusive 
model of Commonwealth membership might encourage former colonies to abandon the 
Commonwealth and seek association with the Eastern Bloc.
2
 This would reduce British influence 
in the world much more than condoning a new concept of the Commonwealth in which Britain 
was no longer the central authority. The British Government reluctantly supported the Secretariat 
in a bid to counter Soviet influence. Whitehall considered this a practical risk management 
approach, particularly in Africa.
3
 The imperatives of the Cold War won out over traditional 
thinking regarding the equality of Commonwealth members.
4
  
                                                             
1 Lloyd, “Britain and the Transformation from Empire to Commonwealth,” 350. 
2 TNA: DO 121/215, Committee on Commonwealth Membership: C.R.O. Comments on Draft Outline for Report, 
November, 1953. 
3 TNA: DO 121/215, Minute from J.J.S. Garner to Sir P. Liesching, 23 November, 1953. 
4 This did not prevent, as David McIntyre argues “a de facto 'two-tier' system of consultation…especially in defence 
matters” from persisting within the formally egalitarian Commonwealth. Defence consultation, however, was 
increasingly transferred away from the Commonwealth to other networks such as NATO, or the Five Eyes. See: 
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Ideas about restricting Commonwealth membership nonetheless persisted despite Cold War 
concerns. In a 1963 procedural note, the CRO reconsidered the tiered model first proposed in 
1953. CRO officials still found the tiered model untenable in light of broader political concerns, 
but nor would they consider automatic membership for newly independent states.
5
 The 1963 note 
recommended that the British Government expedite consultations with other Commonwealth 
members in order to lessen scrutiny on British attitudes towards prospective members, but it did 
not propose any concrete changes to existing membership procedures.    The lack of clarity 
surrounding Britain’s role in Commonwealth membership consultations was not resolved until 
after the formation of the Secretariat. In 1965 the British Government conceded to a more 
egalitarian concept of the Commonwealth and supported the establishment of the Secretariat. 
However, British officials nonetheless worked to mitigate the impact of those concessions and 
maintain control of Commonwealth membership procedures. British opposition to the Secretariat 
processing member applications had four core components. In a broad sense, the British 
Government was restrictionist and opposed the expansion of the Secretariat’s functions in any 
way. Maintaining control of Commonwealth membership procedures was a means to prevent 
Secretariat expansion. A secondary oppositional feature within the British Government was the 
CRO’s proprietary stance towards Commonwealth operations. The CRO had the most traditional 
authority to lose to the Secretariat. CRO officials worried about their future employment and 
wanted to avoid their department being amalgamated. A third significant reason for opposition 
over membership was a deep-seated concern for British sovereignty. In both the Commonwealth 
and other international fora the British Government vehemently defended the position that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
McIntyre, “Canada and the Creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat, 1965,” 754; McIntyre, British 
Decolonization, 120.  
5 TNA: DO 161/309, Procedure for Admission of New Members to the Commonwealth: Note Prepared in the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, 5 April, 1963. 
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colonial affairs were a domestic concern, not to be subject to the scrutiny or advice of other 
nations or organisations.
6
 British officials conceded that the Secretariat could fact-find and 
conduct research among the membership on domestic affairs but maintained that the Secretariat 
had no authority to involve itself in members’ internal affairs and that “…any extension of its 
functions in this way… would be wrong in principle and disastrous for the Commonwealth 
concept which the Secretariat should be designed to promote.”
7
  
Finally, as with the logistical debates detailed in Chapter Five, British officials found it difficult 
to conceive of the Commonwealth as an international organisation. Secretariat management of 
membership applications would require delineating responsibility for making an application from 
the responsibility for processing an application. These responsibilities had never been 
differentiated and had always been conducted internally. To newer members British control of 
Commonwealth membership was an obvious conflict of interest that did not meet the standards 
of an international organisation. When newer members called for the Secretariat to process 
membership applications, in addition to sovereignty arguments British officials argued that they 
were the best equipped to process membership requests because they had the best sense of the 
timing of prospective members’ independence and because they had always done so. This was a 
weak argument that reflected the British difficulty viewing the Commonwealth as something 
other than an Anglo-centric club. As with debates over Secretariat logistics, questions about 
Commonwealth membership were negotiated between the Secretariat and the British 
Government. The membership issue was another field of competition between different ideas 
                                                             
6 In British nomenclature, the term Commonwealth evolved and so at different times meant different things, and 
could be scaled to include a wide range of states. For example “Commonwealth countries” might include colonies, 
but were not the same as “Commonwealth members.”  For the purposes of this paper a simpler distinction is drawn 
between the terms Commonwealth and colonial, in which the former refers to Commonwealth members and the 
latter to dependencies unless otherwise specified.  
7 TNA: T 312/707, Commonwealth Secretariat: British Working Paper, 13 August, 1964. 
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about the nature and future direction of the Commonwealth, either as a continuation of the old 
Anglo-centric club or as a modern international organisation.  
Singapore 
The question of how the Secretariat would affect Commonwealth membership applications arose 
before the Secretariat was even technically operational. When Arnold Smith first arrived at 
Marlborough House on August 18, 1965, he found a letter awaiting him from the Malaysian 
High Commissioner detailing the separation of Singapore from Malaysia and sponsoring 
Singapore’s application for Commonwealth Membership.
8
 Smith immediately acted on the 
Malaysian letter and initiated consultations to approve Singapore’s membership that afternoon. 
The August 18 circular was the first official correspondence of the new Secretariat and was 
issued before the Secretariat had received any funding, before it had its own letterhead or staff, 




The same day Smith met with CRO officials who attempted to dissuade him from acting on the 
Singapore application. They argued that Smith had no background knowledge of Singapore’s 
application and that since the matter was political, any action taken by the Secretariat would be 
an executive function contrary to the terms of the Agreed Memorandum.
10
 CRO officials 
maintained that British coordination of membership consultations was an accepted, established 
procedure that in no way ran counter to the equality of the members. Furthermore, the CRO had 
already begun consultations while Smith was en route to London and felt that he would only 
                                                             
8 The Singapore request was the first item in Smith’s personal files as Secretary-General. See LAC: MG 31 E 47, 
Volume 1, File 1, Letter from the High Commissioner for Malaysia to the Secretary-General, 13 August, 1965. 
9 Ibid; LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 1, File 1, Diary Entries, 17, 18, 19 August, 1965; LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 1, 
File 3, Commonwealth Circular No. 14, 10 November, 1965. 
10 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 1, File 1, Diary, 17, 18, 19 August, 1965. 
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cause confusion by duplicating the consultations.
11
 Smith was surprised that such an important 
message had not been telegraphed to him. He countered that even if the matter was purely one of 
form, if he did not respond the Commonwealth would appear to be a club beholden to Britain 
rather than an organisation in which the members were equal partners.
12
  
Smith initiated membership consultations to demonstrate that the Secretariat was independent 
from British influence. In contrast, CRO officials felt they were defending both British 
sovereignty and their department’s traditional functions. The CRO had been preparing for 
Singapore’s application for six years. In 1959 CRO staff anticipated that small states would 
eventually apply for Commonwealth membership and noted that Singapore would likely be the 
first candidate. The Singapore case was “not very satisfactory” due to the legal complexities of 
dissolving the Malay Federation, tensions between Commonwealth neighbours, and strong 
suspicions of the British operating neocolonial “snatch-back powers.”
13
 In 1962 CRO officials 
agreed that because Commonwealth membership was predicated on member sovereignty (like 
UN membership) with the appropriate legal procedures for sovereignty-transfer, Singapore and 
Malaysia could both inherit Commonwealth membership as successor states if the Malay 
Federation was dissolved.
14
 The CRO initiated advanced discussions about Singaporean 
membership in defence of their office against a possible merger with the Colonial Office. By 
finding solutions for membership problems in advance, CRO official sought to justify the utility 
of their department. However, these discussions were based on the assumption that the CRO 
                                                             
11 TNA: DO 161/309, Letter from J.J.S Garner to Sir Hilton Poynton, 27 August, 1965; TNA: DO 161/309, Minute 
from Sir N. Pritchard to Mr. Walsh Atkins, 19 August, 1965.  
12 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 1, File 1, Diary Entries, 17, 18, 19 August, 1965; Smith, Stitches in Time, 21. 
13 TNA: DO 121/247, Note for Record: Commonwealth States, 9 July, 1959. 
14 TNA: DO 181/27, Malaysia: Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting, 14 August, 1962.  
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would continue operating as a surrogate secretariat for the Commonwealth.
15
 The creation of the 
Secretariat undermined these assumptions and not only re-opened the issue of Singapore’s 
membership but also posed a threat to the CRO and subjected the British Government to more 
scrutiny than if it had been solely responsible for membership consultations.  
Increased scrutiny over British conduct showed the CRO’s willingness to exclude the Secretariat 
from consultations in order to maintain its central position in a hub-and-spoke model of the 
Commonwealth. The exclusion of the Secretariat also demonstrated the inherent conflict of 
interest in British management of Commonwealth membership applications.
16
 In the 
Singaporean case, the Malaysian Federal Government had first approached the CRO to conduct 
the consultations for Singapore’s membership according to pre-Secretariat procedures. However, 
the British Government had repeatedly delayed consultations for Singaporean membership. 
Those delays were in part due to “…very delicate and important discussions with Britain’s allies, 
the United States and Australia, about the future of Singapore…”
17
 The British Government also 
wished to confer with the Old Commonwealth behind closed doors before initiating discussions 
with the wider membership which further delayed the membership consultations.
18
 The 
Malaysian Government wrote to the Secretariat before it was technically operational in response 
to British delays, and as a way to test the new Secretariat.
19
 Arnold Smith’s prompt action within 
                                                             
15 TNA: DO 121/247, Minute from H. Lintott to Sir G. Laithwaite, 30 June, 1959; TNA: DO 121/247, Note for 
Record, 25 June, 1959. 
16 TNA: DO 121/247, Note for Record: Commonwealth States, 9 July, 1959.   
17 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 1 File 1, Diary Entry, 27 August, 1965.  
18 TNA: DO 161/309, Letter from J.J.S Garner to Sir Hilton Poynton, 27 August, 1965. 




24 hours of arriving in London exposed British delays as artificial. British officials later blamed 
the delays on confusion caused by the Secretariat, but the damage was done.
20
   
The Singaporean Government felt misled by the British and argued that without the Secretariat 
they would be made to look like “white men’s stooges.” Because British interest in the Singapore 
Naval Base was affecting membership consultations Singaporean officials went so far as 
threatening to seek other clients to lease the base if the British did not treat the Singaporean 
Government equitably.
21
 In so doing the Singaporean Government leveraged the Cold War 
security considerations that had already steered British policy away from a hierarchical model 
for Commonwealth membership in the early 1960s. However, because the issue of membership 
applications directly touched on British sovereignty, the British Government had a stronger 
impetus to resist change to membership procedures.  
Internally, British officials toyed with the idea of falsely telling Smith that the consultations were 
already complete in order to stop Secretariat “meddling” in the Singaporean application
22
 
However, the Secretariat enjoyed wide support from the newer, expansionist members. Smith 
pressed the issue as a matter of principle and the Secretariat conducted its own parallel 
consultations.
23
 CRO officials privately conceded that the Secretariat might issue a statement on 
the consultation results but contested Secretariat involvement in the consultations themselves.
24
 
Both Smith and the CRO remained unconvinced of the other’s legitimacy in processing 
membership consultations. British officials felt that Smith would follow the matter as a point of 
                                                             
20 TNA: DO 161/309, Outward Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to British Guiana (Sir R. 
Luyt), 23 March, 1966.  
21 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume, 1 File 3, Meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, 29 October, 1965. 
22 TNA: DO 161/309, Letter from J.J.S Garner to Sir Hilton Poynton, 27 August, 1965. 
23 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 1, File 1, Diary Entry, 27 August, 1965; TNA: DO 161/309, Letter from J.J.S Garner 
to Sir Hilton Poynton, 27 August, 1965. 
24 TNA: DO 161/309, Letter from J.J.S Garner to Sir Hilton Poynton, 27 August, 1965. 
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principle and argue that the Secretariat should coordinate membership consultations for all future 
members and so remained evasive on procedural questions.
25
 Smith doubted that British 
representatives understood the significance of the membership question for the image of the 
Commonwealth to the newer members.
26
   
The debate over processing Singapore’s membership aligned to the expansionist and 
restrictionist views of the Commonwealth. For instance, Britain had a staunch ally in Australian 
Prime Minister Robert Menzies. Menzies was a vocal critic of the Secretariat in general and 
specifically opposed Secretariat involvement in the membership question. He echoed British 
reasoning that the Secretariat risked straying into executive functions in processing membership 
applications.
27
 Menzies conceded that Smith’s course of action regarding Singapore was a 
natural course given the circumstances. However, he wrote to Smith personally to note that the 
practice of membership consultation had always been handled by Britain on an inter-
governmental basis and opined that it should continue that way.
28
 In addition to Menzies 
personal antagonism, Australian policy aligned with British restrictionism because Australia also 
had dependent territories. Secretariat participation in membership applications had implications 




In contrast, Smith’s position was buttressed with support from the newer members, as well as the 
legal peculiarities of the Singapore application. The British opposed Secretariat involvement in 
applications as most prospective members were dependencies and thus remained a domestic 
                                                             
25 TNA: DO 161/309, Minute from Sir N. Pritchard to Mr. Walsh Atkins, 19 August, 1965. 
26 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 1, File 1, Diary Entry, 27 August, 1965. 
27 TNA: DO 161/309, Minute by N. Pritchard, 25 August, 1965. 
28 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 1, File 1, Message from R.G. Menzies to Arnold Smith, 10 September, 1965. 
29 Apart from dependencies, Australia and Britain also shared anxieties about non-white immigration and 
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matter in British thinking. In this sense, any attempts by the Secretariat or other Commonwealth 
members to involve themselves in the application process could violate British sovereignty. 
Singapore however, was applying as a member being split from the already independent Malay 
Federation. Malaysia as the applicant sponsor replicated the British role of other Commonwealth 
applicants as they gained independence and the matter was clearly beyond British sovereignty. 
The British recognised this particularity which ultimately led them to accommodate the 
Secretariat’s parallel consultations and to coordinate a joint outcome with Smith. However, the 
CRO worried that Smith would regard the Singaporean case as a precedent for the Secretariat’s 
role in future membership consultations, while in British thinking the case was clearly sui 
generis.
30
      
The Secretariat circulated the formal acceptance of Singapore’s membership on October 14, 
1965.
31
 In a sense, confirming British suspicions, Smith viewed the application as a precedent for 
Secretariat consultation and came to view the Singapore case as the first test of the central 
consultative machinery of the Secretariat.
32
 More importantly, the Singaporean application 
demonstrated the conflict of interest inherent to British management of Commonwealth 
membership procedures and the difficulty British officials had delineating British and 
Commonwealth priorities.   
Malawi 
In the spring of 1966, the Secretariat’s role processing Commonwealth membership applications 
was still unclear. Smith felt that the Singapore case was an important precedent, but the 
constitutional particularities of the Malay Federation had facilitated Secretariat involvement. 
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Because the applicant was already independent, British and Australian arguments that the 
Secretariat would infringe on member sovereignty by participating in the application process 
were unfounded. In April 1966, the Malawian application to remain in the Commonwealth once 
it became a republic reinforced the Secretariat role in processing membership applications. 
Although Malawi was already a Commonwealth, member the Malawian Government felt that it 
was important to affirm its status in the Commonwealth after the changeover of its constitution 
and governmental apparatus planned for July 1966. There were no formally established protocols 
as to whether a change in governmental structure would affect Commonwealth membership.
33
 
However, India, Pakistan, Ghana, Tanzania, and Nigeria had all previously sought affirmation of 
their Commonwealth membership after transitioning to republics which set a strong precedent in 
an organisation based on building member consensus. By seeking the same affirmation, the 
already-independent Malawian Government gave the Secretariat the opportunity to reinforce its 
ability to process membership applications without raising the issue of member sovereignty.   
As an already independent member, the Malawian Government followed the approach used by 
Malaysia in the Singapore case and announced its intentions to other Commonwealth 
governments. Unlike with the Singapore case, the Malawian Government eschewed dual 
consultations and only approached the Secretariat. As with previous republics affirming their 
membership, there was little doubt as to the outcome of these consultations. However, the 
process was important to the Malawian Government and was also a show of support for the 
Secretariat. 
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The British and Australian Governments still opposed Secretariat involvement in membership 
applications and conferred on how to prevent Secretariat participation. However, Malawi was 
already independent, already a Commonwealth member, and had consulted the Secretariat 
directly. The British Government had no authority to contest the approach and feared being 
isolated in the Commonwealth if newer members rallied to the Secretariat. CRO officials advised 
Australian representatives to stand with the United Kingdom on larger matters of principle while 
conceding minor victories to Smith and the Secretariat.
34
 Both Australian and British officials 
made their views known to the Secretariat without risking rebuke from the wider membership. In 
their responses to the Secretariat consultations both emphasised that they had already been in 
direct communication with the Government of Malawi when the republican transition was first 
announced, implying Secretariat redundancy.
 35
 Australian officials took the opportunity to state 
outright that they supported Malawi’s continued membership but that membership consultations 
should be carried out directly between governments and not through the Secretariat.
36
  
As with the Singapore application, Smith and his staff expediently conducted the membership 
consultations and completed the entire process within one month.
37
 Although the affirmation of 
Malawi’s membership was not a major episode in the evolution of membership consultations, it 
demonstrated that the Secretariat could, and in the eyes of the newer members, should carry out 
such consultations.  
Guyana 
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Singaporean and Malawian support reinforced the Secretariat’s role processing membership 
applications and gave the Secretariat a stronger footing to participate in British Guiana’s 
application for Commonwealth membership. Unlike Singapore or Malawi, Guiana (soon to be 
Guyana) was still a dependency under British suzerainty. British officials maintained that up to 
independence the responsibility of a colony’s external affairs remained with Britain and therefore 
if a colony wished to become a Commonwealth member “…she should ask Britain to take the 
appropriate steps, and it is for Britain to decide what steps should be taken.”
38
 Based on the 
Singaporean and Malawian applications, British officials expected the newer members and 
Secretariat staff to object to British management of the Guyanese application.
39
 However, the 
British Government saw the Guyanese case as a matter of principle involving British sovereignty 
and was willing to fight over its right to manage Guyanese membership.  
Smith also regarded the Guyanese application as a matter of principle which would not 
fundamentally change the consultations but was crucial to the success of an egalitarian 
Commonwealth. In his conversations with the Commonwealth leaders, with the exception of 
Australia and the United Kingdom, he found all other Commonwealth leaders supportive of 
Secretariat involvement in the membership process.
40
 The High Commissioner of Ceylon went 
so far as to ask what the point of the Secretariat was if not to carry out such consultations.
41
 The 
Guyanese High Commissioner agreed on this principle and advised his government to apply 
directly to the Secretariat for Commonwealth membership. 
This conflict over principle peaked in the spring of 1966. British Officials again blurred the lines 
between British interests and Commonwealth services. Because Guyanese foreign policy was 
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still administered by the British Government, Guyanese Prime Minister Forbes Burnham sent a 
letter to Arnold Smith care of the Colonial Office. CO officials held the letter on suspicion that it 
was the Guyanese application for Commonwealth membership. Although they were unclear on 
the letter’s contents, CO officials did not forward it to the Secretariat and instead consulted the 
CRO. Both departments regarded direct correspondence between the Guyanese Government and 
the Secretariat as improper and saw it as setting a dangerous precedent on the membership 
issue.
42
 While British officials had intercepted Burnham’s correspondence they were uncertain 
whether the Guyanese Government had already contacted the Secretariat via Sir Lionel Luckhoo, 
the Guyanese High Commissioner in London. The CO and CRO resolved not to deliver 
Burnham’s letter at all and to “summon” Sir Luckhoo to explain Guyanese actions and attempt to 
dissuade Burnham and Smith from a course of action not approved by Britain.
43
  
In conversation with Sir Luckhoo, British officials found that Smith had initiated correspondence 
with Guyanese representatives and that even though they had instructed Burnham on the 
“proper” application procedure, he had ignored their instructions in favour of consulting directly 
with the Secretariat.
44
 On March 22, CO officials were able to convince an upset Sir Luckhoo 
that Smith had misled him with incorrect procedures. British representatives also instructed their 
own High Commissioner in Guyana to tell Burnham that his letter had been held and to remind 
him that the Singaporean application did not constitute a precedent.
45
 The High Commissioner 
was further instructed to tell Burnham that his consultation with the Secretariat was inappropriate 
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and not only broke procedure, but would cause confusion, difficulty, inefficiency, delays, and a 
reduced likelihood of a positive response from other governments.
46
  
When CRO officials met with Smith on March 18, they hedged their responses to Smith’s 
inquiries about Guyanese membership and left the conversation inconclusive.
47
 Only after they 
had dispatched telegrams to Guyana on March 23 did CRO staffers discuss how to answer Smith.  
CRO officials agreed that telling Smith “what we are doing when we do it” would be the best 
approach as it left little room for Smith to protest British actions.
48
 They resolved to initiate 
consultations on Guyanese membership and to keep Smith informed as a courtesy but without 
any advance notice.
49
 In the meantime, CRO officials also exploited Smith’s scheduled visit to 
Canada, the United States, and Trinidad from March 23 to April 7 to begin Commonwealth 
consultations while Smith was away.
50
 The CRO only resumed discussions about how to prevent 
Secretariat interference in the application process the day before Smith returned to London.
51
 
The day Smith returned, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Arthur Bottomley 
wrote to the Secretary-General flatly informing Smith that the CRO had already begun 
consultations on Guyanese membership. Bottomley recognised that the Secretariat had a 
legitimate interest in the membership question but stressed that interest did not mean that the 
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Secretariat had any right to participate in the membership process and that the Singapore case did 
not constitute a precedent for Secretariat involvement.
52
  
Bottomley’s letter demonstrated the fundamental lack of understanding within the British 
Government as to how the Commonwealth was perceived by the newer members. When Smith 
replied to Bottomley he stressed that the membership issue was not a legal or practical problem 
but one “of psychology and political atmosphere.”
53
 Smith recognised that there were valid 
arguments to be made for both of their approaches but argued that consultation through the 
Secretariat and not the former colonial power was the best way to embody Commonwealth 
principles and was the expectation of the membership. He agreed that in keeping with 
international norms the British could reserve the right to manage the external affairs of colonies 
until independence. However, Smith suggested that if those colonies applied for Commonwealth 
membership, the British should submit the application to the Secretary-General on the colony’s 
behalf and the Secretariat should carry out the membership consultations.
54
 Unlike the CRO, 
Smith differentiated between British and Commonwealth matters and sought to remove the latter 
from British control.   
British officials and ministers missed the point of Smith’s letter which they saw as both 
unreasonable and arrogant.
55
 Officials in the CRO saw Smith’s persistence on the question of 
Commonwealth membership as a means of building his own authority rather than a resonable 
function for the Secretariat. However, when the British began their consultations on Guyanese 
membership the newer members preferred Secretariat management of membership applications 
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as with the Malawian and Singaporean cases. Zambian officials for example, supported 
Guyanese membership, but noted in their reply that they “…did not expect the British High 




The CRO did not want to damage relations with other Commonwealth countries, particularly in 
central Africa where tensions over Rhodesia were high.
57
 At the same time, they concluded that a 
firm reply to Smith was needed to check his perceived expansionism. They concluded that if the 
CRO conducted the majority of membership consultations, they would invite the Secretariat to 
issue a formal statement of acceptance after Guyanese independence.  British officials hoped this 
would be an acceptable compromise that would help appease the Secretariat and the newer 
members without any loss of practical authority or breach of British sovereignty.
58
 Bottomley 
replied to Smith on May 9 and restated British arguments but nonetheless offered that the 
Secretariat could issue Guyana’s formal acceptance when the consultation process was 
completed.
59
 At a meeting between CRO and Secretariat officials the following day Smith took a 
conciliatory tack and agreed to the compromise in Guyana’s case, though he reiterated the 
importance of employing the Secretariat’s consultative machinery in future.
60
 British feelings of 
embattlement over Rhodesia and doubts about the Commonwealth occupied the rest of the 
meeting and encouraged Smith to make conciliatory overtures.
61
 In his own records however, 
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Smith noted that Bottomley had ignored a previous oral agreement about consultation procedures 
and that his own ideas remained unchanged.
62
    
The importance of maintaining British cooperation over Rhodesia was paramount and guided 
Smith’s conciliatory efforts. However, debate between the Secretariat and the CRO had also 
been productive. The CRO was providing the Secretariat with regular updates of member 
responses (a courtesy previously unlikely) and the Secretariat had secured the role of formally 
announcing the consultation results.
63
 The Secretariat was also now established enough to fulfill 
its role as an “information clearing house” and prepared a background paper on Guyana that was 
well received even in the CRO.
64
 More importantly, the Secretariat had secured inroads on the 
membership issue and was firmly backed by the newer Commonwealth members that viewed the 
Commonwealth as an IO. 
The Guyanese application was an important step in delineating British interests from 
Commonwealth affairs. The existence of the Secretariat made conflicts of interest more obvious 
in how the British Government managed membership applications. The newer, expansionist 
members did not accept British arguments that the application process should not be managed by 
the Secretariat. The Guyanese Government consistently opposed British involvement in the 
process. In a meeting with Smith after independence in May 1966, Prime Minister Burnham 
stressed that British involvement in the membership process had made the application more 
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politically vulnerable in Guyana, and he wanted the Secretariat to carry out the consultations.
65
 
Burnham stressed that if Guyanese officials had the opportunity at the next Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting, they intended to raise the issue with other Commonwealth members and state for the 
record that they saw membership consultations as a matter for the Secretariat and had requested 
the Secretariat to conduct them in the first place.
66
 The British High Commissioner in Guyana 
reported Burnham’s intent to London and, noting that such a discussion was likely to glean 
extensive support from the newer members, the British prepared a dedicated defensive brief on 
membership procedures in anticipation of the next Prime Ministers’ Meeting.
67
 The debate over 
membership was not over, but the Guyanese case opened the door for greater Secretariat 
involvement in subsequent membership applications  
Others 
By mid-1966, British officials were on a defensive footing regarding Commonwealth 
membership procedures. Not only did British officials prepare a defensive brief in anticipation of 
Burnham’s questioning in the fall of 1966 but in the intervening months they also had to grapple 
with the new consultative dynamics that had been established with the Guyana case. As well, 
they faced the impending merger of the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices into the 
Commonwealth Office at the beginning of August. With three more colonies slated to become 
independent that fall and the upheaval of the impending merger, British officials relented. Rather 
than opposing all Secretariat involvement in upcoming membership applications they focused on 
maintaining the procedures established with the Guyanese case. The Guyanese case had 
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concluded with a compromise between the CRO and the Secretariat. That compromise included 
British management of all stages of the application except the final, formal announcement of 
membership. British management was on the condition that the Secretariat be kept informed at 
all stages of the proceedings and consulted to a greater degree in future.
68
 As preparations for the 
independence of Bechuanaland (Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho), and Barbados began in the 
spring of 1966, the British Government used the Guyanese case as a referent for engagement 
with the Secretariat. These procedures did not condone full Secretariat management of 
membership applications, nor did they invite dispute by fully opposing or excluding the 
Secretariat. It was a defensive policy aimed at avoiding further changes.  
Over the summer of 1966 British officials began membership consultations for the membership 
of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Barbados according to the Guyana precedent. The British 
Government carried out initial consultations and consistently kept the Secretariat informed 
through the process.
69
 But British officials worried about another membership row over the 
Barbados application. By mid-summer, consultations for Bechuanaland and Basutoland were 
going apace. However, due to the Barbadian parliamentary schedule the Barbadian Government 
had not yet submitted a formal request for Commonwealth membership and the British had 
therefore not initiated consultations among the wider membership. In the Barbadian case the 
delay in British consultations was legitimate. But after the questionable delays in British 
consultations for Singapore and Guyana, British officials worried that either the Secretariat or the 
Barbadian Government would initiate their own consultations as Smith and Burnham had for 
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Guyana. These anxieties underscore how effective the efforts of the Secretariat and expansionist 
members had been in shaping British engagement with the Commonwealth.      
As a way to avoid conflict over membership consultation, British officials proposed that the 
formal membership consultations for all three potential members be conducted at the upcoming 
Prime Ministers’ Meeting.
70
 This would not only be efficient but would altogether avoid 
potential problems with Secretariat or Barbadian representatives initiating their own membership 
consultations. British representatives coordinated with Smith to include membership 
consultations in the provisionary agenda for the September Prime Ministers’ Meeting.
71
 British 
cooperation with the Secretariat in anticipation of the meeting was facilitated by the merger of 
the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices into the Commonwealth Office in August 
1966.
72
 The broader staff of the new CO and the reassignment of top CRO personnel dispersed 
the most vehement source of British antagonism towards the Secretariat. The CRO had lost the 
defence of its traditional authority and ceased to be a major obstacle to the functions of the 
Secretariat.    
After the merger of the CRO, British opposition to Secretariat management of Commonwealth 
membership rested on general restrictionism rather than departmental purview or personal 
antagonism with Arnold Smith. At the September Prime Ministers’ Meeting British officials 
prepared to defend the membership procedures based on the Guyanese precedent.
73
 Their brief 
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was somewhat contradictory, in that it argued that the United Kingdom could carry out 
consultations more effectively than the Secretariat by virtue of Britain having representatives in 
all Commonwealth capitals.
74
 However, it also actively endorsed the Secretariat’s role 
announcing formal acceptance as well as the Secretariat’s work in cases of already independent 
applicants like Singapore and Malawi.
75
  
The September Prime Ministers’ Meeting was a turning point on questions of membership. In an 
internal debrief several weeks after the meeting, officials in the new Commonwealth Office 
concluded that in addition to making the formal announcements of member acceptance, it would 
be appropriate for the Secretariat to carry out all membership consultations in the future, 
“particularly since a number of African and Caribbean countries think that it is appropriate.”
76
 In 
a later study of membership debates since the formation of the Secretariat, CO officials noted 
that over the past six membership cases (Singapore, Malawi, Guyana, Botswana, Lesotho, and 
Barbados) Secretariat involvement had steadily increased.
77
 The study noted that every other 
Commonwealth member except Australia preferred the Secretariat to process membership 
applications.
78
 CO officials concluded that to deny this would be destructive to Commonwealth 
relations as it would appear as though the British still thought they ran the Commonwealth.
79
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The British Government no longer saw any advantage “either of principle or convenience” to 
opposing views of the wider membership about membership applications.
80
 This was a major 
shift in British policy that opened the door to the Secretariat fully managing membership 
applications. In 1967, the Commonwealth Office requested that the Secretary-General process 
Mauritius’ entire membership application on their behalf.
81
 In February 1968, the Secretariat 
hosted the Swaziland Independence Conference at Marlborough House and was also able to 




The early debates between the Secretariat and the British Government led to the gradual 
reduction in British opposition to Secretariat management of Commonwealth membership, 
which paved the way for the Secretariat to operate as an IO. The British Government maintained 
a restrictionist view of the Secretariat but was willing to concede to the views of newer, 
expansionist members in order to maintain good relations with the Commonwealth. The debates 
over membership applications consistently demonstrated that newer members expected the 
Secretariat to handle membership applications as the Secretariat of any other international 
organisation would. The ensuing applications also demonstrated that the Secretariat was capable 
of effectively handling these applications. Expansionist members exerted considerable pressure 
on the British Government and Whitehall gradually conceded. The dispersal of the CRO in 
August 1966 effectively ended British arguments based on traditional authority. The the British 
Government’s weak assertion in the September 1966 defensive brief that it was the best equipped 
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to handle membership applications was significantly less potent than earlier CRO arguments 
based on traditional authority and long-established procedures.  
Perhaps more importantly, debates over Commonwealth membership provided a framework for 
British officials to envision the Commonwealth as something other than a British entity. 
Discussion over the membership of Singapore, Malawi, and Guyana forced the British 
Government to differentiate between British and Commonwealth procedures. Historically, both 
the submission and processing of membership applications had been carried out within the 
British Government. There had been no need to clearly delineate responsibility for these two 
tasks. The formation of the Secretariat exposed British conflicts of interest in handling 
membership applications. Newer members’ suspicions of British motives and view of the 
Commonwealth as an international organisation led them to demand membership applications be 
processed by the Secretariat. With clearer definition of how responsibility for applications could 
be divided, British officials became more receptive to the Secretariat’s role in processing 
membership applications. In 1965, Arnold Smith unsuccessfully tried to explain the expansionist 
members’ perspective to British Officials by analogising the problem in terms of a club. He 
recalled that “giving a local clubland analogy, I said that I had just been told of my election to 
the Athenaeum by the club’s secretary, not by its oldest living member.”
83
 However, by 1968 
officials in the Commonwealth Office agreed that Secretariat management of Mauritius’ entire 
application was a reasonable course of action.  
A clearer delineation between the submission and processing of membership applications also 
assuaged fears of Commonwealth infringement on British sovereignty. Newer members 
demonstrated that they expected transparency and progress towards decolonisation but would 
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respect British sovereignty over colonial possessions to the same standards they observed in the 
United Nations. In a similar sense, Arnold Smith and his staff demonstrated that they would not 
interfere with British sovereignty but expected to process applications for Commonwealth 
membership.          
Over a four year span, the task of processing Commonwealth membership applications had been 
divorced from the British Government in favour of the Secretariat. While this was in part due to 
Arnold Smith’s persistance and the eventual reorganisation of the British diplomatic service, the 
change was primarily due to pressure from the newer Commonwealth members. Newer members 
consistently advocated for a strong Secretariat that functioned like other international 
organisations. The British Government was used to an exclusive, Anglo-centric model for 
processing membership applications and British officials had difficulty conceiving of the 
Commonwealth beyond that model. Pressure from the newer members and the Secretariat forced 
British officials to better define the processes governing Commonwealth membership, which 
opened the door to a larger, more well defined role for the Secretariat.  
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Chapter Seven: High-Level Meetings 
Introduction 
Free consultation on matters of common interest was the basis of the original Commonwealth. 
The Imperial Conferences of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century were the foundation of the 
organisation, and remained central to Commonwealth values and action. Few aspects of the 
organisation were decided outside the meetings of prime ministers and senior Commonwealth 
officials. The management of high-level Commonwealth meetings was a means to shape what 
was included in Commonwealth consultation and how that consultation was carried out.
1
 In the 
late 1960s, the expansionist and restrictionist groups agreed that the Secretariat should have a 
role managing Commonwealth meetings. However, the extent of the Secretariat’s role in 
Commonwealth meetings was the main field of conflict between expansionist and restrictionist 
views for the future of the organisation.   
Debate over the Secretariat’s role organising and servicing Commonwealth meetings increased 
as the Secretariat’s administrative functions were established through 1965 and 1966. These 
debates hinged on interpretation of the Agreed Memorandum. The memorandum outlined the 
responsibilities of the Secretariat in four main areas including international affairs, economics, a 
review of Commonwealth organisations, and the servicing of Commonwealth meetings. The 
Secretariat’s role was prefaced with the old axiom that “consultation is the life blood of the 
Commonwealth.”
2
 In international affairs the Secretariat was tasked with arranging specialised 
political meetings when deemed appropriate by the prime ministers.
3
 In economics, the 
Secretariat was tasked with planning meetings on behalf of the Commonwealth Economic 
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Consultative Council (CECC) and Commonwealth Liaison Committee, and other bodies like the 
Commonwealth Economic Committee (CEC) pending the review of Commonwealth 
organisations.
4
 Also pending review, the Secretariat would take over the planning of the 
Commonwealth Education Conference and other Commonwealth Education Liaison Unit 
meetings, in addition to the meetings of the Commonwealth Telecommunications Board.
5
  
The Secretariat was primarily tasked with organising Prime Ministers’ Meetings and eventually, 
other ministerial or officials’ meetings “where appropriate.”
6
 The process of planning and 
executing Commonwealth meetings was the thread uniting the four areas of Secretariat 
responsibility. Meetings were not only a manifestation of Commonwealth values, but also the 
practical means to assert the Secretariat’s role vis-à-vis the British Government and other 
restrictionists, and to cement the Secretariat’s reputation as a reliable central body. Assuming 
management of meetings involved divorcing basic administrative functions from the British 
Government in favour of the Secretariat. In practical terms the main organisational aspects of 
Commonwealth meetings were consultation before meetings, setting dates, agendas, and meeting 
locations, coordinating the role of the host government and logistics, and arranging the 
chairmanship of meetings. The handover of servicing Commonwealth meetings from the British 
Government to the Secretariat was marked by four evolutionary dynamics.  
The first was widespread passive resistance to Secretariat management of Commonwealth 
meetings. This resistance was centred in the restrictionist camp and included more nuanced 
opposition from the British Government. In most British governmental departments opposition to 
the Secretariat was manifested when British interests were at stake. Many departments were used 
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to British preferences taking precedent in Commonwealth meetings. Resistance to the Secretariat 
in this manner was the product of a general institutional memory with Britain as the centre of a 
hub-and-spoke Commonwealth. “Britain had an entrenched institutional and historic knowledge 
of colonial governance, as well as many highly skilled practitioners with specialist knowledge of 
individual colonial territories.”
7
 The British Government was often supportive in principle but 
decidedly restrictionist and wary of Secretariat expansion. Suspicion of any Commonwealth 
body that might interfere with member sovereignty or otherwise act as a pressure group to the 
most established members was also a key factor among the restrictionists, though occasionally 
opposition was simply based on support for the British Government as in the case of Australia 
and New Zealand. Australian opposition to Commonwealth reform on racial grounds was also a 
major factor during the Menzies years.  
The second theme of the Secretariat’s takeover of Commonwealth meetings was the active 
resistance of the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) until its amalgamation with the 
Colonial Office in August 1966. Before the Secretariat, the CRO was able to insert British 
preferences into the planning process for meeting timing, agenda, attendance, and logistics under 
the guise of providing secretariat-style services to the Commonwealth. The growth of the 
Secretariat meant that the British Government could only pursue those preferences by 
coordinating with the Secretariat, thereby reducing deference to British preferences and the 
relevance of the CRO itself. Unlike the question of membership consultations, planning and 
servicing Commonwealth meetings was a responsibility specifically mandated to the Secretariat 
in the Agreed Memorandum. In consequence, CRO opposition was less marked as in other areas 
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such as administrative logistics or membership consultations. However, in order to justify its 
continued existence, the CRO opposed the Secretariat in most facets of meeting coordination 
even when other British departments were supportive. This was particularly evident in 
delineating the role of the host government, setting meeting agendas, and servicing smaller 
meetings of Commonwealth officials, committees, and ministerial meetings below the level of 
the prime ministers. For these smaller meetings and administrative tasks Secretariat involvement 
would require approval from the membership and had been left open to interpretation in the 
Agreed Memorandum.
8
 Resistance from the CRO was largely manifested in promoting and 
acting on a very limited interpretation of the Agreed Memorandum. The CRO ultimately ceased 
to be the focal point of active British resistance to the Secretariat as the British diplomatic 
service was reorganised. . 
The third dynamic was the expansion of the Secretariat itself. Though initially reliant on British 
assistance, the growth of the Secretariat’s capacity to service meetings allowed it to decentralise 
aspects of Commonwealth meetings in such a way as to render them less contingent on the 
British or any other host government. The growth of the Secretariat reflected the expansionist 
members’ vision for the organisation and facilitated a greater consultation between the 
Secretariat and prospective host governments as well as a greater role for the Secretariat in a 
wider array of ministerial and officials’ meetings. The expansion of its capacity ultimately 
bolstered the Secretariat’s role as an independent organisational body and Commonwealth 
interlocutor working on behalf of all members.  
Finally, the Secretariat’s use of informal connections within the Commonwealth to manage 
meetings shaped the handover process. Secretary-General Arnold Smith used his connections 
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within the Canadian Government under Pearson and the support of the newer Commonwealth 
members to bolster the Secretariat’s capacity and independence before that capacity was 
reflected in the Secretariat’s own staff and resources.
9
 This dynamic speeded the handover and 
more effectively democratised the Secretariat.  
Taken together, these four dynamics characterised the evolution of the Secretariat’s role in 
servicing Commonwealth meetings. These features received less attention from contemporaries 
than the major political and economic debates that shaped the modern Commonwealth. However, 
these dynamics are more important to understanding the history of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat and transition of the Commonwealth from an imperial club to an international 
organisation. These dynamics characterised the Secretariat’s role in meetings which in turn 
represented Commonwealth values or the “life blood” of the organisation. Meetings and the 
service thereof were a common feature of the four main areas of Secretariat responsibility and 
the most practical way for the Secretariat to impact the organisation.
10
 The process of the 
Secretariat taking on Commonwealth meetings was foundational to Secretariat engagement in 
the politico-economic affairs of the Commonwealth. The following chapters explore the 
Secretariat’s first forays into planning Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings and relate the 
process of planning meetings with the political problem of Rhodesia and, as the Secretariat 
became more established, to the economic problem of aid and development.  
Background 
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As the root of Commonwealth consultation, meetings had been a central feature of the nascent 
Commonwealth since the Imperial Conferences of the late 19
th
 century. By the mid-1960s, even 
with rapid advances in communications technology, in-person meetings were still the most 
effective form of Commonwealth consultation. The Secretariat faced a well-established tradition 
of British management of Commonwealth meetings. The British Government had hosted all but 
two imperial and Commonwealth Conferences in addition to the majority of smaller 
Commonwealth meetings since the 19
th
 century. The CRO was well habituated to planning 
Commonwealth meetings. The department was established in 1947 and had provided secretarial 
services ever since.  
However, British organisation of Commonwealth meetings allowed Whitehall’s preferences 
about meeting dates, timing, agendas, and policy directions to be incorporated into 
Commonwealth affairs under the guise of providing services to the group. As the 
Commonwealth membership grew, British interests were increasingly evident in the planning 
and execution of Commonwealth meetings. For example, in preparation for the 1953 Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting, British preparatory documents focused on imperial and Cold War topics like 
security in the Middle East and the Suez Canal, NATO, the problem of Germany, and recent 
Soviet and Chinese actions.
11
 The topics of British preparations took the confident imperial tone 
of pre-Suez foreign policy.
12
 British preparations generally assumed that other members were 
also suspicious of Soviet and Chinese activities and supported NATO and the European Defence 
Community.
13
 The 1953 communique largely reflected British planning save the addition of a 
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discussion over the armistice talks in Korea. The Korean armistice was a project of particular 
interest to the Indian delegation but was scarcely reflected in the broader meeting and not at all 
in British preparations.
14
 South Asian concerns were not prioritized. In 1953 India, Ceylon, and 
Pakistan were still a clear minority to Old Commonwealth settler-states. Without the later 
support of Afro-Caribbean members, racial politics and the notion of non-alignment were not 
tenable in the Commonwealth. 
By the 1960s however, the old dominions and Britain no longer commanded a majority in the 
Commonwealth. Assumed allegiance to the Western Bloc or the British Empire rendered 
attempts to align Commonwealth Conferences with British interests more obvious and more 
offensive to the membership. By the 1964 Prime Ministers’ Meeting, South Africa had 
withdrawn from the Commonwealth and a greater number of Afro-Caribbean members were 
represented. The 1964 communique asserted that the most important major issue of the day was 
race relations.
15
 The Secretariat was also commissioned in 1964 to be recruited from throughout 
the Commonwealth and to serve all member governments.
16
 There was little assumption of 
shared geopolitical stances and so defence and security-related discussions moved to other fora.
17
 
Yet while British posturing over the content of meetings had been more thoroughly exposed and 
rejected by the 1960s, the habit of pressing British preferences persisted. 
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A 1964 distribution list error illustrates the extent to which these habits persisted and were rooted 
in the CRO. In this instance posturing over British preferences caused confusion among the 
members and demonstrated the methods by which the CRO could manipulate Commonwealth 
meetings to serve British preferences. When the CRO circulated documents regarding the 
Secretariat preparatory committee after the 1964 Prime Ministers’ Meeting they accidentally 
included central African colonies (North Rhodesia and Nyasaland) on the distribution list several 
months prior to those colonies’ independence that October. This error threatened British efforts 
to keep the working party small as well as British suzerainty (by inviting colonies to participate 
prior to their independence). The mistaken invitation was quickly retracted and British officials 




The retraction and double standard of information distribution caused a great deal of confusion 
and was criticised by F.M. Thomas, the Deputy-Governor of North Rhodesia. Thomas went so 
far as to write Sir Neil Pritchard, the Cabinet Secretary to say “With all respect to the C.R.O. I 
think they are not good at classification. This telegram asking us to treat other telegrams as 
personal is itself in the non-personal series, and this is bound to cause confusion. Could they be 
asked to keep the two series quite distinct?”
19
 The CRO defended its right to exclude colonies 
from the deliberations, noting the British commitment to maintaining their sovereignty to the day 
of legal independence and not before. This was in keeping with wider British policy in the UN 
and other international fora. However, CRO officials noted internally that they would be obliged 
to revisit the attendance issue if the meeting were postponed until after those nations’ 
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independence. A postponement would remove any question of British sovereignty over her 
colonies but would also undermine CRO efforts to keep the number of representatives at 
Commonwealth meetings at a minimum.
20
  
On the other hand, the next British election was set for October 1964. The deliberations about the 
Secretariat working party were increasingly inconvenient for many members of the British 
Government. The looming British election added to the appeal of postponing the meeting. 
Postponement might lead to a larger working party with the addition of Zambia and Malawi as 
full members, but would clear up the embarrassing issue of the distribution list error and allow 
the British to stand their ground on the sovereignty principle without appearing to go back on 
their word. Thus, the CRO increasingly sought to postpone the preparatory meeting until after 
the conclusion of elections, which would now be convenient for the British in multiple ways. 
However, the CRO did not wish to arouse suspicion of obstructing the Commonwealth working 
party. Internally, CRO staff agreed to push for delaying the Officials Meeting into 1965 although 
they would not openly advocate for the postponement.
21
  
On the heels of the CRO mix-up there were heated discussions in the Commonwealth over both 
colonial and member representation in the Secretariat working party. Ultimately, colonial 
representatives were excluded and the British conceded that Commonwealth members could 
send their own representatives rather than agreeing on regional ones (see Chapter Three). 
However, the CRO circulated the news that members could represent themselves independently 
only eleven days before the proposed meeting.
22
 In consequence, East African Commonwealth 
members who had been attempting to co-ordinate regional representation from an early date, as 
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well as Zambian and Malawian officials anticipating independence in October, respectively 
wrote to the CRO to request clarification as to whether each member could be represented and to 
request more time to select their own candidates in lieu of their previous work on regional 
nominees.
23
 On September 23, one week before the proposed meeting, the CRO issued a circular 
letter noting that a number of Commonwealth governments had expressed that it would be 
difficult for them to be adequately represented on September 29 and that those members had 
suggested the meeting be postponed. Ultimately, the meeting of the working party took place in 
January 1965 with Zambia and Malawi represented as full members.
24
   
Outwardly the CRO had successfully consulted with the membership, resolved the issue of 
representation, and organised the logistics of the officials meeting. In the process however, the 
CRO had injected British preferences into the workings of the Commonwealth and delayed the 
meeting in such a way that it was most conducive to the British electoral schedule. Furthermore, 
the CRO-facilitated delay upheld the British desire to maintain control of dependencies’ foreign 
policy up to the day of their independence and cleared the CRO of any embarrassment resulting 
in the distribution error. While British officials conceded that the meeting would not be as small 
as they would have liked, under the guise of providing services to the Commonwealth they had 
nonetheless maintained most of their preferences without appearing to do so.  
There were thus significant problems with British management of Commonwealth meetings on 
the eve of the Secretariat’s formation. Whitehall was accustomed to the Commonwealth catering 
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to British preferences. Those preferences were further facilitated by the CRO. As with the 
membership debates outlined in Chapter Six, there was a clear conflict of interest between the 
Anglo-centric status quo maintained by the British Government and the more egalitarian ideas of 
the newer members. The newer, expansionist members saw the Commonwealth as an 
international organisation and supported a strong Secretariat with a broad mandate encompassing 




Chapter Eight: Prime Ministers’ Meetings 
When the Secretariat was formed in 1965 it was primarily tasked with servicing Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers’ Meetings. The Secretariat faced a well-established tradition of the CRO 
organising meetings according to British preferences. In the core organisational aspects of 
Commonwealth meetings (consultation, setting dates, agendas, and locations, coordinating the 
role of the host government, logistics, and arranging the chairmanship) passive resistance from 
the British Government and restrictionist members persisted in tandem with the concerted, yet 
declining opposition of the CRO (in contrast to the Cabinet Office, which reflected Labour’s 
cautious support). Arnold Smith and the Secretariat countered that pushback with capacity-
building efforts facilitated by interpersonal connections and support from the newer members. 
The newer, expansionist members also exerted considerable pressure on the British Government. 
Those members opposed continued British management of Commonwealth meetings which they 
saw as a conflict of interest and antithetical to the proper workings of an international 
organisation. These debates were played out during the planning and execution of Prime 
Ministers’ Meetings. These meetings were the Secretariat’s main priority and had the most 
potential to cement the Secretariat’s role in both the political and economic activities of the 
Commonwealth.  
The 1966 Lagos Prime Ministers’ Meeting 
The first Prime Ministers’ Meeting after the formation of the Secretariat was an emergency 
meeting proposed by the Nigerian Government specifically to address the unfolding crisis in 
Rhodesia.
1
 This was the first instance of the Secretariat fulfilling its mandate of servicing Prime 
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Ministers’ Meetings. The meeting was a surprise and took place before the Secretariat was able 
to manage a meeting of that scale on its own strength.
2
 This January 1966 meeting was also 
unique in that it was the first Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting to take place outside of 
London since 1932. The Secretariat worked closely with the host Nigerian Government to 
organise the meeting. In contrast to working with the British Government in its capacity as host 
for other Commonwealth meetings there was much less friction between the Secretariat and the 
Nigerian Government. The former did not need to combat British recalcitrance and the latter saw 
the Secretariat as an asset rather than a threat. The division of labour between the Secretariat and 
host government was much more freely shared and ultimately helped solidify the Secretariat’s 
capacity to organise Commonwealth meetings beyond reliance on the British as host or 
predecessor.  
Key to the Secretariat’s success in Lagos was that the meeting did not originate from a British 
proposal and did not involve the British Government as host. On November 11, 1965 the 
Rhodesian Government unilaterally declared independence (UDI) from the British Empire. This 
was a move by the white settler government in order to avoid a transitional model for 
independence that included majority rule. Rhodesia was a functionally apartheid, rogue state. 
The UDI escalated the Rhodesian crisis and alarmed other African governments. In early 
December the Nigerian Government proposed and initiated consultations for an emergency 
Commonwealth meeting in early 1966. The Nigerian Government assumed full Secretariat 
involvement and kept the Secretariat informed as they collected member responses.
3
 Shortly 
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after the Nigerian call went out, Secretary-General Smith issued his own circular requesting that 
Commonwealth governments send a copy of their replies to keep the Secretariat informed of 




Secretariat staff kept track of the responses from member governments which were mostly 
willing to coordinate with both the Secretariat and the Nigerian Government. While most 
members kept the Secretariat informed, the Australian High Commissioner called on Smith 
personally to inform Smith that Robert Menzies had no intention of replying to the Secretariat 
which he saw as interfering with the prime ministers’ right to private communication between 
themselves. Menzies’ objection echoed both a limited interpretation of the Agreed Memorandum 
and a wider pattern of Australian resistance to the Secretariat’s activities including coordination 
of Singapore’s membership application, the Secretariat’s involvement in the most recent Trade 
Officials Meeting, and its work on the review of Intra-Commonwealth Organisations mandated 
in 1965.
5
 Smith promptly wrote to Menzies to address his concerns and “regretted that there had 
been a misunderstanding” about the Secretariat’s role in organising the meeting. However, Smith 
was secure in the backing of the Nigerian Government and the wider group of expansionist 
members.
6
   
Within the wider Commonwealth, the British debated the merits of the Lagos meeting, the 
Australians opposed it outright, and the New Zealanders expressed that they would follow the 
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majority. In a show of good faith, officials from Trinidad and Tobago questioned the need for the 
meeting if the Rhodesian crisis was ended by British action in the meantime.
7
 The bulk of the 
membership distrusted British intentions and felt that the proposed meeting would be an 
important step in resolving the crisis. Consequently, the majority responded to the Secretariat’s 
calls for coordination and confirmed their countries’ attendance with the Secretariat as well as 
with the Nigerian Government. Amidst this supportive milieu, Britain and the East African 
members with the largest stake in the Rhodesian crisis were in attendance and the diplomatic 
balance of the conference was aided by the absence of the most extreme parties. At one extreme, 
in solidarity with the OAU, Ghana’s Nkrumah and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere had already broken 
diplomatic relations with Britain. Although both leaders continued to correspond with the 
Secretariat as Commonwealth members, they refused to breach their diplomatic breaks by 
attending the conference. At the other extreme, Robert Menzies felt that the single-issue 
conference in Africa was tantamount to the African members summoning the British Prime 
Minister to come and explain British policy. Menzies felt that this was simply wrong, and 
refused to send an Australian delegation to a conference. Australia was represented by an 
observer only.
8
 The absence of these extreme parties helped mediate the January meeting and 
keep key parties (notably Britain and Zambia) at the table.  
Smith worked with his limited staff and the Nigerian Government to set up the meeting logistics, 
in addition to working on a political level to ensure that the meeting took place at all. African 
governments under pressure from the OAU were contemplating breaking diplomatic ties with 
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Britain (as Ghana and Tanzania had done) or leaving the Commonwealth in protest over British 
handling of the Rhodesian crisis.
9
 The British Government was interested in the meeting in 
principle but had no intention of attending a hostile gathering where they would be “put in the 
dock” by former colonies.
10
 Arnold Smith maintained extensive correspondence with his African 
and British counterparts to keep them in dialogue with each other and ensure that the 
Commonwealth did not break up before the Lagos meeting took place.  
Smith also employed his personal connections in the Canadian Government to facilitate the 
Lagos meeting. The Canadian Government under Pearson was supportive of both the Secretariat 
and the Lagos meeting and worked closely with Smith to keep both the United Kingdom and 
African members engaged. On December 16, 1965, two days after Smith initiated coordination 
with the Nigerian Government and the same day as consultations for the meeting began, he 
announced that the Canadian Government had expanded its program of sanctions so that over 
90% of Canadian imports from Rhodesia had been embargoed.
11
 The circular expressed 
Canadian support for the British strategy of sanctions over military intervention while also 
showing appreciation of the gravity of the situation and support for African members calling for 
increased action.
12
 The Secretariat’s timely announcement of these Canadian measures showed 
that action was being taken within the Commonwealth and that there was momentum to be 
harnessed at the upcoming meeting.  
Canadian officials helped Smith build rapport between British and African Commonwealth 
members, and worked closely with Smith in advance of the Lagos meeting. On December 17 
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Smith hosted a luncheon at his personal residence, inviting high-level British officials with a 
hand in the Rhodesian crisis, as well as Central and East African representatives. The number of 
Canadian statesmen invited was equal to the number of other representatives and the Canadian 
guests were interspersed among the other attendees in the seating plan for the occasion.
13
 At the 
suggestion of Paul Martin, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, the following 
day Smith sent a lengthy secret telegram to the Canadian Prime Minister and heads of External 
Affairs.
14
 Smith knew that British Prime Minister Harold Wilson was having second thoughts 
about the meeting but planned to consult with the Canadian Government before making a final 
decision (as per the established British practice of consulting with the Old Commonwealth 
outside of regular Commonwealth meetings). Smith hoped that forearming the Canadian 
Government with a full complement of information and arguments would help them convince 
Wilson to attend.
15
 Smith also outlined that any attempts by the British to delay the meeting, call 
for it to be held in London, or to seek the chairmanship would be seriously damaging to African 
views of the Commonwealth.
16
 Pearson managed to convince Wilson to attend the conference in 
a telephone conversation on December 31 though he advised Smith that the Secretariat would 
have to tread a carefully non-partisan line if the British were to follow through.
17
 Pearson later 
echoed a number of Smith’s arguments in his speech at the successful opening of the conference 
on 11 January, 1966, showing that the Secretary-General not only made compelling points but 
had a valuable ally in Pearson.    
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Smith also had local Canadian support from the Canadian High Commissioner’s office in Lagos. 
The office appointed Andre Couvrette as Secretary to the Canadian Delegation for the 
conference. Couvrette wrote to Smith upon his arrival in Lagos and noted that while they had 
thought better than to “appropriate” Smith upon his arrival, the office was looking forward to 
seeing him and was anxious to assist in any way possible. Smith’s personal connections in the 
Canadian diplomatic service afforded him additional Canadian support in Lagos. Beyond the 
official Chancery channels for correspondence, Couvrette’s letter included both the High 
Commissioner’s and his own home telephone numbers in case Smith needed anything.
18
 Before 
signing the typed letter, Couvrette also included a handwritten note saying “Remember the Paris 
visit! This is going to be fun too! The start of a Happy New Year.”
19
 Smith employed his 
connections in the Canadian Government and diplomatic service as well as Canada’s good 
reputation in both the old and new Commonwealth to bolster the Secretariat and to facilitate the 
success of the Lagos Meeting. David McIntyre has argued that Canada’s chief contribution to the 
Secretariat was Arnold Smith, but Smith’s continued association with Canadian diplomats 
provided the ongoing support necessary to his success as first Secretary-General.
20
  
Secretariat staff worked closely with the Nigerian Government to prepare for the meeting 
including consultations, background papers, staff, and logistics. On December 20, only ten days 
after the Nigerian proposal was first circulated, Deputy Secretary-General T.E. Gooneratne was 
already in Lagos to work with the Nigerian Government.
21
 Two days later Gooneratne reported 
to Smith that he had discussed the conference details with Mr. Nwokedi, the Nigerian Permanent 
Secretary of External Affairs, and secured a suitable venue. The Nigerian Government saw the 
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Lagos meeting as establishing an important model for hosting Commonwealth meetings outside 
London.
22
 The expansionist Nigerian Government was committed to the success of the 
conference and appointed a Joint Conference Officer to work more closely with the Secretariat.
23
   
Secretariat staff pursued a comprehensive role in planning the Lagos Prime Ministers’ Meeting 
while avoiding reliance on a hostile CRO. The Secretariat prepared detailed plans for the 
meeting directly based on CRO documents from the June 1965 Prime Ministers’ Meeting.
24
 
However, Smith obtained these template documents from the British Cabinet Office, rather than 
the CRO itself.
25
 Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend also helped in terms of administrative supplies 
and arranged a meeting between Smith and Mr. J. Howard-Drake who had previously worked on 
the logistics of several Prime Ministers’ Meetings.
26
 In this manner the Secretariat gleaned 
information and assistance from the British Government through the cautiously sympathetic 
Cabinet Office without deferring to the resistant core of the CRO.   
The bulk of the work setting up the conference was nonetheless coordinated between the 
Secretariat and the Nigerian Government. Nigerian officials decisively accounted for shortfalls in 
available Secretariat staff. While the Secretariat anticipated contributing 28 staff members, the 
Nigerian Government provided an initial 42, as well as all security, press, transportation, 
communications, protocol, and hospitality staff.
27
 By the conclusion of the conference the 
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Secretariat had employed a further nine British staff (none of which were from the CRO) in 
addition to two Pakistani, one Indian and one Jamaican staff on loan.
28
 The Nigerian 
Government meanwhile had loaned several dozen other staff officers to the Secretariat for the 
duration of the conference.
29
 In this manner the Nigerian Government supported a robust role for 
the Secretariat. The Secretariat itself overcame its capacity limits by diversifying its sources of 
aid and thus reducing reliance on the British Government in general and the CRO in particular.  
The Nigerian Government proposed solutions to logistical questions such as the chairmanship 
and press arrangements for the meeting. Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa proposed to 
chair the meetings (customary for the leaders of host governments) with the Secretary-General 
seated at his right hand.
30
 The Secretary-General would then be free to open subcommittee 
meetings as needed. Smith would also issue two press statements per day that would not interfere 
with delegate statements but would provide key non-partisan summaries of each conference 
session.
31
 British officials had previously expressed concerns about other members chairing any 
session dealing with Rhodesia and doubted the Secretariat’s capacity to manage press relations  
The active coordination between the Nigerian Government and the Secretariat helped resolve 
these issues well before the meeting and without room for contestation from the British 
Government.  
The help offered to the Secretariat was also evident in the three delegations selected to give the 
opening speeches of the Lagos Meeting. As host, Nigerian Prime Minister Abubakar opened the 
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proceedings with words of welcome and by noting the significance and gravity of the meeting. 
He referred to the Commonwealth as a cherished organisation that was held together by invisible 
ties and that continued to thrive. Perhaps more importantly, he repeatedly emphasised the 
Commonwealth’s multi-racial character and noted that it was the first meeting called to discuss a 
single problem. Abubakar also noted that it was the first conference to be serviced by the new 
Secretariat and placed significance on the fact that the Secretariat was doing so outside of its 
London headquarters. Although he recognised that members may not have been in agreement for 
the necessity of the meeting, he underscored their shared goal of a speedy end to the Rhodesian 
crisis and hoped that the conference would realise that goal.
32
  
Speaking next, Pearson also recognised the uniqueness of the meeting as the first since the 
establishment of the Secretariat, the first emergency meeting, and the first dedicated to a single 
problem. Pearson extensively thanked the Nigerian Government and the Commonwealth 
Secretariat under Arnold Smith for their quick organising work before concluding by evoking the 
multiracial nature of the Commonwealth and the grave responsibility to make the conference a 
constructive one. Pearson foresaw productive conversations if Commonwealth leaders kept the 
frankness of friends and the respect and trust of associates.
33
 Pearson’s speech echoed Smith’s 
arguments in the December telegram for Canadian eyes only. The meeting would be successful if 
the members focused on one issue and worked to build trust among one another. Pearson also 
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Representing the newest Commonwealth member, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
was the last to speak during the opening remarks. He made a point of noting that the occasion 
would not soon be forgotten and was underscored by the fact that it was the first time that a 
British Prime Minister had travelled abroad to a recently independent colony to meet the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government and discuss a situation in one of its current colonies. Yew 
also noted that they shared a goal to resolve the single issue of Rhodesia and expressed optimism 
that they would find constructive steps forward to solve “a problem so charged with passion for 
all of us” and that that goal might be achieved in an “emotionally acceptable” timeframe.
35
  
Each of the initial speakers had played a significant role in supporting the Commonwealth 
Secretariat in its first months of its existence. The Nigerian and Singaporean Governments 
trusted the Secretariat to serve them as members in coordinating both membership and meetings, 
and the Canadian Government was an ally of Arnold Smith as well as a broker between the old 
and new Commonwealth. The speeches at the start of the meeting set a more collegial tone for 
the subsequent discussions by giving the newest member, the host, and a reliable partner to both 
old and new members the opportunity to speak. The opening speeches were also a strong show 
of support for the Secretariat and were good diplomacy in the face of difficult discussions to 
come. The successful coordination of the meeting with the support of the wider membership 
underscored that the Secretariat was increasingly able to, and in the mind of the newer members, 
obligated to operate in a realm of wider Commonwealth coordination. The framing of the Lagos 
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Communique reflected the expectations of the newer members by emphasising that the Lagos 
meeting was the first Commonwealth Conference held in Africa. Delegates agreed that after this 
success holding meetings throughout the Commonwealth would underscore the essential 
egalitarian character of the Commonwealth association.
36
  
Though not yet at full strength at the Lagos meeting the Secretariat asserted its central role 
arranging the chairmanship, timing, logistics, and consultation for the meeting. Smith and the 
Secretariat needed assistance to accomplish the meeting preparations in a mere three weeks. The 
necessary work was accomplished with Nigerian coordination and Smith’s Canadian 
connections. The preparations were also totally independent of the CRO and therefore minimally 
reliant on the British Government. Smith underscored the importance of the Secretariat’s success 
in these areas in his first annual report as Secretary-General and later in his memoirs.
37
 He noted 
that the Lagos meeting was novel in appointing standing committees on sanctions and assistance 
for training Rhodesian Africans which were the first standing committees collectively appointed 
by the prime ministers.
38
 The Lagos meeting also secured a statement from the British 
Government committing to the NIBMAR principle (No Independence Before Majority Rule).
39
   
Smith credited the success of the Lagos meeting to the new standing machinery of the Secretariat 
which could overcome the episodic nature of past Commonwealth coordination.
40
 This was an 
additional victory for the Secretariat as Smith had prepared a memorandum suggesting the 
special assistance programme to provide educational training for Rhodesian Africans. The 
acceptance of this principle and the appointment of a standing committee to oversee the 
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programme showed that the Secretary-General could take constructive action by putting forward 
and speaking on his own recommendations rather than passively attending the meetings.
41
 The 
Lagos Conference did not resolve the Rhodesian crisis and left many broader political questions 
to be addressed but was a considerable success in terms of Secretariat capacity-building and 
posturing vis-à-vis the CRO. 
Sanctions Committee Meetings 
Following the Lagos Meeting, Secretariat staff continued to expand the Secretariat’s capacity to 
coordinate Commonwealth meetings. The expansionist members supported greater Secretariat 
involvement in officials’ and ministerial gatherings beyond the central Prime Ministers’ 
Meetings. The most immediate opportunity to pursue an expanded role was the first meeting of 
the newly formed Sanctions Committee. At the behest of the prime ministers, Smith followed up 
on the Sanctions Committee within a week of the Lagos Meeting. On January 18 he proposed 
that the Sanctions Committee convene on January 25 and circulated relevant documentation from 
Lagos several days later.
42
  
Because the Sanctions Committee meetings would take place in London, the planning process 
was negotiated between the Secretariat and the British Government. British officials tried to use 
past Commonwealth practices about location and chairmanship to further their own preferences 
and policy goals. Established Commonwealth practice was for the host government to chair 
meetings. British Officials rightly claimed that this was a traditional prerogative of the host 
government. However, there had never been a Sanctions Committee and at Lagos the Secretary-
General was tasked with organising the Sanctions Committee. Rather than consulting with Smith 
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on procedures for the committee, the British Government assumed chairmanship of all Sanctions 
Committee meetings and unilaterally informed the Commonwealth High Commissioners of this 
arrangement.
43
 Only after they had claimed the chairmanship did British officials inform Arnold 
Smith and explain that they were acting on precedent.
44
  
Smith had recognized this precedent in wider Commonwealth meetings and was understanding 
of the British position in a subsequent conversation with Sir Saville Garner (the Permanent 
Undersecretary of State for Commonwealth Relations).
45
 Garner elaborated that “…Britain was 
anxious to retain the Chair of the Sanctions Committee…[because] Britain was primarily 
responsible for Rhodesia and had some fear of a partial Chairman if sanctions were 
unsuccessful.”
46
 However, the newer members objected to the British Government handling 
Commonwealth affairs, especially for politically charged scenarios like Rhodesia. The record of 
conflicts of interest in British handling of Commonwealth affairs was unacceptable to the newer 
members.  
Jamaican High Commissioner Sir Henry Lindo wrote personally to Garner to object to British 
chairmanship of the Sanctions Committee. Lindo wrote that he was “disturbed” by this 
assumption that “cut across the whole concept of the Commonwealth Secretariat.”
47
 Lindo 
argued that the prime ministers would never have agreed to British Chairmanship during the 
Lagos Meeting. Lindo warned Garner that he intended to raise the chairmanship issue as soon as 
the Sanctions Committee convened and that he would propose that the Secretary-General chair 
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 Ultimately Sir Arthur Bottomley, the British Commonwealth Secretary of State 
chaired the first meeting of the Sanctions Committee on January 25, 1966. This saw further 
escalation of opposition to British chairmanship. The Sierra Leonean High Commissioner wrote 
to the Secretariat objecting to Bottomley’s continued chairmanship. Sierra Leonean officials 
argued that because the British Government was the only member able to present evidence on 
whether sanctions were working in Rhodesia it was inappropriate that Britain should chair the 
meeting regardless of past procedures.
49
 Per Sierra Leonean request, Smith circulated this view 
to all Commonwealth governments in the lead-up to the next meeting of the Sanctions 
Committee on February 23.
50
 Both the Sierra Leonean and Jamaican High Commissioners 
recognised that British representatives were exploiting precedents to influence the workings of 
the Committee. They argued that the British Government knew that the prime ministers in Lagos 
would not approve of a British chairman and that it would be inappropriate to ignore such a 
conflict of interest. 
Smith worked with all parties to find a viable solution for both British fears and the demands of 
the newer members. When Smith met with Garner on February 16, Garner suggested that the 
British would like to make an announcement about a pending oil embargo on Rhodesia to 
demonstrate understanding to the Commonwealth members in the OAU and Smith agreed to call 
a meeting to facilitate this. Smith noted however that Garner had glossed over the issue of the 
meeting’s chairmanship.
51
 When they met again two days later Smith directly addressed the issue 
of chairmanship. Garner had since issued a circular within the CRO and consulted with various 
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Commonwealth High Commissioners about the issue. Garner concluded that British policy 
should be to not seek the chairmanship of all Commonwealth meetings but that they would 
continue to press for chairmanship of the Sanctions Committee. Smith was clear that this would 
not pass with the wider membership. Eventually, British officials conceded on the conditions that 
the new chairman was not the Secretary-General and was elected from the Old Commonwealth.
52
 
Smith disagreed with the idea of limiting either his own or the new members’ ability to chair 
Commonwealth meetings, but encouraged Garner to take further soundings for alternative chairs 
in his ongoing correspondence with High Commissioner Lindo.
53
 Garner was anxious to avoid a 
row over the issue and pursued consultations with Lindo as well as attempts to convince 




Lindo’s consultations revealed that the Afro-Caribbean members were overwhelmingly in favour 
of Canadian chairmanship of the meetings. Other members who supported either the Secretary-
General or a British chair agreed that they would accept Canadian chairmanship if a popular 
consensus emerged.
55
 The British Government relented once the Canadian nomination was 
secured. After opening the February 23 meeting Bottomley handed the chairmanship to the 
Canadian High Commissioner Lionel Chevrier.
56
 Chevrier presided over the most intensive 
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By all accounts, Chevrier took his role quite seriously. On June 15, 1966 for example, when he 
was briefly dispatched to Canada, Chevrier wrote to Smith to inform him that he might not be 
back in time for the June 22 Committee Meeting. While Chevrier said he would keep Smith 
informed of the timing, in the event he was not back by June 22 he asked Smith to postpone the 
meeting rather than opening up the election of a new chairman.
58
 Chevrier remained chairman 
until the next Prime Ministers’ Meeting in September at which point he was succeeded by Andre 
Rose, the High Commissioner for Trinidad.
59
 Subsequent chairmanships were decided on a 
rotating basis.  
With the assistance of the Canadian Government as a Commonwealth mediator, management of 
the Sanctions Committee chairmanship was centralised in the Secretariat as was the wider 
coordination of the Committee itself. The chairmanship issue demonstrated how the expansionist 
members could apply effective political pressure on the British and other restrictionist 
governments. By 1969, the Secretariat had so fully taken over management of the Sanctions 
Committee that the Labour party preferred to defer questions about the Sanctions Committee to 
the Secretariat itself. For instance, when Sir John Briggs-Davison, a noted supporter of the 
Rhodesian Government and a member of the Conservative Monday Club, posed a parliamentary 
question about the cost of the Sanctions Committee,  Labour MP Maurice Foley indicated 
because the Sanctions Committee was serviced by the Secretariat, it was not possible to answer 
Briggs-Davison’s question.
60
 In 1969 the workings of the Commonwealth were separate from the 
British Government as befitted an international organisation.  
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During the establishment of the Sanctions Committee the British worried about political pressure 
from the UN if Commonwealth members lost confidence in British handling of the Rhodesia 
Crisis. The anti-colonial tenor of the UN in the early 1960s was a growing concern for the British 
Government. Officials in the Colonial Office specifically noted that after the expansion of the 
UN Special Committee on Decolonization from 17 to 24 in late 1962 they no longer knew 
whether the UN would be “reasonable” in its calls for decolonization.
61
 There was also no longer 
a guarantee of Commonwealth backing in the UN as the number of African members grew. The 
British Government had foreseen difficulties with Rhodesia having implications for how they 
managed the transition to independence for all colonial territories. The British Government 
feared the unknown consequences of UN intervention if the crisis escalated, but felt that it would 
invariably result in Britain being isolated or having its sovereignty violated. Thus, from an early 
date the British Government sought to manage the crisis with as little international upset and 
therefore as little criticism of its own policies as possible. 
The eventual involvement of the UN on an increasing scale was unfolding alongside debates 
about the chairmanship of the Sanctions Committee. In an effort to keep all parties in dialogue, 
Arnold Smith worked to resolve the chairmanship issue without exacerbating rifts over potential 
UN involvement. For example, while Smith circulated the Sierra Leonean protest over the 
chairmanship of the Sanctions Committee he did not circulate the associated threat of sponsoring 
UN Chapter VII sanctions if British led efforts in the Commonwealth failed to bring down the 
rogue Rhodesian regime.
62
 This was in part because Smith was working to broker discussions of 
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UN involvement between the British and the African members and in part because the threat of 
invoking Chapter VII action was a longstanding one. When the prime ministers agreed to 
concerted action at the Lagos meeting some had reserved the right to propose UN action under 
Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII if the need arose.
63
 These clauses respectively governed the 
severance of economic, communication, and diplomatic ties, and the use of military force, while 
Chapter VII more broadly addressed breaches of, and threats to peace.
64
 Because the use of force 
would involve problematic “kith-and-kin” politics in the United Kingdom and would 
theoretically breach British sovereignty in Rhodesia, British officials wished to avoid UN 
involvement altogether. The Sierra Leonean threat to make good on the rights reserved at the 
Lagos meeting would escalate the gravity of the crisis and force the British Government to 
concede that the crisis constituted a threat to peace, and therefore to concede United Nations 
involvement on a broader scale.   
Although British officials slowly came around to the need for UN Chapter VII sanctions as the 
situation in Rhodesia evolved that spring, they remained resistant to the idea of UN action and 
hesitant to work with the Sanctions Committee. On April 7, the British Government decided to 
sponsor a limited program of Chapter VII actions themselves in order to enforce the oil embargo 
on Rhodesia. However, to announce this shift in policy the CRO called an ad hoc meeting of 
Commonwealth representatives rather than consulting with the Sanctions Committee. Smith 
noted that Saville Garner “rather lamely” suggested that meeting with the Sanctions Committee 
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in Marlborough House would take more time than calling a meeting of Commonwealth 
representatives at the CRO but would not explain why.
65
  
Smith attended the CRO meeting and made the point that the Sanctions Committee would keep 
abreast of the situation and could recommend UN action as needed. He later wrote in his diary 
that he made this point to lessen African suspicions of British manoeuvring and to tie the work of 
the Sanctions Committee into the British decision-making process. Perhaps reading the room, 
Garner echoed Smith’s point once made and highlighted the valuable work of the Sanctions 
Committee.
66
 Smith’s attendance and arguments and Garner’s reception of those arguments in 
the meeting itself were important because there were clear implications of how the CRO had 
handled the Chapter VII announcement. At a time when Commonwealth tensions were at an all-
time high, by hosting the meeting in the CRO the British had effectively summoned 
Commonwealth representatives and announced the direction of their policy. There was little 
room for discussion, the terms and hierarchy of the meeting were clear, and the Secretariat had 
no role in calling or planning the meeting. Smith’s effective diplomacy during the meeting 
helped smooth over these tensions and encouraged British officials to work more closely with the 
Secretariat in future.  
In May 1966, British officials began working more closely with the Sanctions Committee to 
implement joint action on Rhodesia.
67
 Both the newer members and the Secretariat continued to 
pressure the British to cooperate as equals with their Commonwealth counterparts. The genesis 
of the Sanctions Committee illustrates several points about the establishment of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat. The British Government initially reverted to the habit of embedding 
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their own interests in Commonwealth affairs in order to pursue their own policy objectives. In 
both assuming the chairmanship and calling ad hoc meetings outside of the Sanctions 
Committee, British officials demonstrated an older, Anglo-centric understanding of 
Commonwealth meetings. Pressure from the newer, expansionist members along with the 
Secretariat showed that this was unacceptable to the wider membership. This pressure pushed 
Garner to pursue a conciliatory course in spite of the CRO’s early manoeuvring. The genesis of 
the Sanctions Committee showed the extent to which newer members were able to use the 
Secretariat to check British actions and bring them into line with a central Commonwealth body. 
Newer members were able to point out how inappropriate they found British actions in both bi- 
and multilateral channels and launch a corrective course in conjunction with the Secretary-
General.  
The organisation of Sanctions Committee meetings also illustrated the degree to which Canada 
played a bridging role between the old and new members. As with the Lagos meeting earlier in 
1966, Arnold Smith used his connections within the Canadian Government and Canada’s 
acceptable, if not positive reputation among the membership to break deadlock between the most 
vocal Commonwealth members (notably Australia and elements of the British Government such 
as the CRO on one hand, and African members such as Zambian, Ghana and Tanzania on the 
other). The newer, expansionist members provided the vision for the Commonwealth as an IO. 
The Canadian Government helped realise that vision by bolstering the Secretariat’s capacity and 




Chapter Nine: 1966 and 1969 London Prime Ministers’ Meetings 
1966 London Prime Ministers’ Meeting 
Over the summer of 1966, the Secretariat continued building its capacity to organise 
Commonwealth meetings with its work for the Sanctions Committee while working to hold the 
Commonwealth together through its deepest divisions over Rhodesia. At the Lagos meeting the 
prime ministers had agreed to meet again in July 1966 if the rebellion had not yet ended.
1
 As the 
year progressed it was increasingly clear that sanctions were not having the anticipated effect on 
the Rhodesian economy. By mid-summer, the white Rhodesian population had not had to make 
any economic sacrifices and the Rhodesian industrial sector had actually expanded.
2
 Black 
Rhodesians were increasingly frustrated by the lack of impact from international sanctions which 
gave substance to African governments’ calls to end the crisis by force.
3
 Per the terms of the 
Lagos Conference, the ongoing Rhodesian crisis warranted a second Prime Ministers’ Meeting in 
1966.   
The preparations for the second 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting included consultation for dates 
and location, setting the agenda, coordinating logistics, and finding agreement over the 
chairmanship. In each of these areas the Secretariat demonstrated growing capacity and 
confidence with a corresponding decrease in deference to British preferences and assumptions. 
Smith and the Secretariat again used connections throughout the Commonwealth and especially 
in Canada to keep all members engaged with one another. The September 1966 Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting was the first full scale Prime Ministers’ Meeting organised by the Secretariat and was a 
turning point in the Commonwealth’s transition from imperial club to international organisation. 
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Struggles between the expansionists and restrictionists, and between the Secretariat and the 
British Government, began with the formation of the Secretariat in 1965 came to a head during 
the September 1966 meeting. Few of these issues were resolved that year, but the September 
Prime Ministers’ Meeting shifted the organisational balance to the newer members’ view of the 
Commonwealth as an IO. 
Timing and Location 
The advances in the Secretariat’s capacity to service meetings demonstrated at Lagos and 
Smith’s good standing with the newer African members were important factors in the lead-up to 
the September Prime Ministers’ Meeting. British officials continued to maintain an older, Anglo-
centric view of how the Commonwealth should operate. However, the exigencies of the 
Rhodesian crisis forced the British Government to work with the Secretariat, which they 
conceded was a better avenue to building Commonwealth consensus over Rhodesia. 
Because sanctions were not having a considerable effect on the Rhodesian economy, in May 
1966 Secretariat staff initiated consultations for a second Prime Ministers’ Meeting in July. 
British officials had never fully supported a July meeting and preferred that it be postponed until 
later in 1966. In the past British officials inserted British preferences directly into the planning 
process under the guise of providing Commonwealth Services (as the CRO had done with the 
postponement of the Commonwealth working party outlined in Chapter Three). However, in 
1966 British officials brought their scheduling concerns to Arnold Smith rather than pursuing 
them unilaterally.  
In a meeting between Smith and CRO officials on May 10, Arthur Bottomley noted that the 
British Government had a heavy parliamentary schedule in July and would be hosting the World 
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Cup in addition to a state visit by the King of Jordan. Not only would this mean that British 
representatives would be busy in July but there would also be little room for Commonwealth 
delegates in London hotels.
4
 A more pressing British fear was that a July meeting would not 
leave enough time to achieve any real results with either negotiations or sanctions in Rhodesia. 
This was in part because South African intervention was slowing the impact of sanctions and in 
part because “…the British Government had no desire to provide the opportunity for a number of 
lesser representatives [my emphasis] to let off steam.”
5
     
For these reasons, British officials preferred that the meeting be postponed until September. An 
autumn meeting would be more convenient for the British schedule and would place the meeting 
right before the opening of the UN General Assembly which might be useful for gaining 
international support for any Commonwealth efforts to resolve the Rhodesian crisis. Whitehall 
would also prefer that the meeting be held in Canada. This would eliminate possible 
“embarrassment” over the chairmanship (as with the Sanctions Committee) without changing the 
traditional right of host governments to take the chair. British representatives also felt that Lester 
Pearson would support the United Kingdom in the discussions.  
There were practical advantages to some of the British proposals such as greater availability of 
hotels in London and better timing vis-à-vis the UN General Assembly. However, at the May 10 
meeting CRO officials simply informed Smith of their preferences and showed little regard for 
other members’ perspectives or the meeting schedule agreed to at Lagos. While British officials 
understood that they now had to coordinate Commonwealth meetings with the Secretariat, they 
maintained a decidedly Anglo-centric view of the Commonwealth and how it should function.   
                                                             
4 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 1, File 13, Note of Conversation with the Rt. Hon. Arthur Bottomley, Secretary of 




In subsequent correspondence with British officials, Smith noted that as a servant of all 
Commonwealth members he was willing to help the British Government explore the possibility 
of postponing the meeting and holding it outside of the United Kingdom. However, Smith was 
also clear that as per the Agreed Memorandum the planning process would be transparent, and 
that the British Government should be willing to accommodate a July meeting in London if this 
meant avoiding conflict with the other members.
6
 Smith also requested that if the meeting was 
postponed the British Government provide assurances to the African members that they would 
adhere to the commitments they had agreed to in Lagos. In the meantime, Smith agreed to 
consult the membership on the viability of other locations and dates after Prime Minister Wilson 
had a chance to discuss the possibility of a meeting in Ottawa with Pearson. 
Smith and the British Government launched parallel consultations on the viability of 
postponement and alternative locations on May 18.
7
 These consultations illustrated the differing 
views of the British Government and the Secretariat about the nature of the organisation. For 
instance, the British Government maintained that private correspondence between government 
officials was the best method for consultation. Whitehall used its own diplomatic networks to 
gauge whether other members would be receptive to postponing the meeting. In contrast, 
Secretary-General Smith issued a circular on May 18 and met with groups of Commonwealth 
High Commissioners over the following day.
8
 Smith relied on the central mechanism of the 
Secretariat to Communicate with Commonwealth governments through both the circular 
distribution, and direct conversations with the High Commissioners. Smith also went beyond 
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these formal channels in the service of Commonwealth members. The Tanzanian Government 
had boycotted diplomatic relations with Britain over British handling of the Rhodesian crisis. 
Because Tanzanian diplomats had been withdrawn from London, there was less opportunity to 
include Tanzania in personal consultations like Smith’s meetings with Commonwealth High 
Commissioners on May 18. Smith corresponded directly with Julius Nyerere (as he did 
throughout the Tanzanian boycott) to keep him informed of developments in the organisation 
and to encourage him to attend the next Prime Ministers’ Meeting. 
Smith also used his Canadian connections to bolster the Secretariat’s central position. On May 
29-30 while visiting Ottawa, Smith discussed the possibility of hosting the meeting in Canada 
with Pearson and various Canadian Government officials. Canada was perceived to be a neutral 
meeting place that would be accepted by all members. Pearson was hesitant given the political 
climate and feared the domestic political implications if Canada should host the meeting that 
ended the Commonwealth.
9
 While he did not wish to be on record as refusing to host the meeting 
Pearson told Smith that because British intentions were so unclear all of his advisors cautioned 
against hosting the meeting in Canada.
10
 However, at Smith’s request Pearson was willing to 
have a frank personal conversation with Wilson and to “put [the issue] to him squarely.”
11
 Smith 
emphasised in his talks with Pearson and other Canadian officials that the meeting would be 
much easier to postpone if Wilson could be persuaded to give assurances about British intentions 
to the African members.
12
 Again, Smith appealed to the good offices of his connections within 
the Canadian Government and the good reputation that Canada enjoyed among the members to 
work toward the success of the meeting. He continued closely coordinating with the Canadian 
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Government through the planning process, gaining further insight on Julius Nyerere’s stance on 
the meeting from Canadian officials in Dar es Salaam, as well as receiving copies of Pearson’s 
correspondence with the Canadian High Commissioner in London.
13
  
The consultative channels employed by the British Government and the Secretariat affected the 
results of their initial consultations. When CRO officials passed the results of British inquiries to 
the Secretariat in early June, the results were skewed towards postponement. The wording of the 
British report supported British preferences for the meeting, and simply noted whether or not 
other members would support a meeting in September. The Secretariat’s own inquiries yielded 
much more nuanced results with most members supporting either a July or a September meeting 
so long as a meeting took place that year.
14
 In most cases members were willing to go along with 
whatever majority emerged even if that would affect the composition of their delegations.
15
 For 
example, because of their electoral schedules and domestic business, if the meeting was held in 
September the leaders of Kenya, Ghana, Trinidad & Tobago, India, Pakistan, Zambia, Ceylon 
and Nigeria would not able to attend and secondary ministers would need to be sent in their 
stead. However, even though their delegations would be affected, these members were willing to 
work toward a broader Commonwealth consensus.
16
   
The parallel consultations demonstrated very different views of the Commonwealth and how it 
should function. The British Government continued to operate as if the Commonwealth was an 
imperial club in which the United Kingdom was primus inter pares. Whitehall preferred that 
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consultations be carried out between member diplomats rather than by a central Secretariat, 
prioritised the attendance of prime ministers at the meeting, and expected British preferences for 
timing and location to be accommodated by other members. The CRO continued to insert British 
preferences into their Commonwealth consultations. The CRO’s report reflected a binary of 
opposition or support for a September meeting while ignoring that most members were flexible 
on dates but insistent on the meeting itself.  
In contrast, newer members approached the consultations based on the Commonwealth operating 
as an IO. They felt that coordinating through a central hub was more appropriate and readily met 
and corresponded with the Secretariat. Newer members trusted the Secretariat to organise the 
meeting to best serve all members. Many replied that they would support a meeting in either July 
or September and would accept whatever consensus emerged. Unlike the CRO, the Secretariat 
was transparent about that consensus and gave a nuanced report that better reflected the 
preferences indicated by individual members. The newer members were also prepared to attend 
regardless of whether their Heads of Government were available. In this sense they saw the 
Commonwealth as an organisation like the UN rather than a club. Meetings were organised by a 
central Secretariat and the members would send a delegation to participate, rather than meetings 
being contingent on member Heads of Government being available at British convenience.   
The pressures exerted on Britain by the newer members over the Rhodesian crisis forced the 
British Government to work more closely with the Secretariat as the meeting preparations 
continued. The key to the meeting’s success lay with the African members in general, and 
Zambia in particular. At this point, Britain’s handling of the Rhodesia problem was causing 
many African nations to question their continued participation in the Commonwealth in general. 
Zambia was most directly affected by the Rhodesian crisis and President Kaunda felt both 
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isolated and betrayed by Wilson’s recent attempts to bring the Rhodesian Government into 
negotiations, further undermining confidence in British intentions after Lagos.
17
 However, he 
continued to engage with the Commonwealth as he felt that on balance its ongoing support was 
advantageous for Zambia. Ghana’s Nkrumah had been fostering support for a Commonwealth 
boycott, but this was curbed by Nkrumah’s ousting in a military coup that February and 
replacement with a military government. Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta consistently supported 
Commonwealth meetings throughout this time (and later worked to prevent an African walkout 
once the meeting began).
18
 However, other African members would support Zambia in a 
Commonwealth boycott if British policy continued on its apparent course. Tanzania had already 
broken diplomatic ties with Britain in protest over Rhodesia and Julius Nyerere did not see much 
use to his attending in light of British policies. Nyerere also feared backlash from the OAU if he 
reversed on the Tanzanian break with Britain.
19
 The new military government in Nigeria also 
expressed the contingency of their attendance, noting that unless concrete measures were 
forthcoming on Rhodesia that summer there would be no point in attending the Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting.
20
 The ongoing possibility of an African boycott threatened to collapse the meeting 
preparations.  
Whitehall wanted to maintain relations with the Commonwealth. The British Government 
viewed the Commonwealth as a useful means of extending British influence in the world but was 
also accustomed to pursuing their own policy objectives regardless of other members’ views. By 
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June 1966, the British Government continued to press for postponing the Commonwealth 
meeting while refusing to provide assurances that they would not go back on their commitments 
at Lagos.
21
 Smith reminded CRO officials on June 7 that the viability of postponing the meeting 
depended on African opinion which depended in turn on British policy.
22
 It was still unclear 
whether there was a consensus among African governments. By mid-June, replies from the 
membership indicated that seven members would prefer July, six members would support either 
date, and nine would prefer September.
23
 The Ghanaian Government was amenable to a 
September Meeting but would support the preference of the majority of African governments. It 
was still unclear whether Tanzania would be represented at the meeting at all. Zambia’s Kenneth 
Kaunda was particularly vocal against potential British back-pedaling and enjoyed strong 
support among other African members.
24
 Kaunda argued that any delay took pressure off the 
Rhodesian Government, lessened the accountability of the British, and allowed further 
destruction of the Zambian economy. Writing to Smith on June 13, Kaunda insisted that the 
terms of the Lagos meeting be upheld and if that meant holding the July meeting elsewhere he 
proposed that it be held in New Delhi.
25
 The Zambian Government with the support of other 
undecided African members could make or break a majority consensus on the meeting dates. But 
Zambian action depended on British policy, thus creating an impasse in the meeting 
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preparations. Both the British and Zambian Governments would need to revise their positions for 
the Prime Ministers’ Meeting to move ahead.
26
   
The Secretariat facilitated consensus on the meeting dates. As with the lead-up to the January 
Meeting in Lagos, Arnold Smith worked to keep all parties at the table in spite of a gloomy 
outlook regarding the Rhodesian crisis.
27
 In addition to working with Canadian representatives to 
try to smooth out the administrative issues leading up to the meeting, Smith corresponded 
continuously with Commonwealth leaders on a personal level with special attention to Zambian 
and British representatives. Following Kaunda’s call for the July meeting, Smith wrote him 
personally to appeal for cooperation with the emerging consensus for a date in September.
28
 
Smith continued sustained personal correspondence with Kaunda, writing on multiple occasions 
to plead that Kaunda not leave the Commonwealth and to encourage him to use the 
Commonwealth machinery and meetings as a way to resolve the Rhodesian crisis.
29
 Shortly 
before the meeting itself Smith sent Kaunda advance copies of the Secretary-General’s first 
report to show how Kaunda’s own recommendations had influenced the British and directly 
influenced many of the Secretariat’s own activities.
30
 It was a final note of encouragement on the 
use and value of the Commonwealth as the meeting drew near.  
Smith also argued with British representatives across party lines. He grappled with both Labour 
Prime Minister Wilson and other influential figures like Duncan Sandys (who had until recently 
been Conservative Shadow Secretary of State for the Colonies) over the need to give assurances 
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that Britain would not go back on her word in Lagos. Both Wilson and Sandys were offended 
that the Commonwealth was pressuring Britain and would not consider giving assurances about 
Britain’s commitment to NIBMAR. Sandys advocated granting independence to Rhodesia to 
technically resolve the crisis before the Prime Ministers’ Meeting.  Wilson took a more deft 
approach and sought to defer the Rhodesia discussion to a sub-committee at the Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting on the condition that the committee be chaired by Lester Pearson.
31
 Smith faced a well-
entrenched view of the Commonwealth as an Anglo-centric club.
32
   
Secretariat efforts to keep Zambian and British officials engaged in the planning process 
culminated with Deputy Secretary-General Adu being dispatched to Zambia to assist with new 
talks between the Zambian and British Governments. The talks focused on how to deal with the 
impact of the Rhodesian crisis on the Zambian economy, particularly as sanctions began to have 
an effect. Through these talks, new measures to support the Zambian economy were tabled by 
British officials and Secretariat personnel agreed to issue an emergency call for aid to the wider 
membership. The Secretariat’s facilitation of these fresh talks was an important part of the 
planning process that contributed to the 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting taking place at all. With 
new British assurances and the Secretariat’s call for emergency Commonwealth assistance 
Kaunda accepted postponement of the Prime Ministers’ Meeting until September.
33
 Once the 
September dates for the Prime Ministers’ Meeting were set, Smith issued an additional circular 
to follow up on the meeting location.
34
 While Ottawa had already been ruled out in the 
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preliminary rounds of discussion, Nairobi had been proposed as a potential host city in addition 
to New Delhi and London.
35
 With the issue of dates resolved consensus to hold the meeting in 
London was quickly achieved and by June 27 the location was finalised.
36
 However, the decision 
to host the meeting in London prompted both Guyanese and Ghanaian officials to call for future 
meetings to rotate throughout the Commonwealth.
37
  
In the process of planning the dates and location for the second 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting, 
the Secretariat had to keep all parties engaged through some of the deepest divisions the 
Commonwealth had yet seen. Coordinating the meeting involved negotiating expansionist and 
restrictionist perspectives of what the Commonwealth was and how it should operate. 
Furthermore, the planning process necessitated the Secretariat’s involvement in Commonwealth 
politics. In order to successfully fulfill the limited mandate of planning Commonwealth 
meetings, Secretariat staff had to adopt a wider political mandate to facilitate and coordinate 
cooperation between members and to keep the parties with the greatest stake in the Rhodesian 
debates (the UK and Zambia) in dialogue with one another. By facilitating the talks in Lusaka 
the Secretariat helped both parties reach a compromise. Smith and the Secretariat did so in order 
to ensure that the Commonwealth held together and the second 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting 
would go ahead. However, by pursuing that original meetings-based mandate the Secretariat 
stepped into a wider political role that included negotiation and mediation between members. 
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The process of scheduling the 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting thus illustrated that the 
management of Commonwealth meetings could be a stepping stone to Secretariat expansion  
Logistics and Press 
After the difficult work of coordinating the timing of the meeting, managing practical logistics 
was comparably straight forward. The Secretariat capacity to plan logistics was much greater 
after Lagos and Secretariat staff could work on procedures established at the previous meeting 
without as much reliance on the host government. Adopting a practice from Lagos, Smith 
proposed that members appoint conference liaison officers to work with the Secretariat and the 
British Government to facilitate the arrangements.
38
 In a July briefing outlining the division of 
responsibilities between the British Government and the Secretariat, CRO officials noted that it 
would be the first time the Secretariat serviced such a meeting in the United Kingdom. The CRO 
acknowledged that the Secretariat would be in charge of the wider services and organisation in 
addition to setting the agenda and managing press relations.
39
 The CRO was therefore 
responsible only for host government arrangements such as ceremonial and social programming 
(apart from the opening ceremony which was organised by the Secretariat), administrative 
concerns such as catering, communications, service staff, parking, and security, and briefing the 
British delegation.
40
 These were the traditional responsibilities of a host government and the 
extent of the British role in the 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting.  
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The CRO briefing that outlined responsibilities for the meeting and recognised the Secretariat’s 
central role was the product of the Secretariat’s success in Lagos. Secretariat staff had 
coordinated the logistics of the Lagos meeting without any involvement of the CRO. Because the 
Secretariat had done so away from its home offices while understaffed and working on short 
notice, there was no justification for the CRO to push for a greater role beyond the letter of its 
responsibilities as host government. The newer members would be suspicious of any British 
claims to more responsibility for the planning of the September Prime Ministers’ Meeting. 
The management of the 1966 press arrangements reflected the effective pressure the expansionist 
members exerted on the restrictionist British Government. In the past CRO officials had been 
tempted to exploit the lack of Secretariat press staff to their own advantage. In 1964, the CRO 
considered exerting influence on Commonwealth press activities before the Secretariat had been 
established or had its own press division, but elected to not attempt this lest they be perceived to 
be controlling upcoming meetings.
41
 In the July 1966 briefing CRO officials noted that the 
Secretariat still did not have sufficient press staff to manage the meeting requirements and that 
they could provide loaned staff from the CRO News Department.
42
 As in the 1964 case, by 
providing loaned staff the CRO could potentially influence the media coverage of the Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting. The ongoing Rhodesian crisis gave added impetus for British officials to 
want to manage Commonwealth press coverage. After the second meeting of the Sanctions 
Committee in February 1966, Cledwyn Hughes, Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations 
wrote to Smith to complain that a recent article in the Times contained information that was 
                                                             
41 TNA: DO 194/66, Minute from N. Pritchard to Mr. Walsh Atkins, 2 April, 1965.   
42 TNA: DO 163/103, Departmental Notice: Arrangements for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting 6-15 
September, 19 July, 1966.   
183 
 
“based on more than intelligent guesswork.”
43
 While Hughes did not make any outright 
accusations of information mismanagement, he reminded Smith that press security was the 
responsibility of the Secretariat. Hughes stressed that this was particularly important in the 
context of ongoing negotiations with the Rhodesian Government and suggested that Smith 




The management of press at Commonwealth meetings was a responsibility which had technically 
been transferred from the CRO to the Secretariat after the latter’s foundation.
45
 The CRO had 
managed press arrangements for the 1964 and 1965 Prime Ministers’ Meetings after the decision 
to form the Secretariat had been taken but before it began operations. In this period the CRO 
actually expanded its press capabilities and introduced new protocols to deal with increased 
media volume and new media technologies.
46
 The Secretariat had been building its capacity to 
manage press relations but by 1966 was still understaffed. With the ongoing Rhodesian crisis and 
the understaffed Secretariat, the British Government had the motive and the means to influence 
Commonwealth press management for the September 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting.  
CRO officials took note of the potential to influence Commonwealth press management in 1966 
but as they had done in 1964, did not pursue that opportunity. British officials feared other 
Commonwealth members’ reactions if the British Government was found to be influencing the 
press during the meeting. That fear was greater than the advantage of controlling the image of 
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the Commonwealth in the press. In consequence the CRO relented and allowed the Secretariat to 
conduct press management on its own.  
With the exception of the Lagos and Ottawa Prime Ministers’ Meetings, the British Government 
had hosted most Commonwealth meetings to date. As with the question of membership detailed 
in Chapter Six, there was no clear division of responsibilities in the British management 
structure. With membership applications, the division of responsibility for submitting and for 
processing applications was unclear as it had hitherto been managed within the British 
Government. The same problem occurred with Commonwealth meetings. All logistical 
deliberations were internally conducted between British Government departments in their 
capacity host and their capacity as Commonwealth planners. The formation of the Secretariat 
challenged these practices. Newer members expected the Secretariat to manage the logistics and 
press arrangements for high-level Commonwealth meetings. The Lagos Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting had shown that the Secretariat could effectively arrange such logistics. For the 
September Prime Ministers’ Meeting, the newer members continued to pressure the British 
Government to respect the Secretariat’s central administrative role. The British Government 
came to see Secretariat growth as less problematic than a schism with the expansionist Afro-
Caribbean members and moved to a more cooperative footing in the summer of 1966. This 
process was facilitated by the imminent reorganisation of the CRO in August of that year. Both 
the Secretariat and British planning documents for the September 1966 meeting heavily 
emphasised the division of tasks between the Secretariat as planner and the British Government 
as host. That emphasis was not a coincidence or point of nomenclature but a reflection of 
changes in the operation of the Commonwealth.  
Agenda and Chairmanship 
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By the end of July1966, the logistical preparations for the Prime Ministers’ Meeting were 
finalised. Deputy Secretary-General Adu was able to call a meeting of conference liaison officers 
to explain the administrative arrangements and begin consultations for setting the meeting 
agenda.
47
 The preparation of the meeting agenda again involved conflict between the Secretariat 
and the British Government. As with the other meeting logistics, that conflict involved 
differentiating between the British and Secretariat roles in the meeting preparations and pressure 
from the newer members for the British Government to respect that differentiation.  
According to the terms of the Agreed Memorandum, preparing the meeting agenda was a 
responsibility of the Secretariat. The September Prime Ministers’ Meeting was mandated by the 
Lagos meeting which had been the first Prime Ministers’ Meeting focused on a single issue 
(Rhodesia). After the intense discussions in Lagos the membership supported a full Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting in London including a customarily wide agenda. Wider world political 
problems, the future of British dependencies, Commonwealth membership, and Secretariat 
affairs were set to be prominent items.
48
 In anticipation of these discussions, the Secretariat 
issued background papers on the independence of Basutoland and Bechuanaland, the Secretariat 
budget, Commonwealth aid, and nuclear disarmament.
49
 Each of these papers was a significant 
research undertaking. In fact, the Secretariat’s research and background papers on disarmament 
were far more voluminous than the more pointed materials on Rhodesia. Smith and a number of 
Commonwealth officials felt a strong third party appeal in the UN by a group like the 
Commonwealth could tip the scales to closing a disarmament settlement between the United 
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States and the Soviet Union.
50
 These efforts reflect that the Secretariat was fielding member 
concerns (India’s work on disarmament in the 1950s never received the same attention at Prime 
Ministers’ Meetings), and that the Commonwealth was functioning as an international 
organisation.  
However, while preparing research on issues such as colonial independence and disarmament 
was an important component of Secretariat preparations for the meeting, it was clear that these 
issues would be overshadowed by the Rhodesian crisis at the meeting itself. As the agenda 
preparations went ahead British officials pushed for Rhodesia to be included as a sub-section of 
the customary discussion of world affairs rather than as a stand-alone agenda item in its own 
right.
51
 However, unlike the pre-Secretariat meetings, the agenda could no longer be quietly 
organised according to British preference. Agenda items proposed by the membership were 
weighed equally and further developed by the Secretariat. This new dynamic was facilitated by 
the merger of the CRO and CO into the Commonwealth Office at the beginning of August 1966. 
While many former CRO personnel continued to oppose the Secretariat in their new capacities in 
the Commonwealth Office or other departments, the reorganisation nonetheless marked the 
removal of the CRO as the central source of British antagonism to the Secretariat. The genesis of 
Rhodesia’s place on the September agenda illustrates this shift in both British deference to the 
Secretariat and the role of the Secretariat in coordinating member input on a more equal basis.  
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As the merger of the CRO and CO drew near, CRO officials began to defer responsibilities more 
readily to the Secretariat. In contrast to the earlier manoeuvring over the agenda at the 
Commonwealth Law Ministers’ Meeting (see Chapter 10), a CRO circular to request internal 
briefs for the British delegates that July acknowledged that the Secretariat would be drafting the 
agenda with the input of the wider membership.
52
 However, the CRO nonetheless suggested that 
briefings be organised on the lines of the 1965 Prime Ministers’ Meeting during which Rhodesia 
had been lumped together with discussion of other dependencies in the agenda.
53
 While this 
would not fundamentally alter the content of the Rhodesia briefs, it was a point of order that 
reflected British preferences about the framing of the Rhodesia discussions.  
The order of the agenda was a significant symbolic issue for many of the members especially 
after the delay of the meeting itself. In the case of the Rhodesian crisis, African members argued 
that the Rhodesia issue was the most important point of the September meeting and should be 
treated as a stand-alone topic that was first on the agenda. They worried that any other agenda 
items would be out of proper perspective if they were not discussed in the context of the 
Rhodesian crisis. They argued that time to discuss other subjects would work itself out once the 
Rhodesian subject was treated.
54
 Asian members agreed on putting Rhodesia first but for 
different reasons. Indian officials spoke of the psychological effect of treating race issues 
seriously and the need to curtail press speculation as soon as possible. Malaysian officials 
pointed out that delegates would no doubt wish to consult their capitals on any decisions made 
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about Rhodesia, so placing the topic as early as possible would also be practical.
55
 British 
officials backed by the New Zealand Government countered that because Rhodesia was part of 
the ‘world situation’ it would only be logical to discuss the former first. They also hoped to have 
the opportunity to sound the tone of the discussions and adjust their stance according to other 
members before delving into the Rhodesia discussions.  
While preparing the agenda Smith was cognisant that the Afro-Asian members overwhelmingly 
supported getting straight to the point with Rhodesia as a standalone item first on the agenda. 
However, Smith was also aware of British concerns and he himself desired to create a climate for 
productive discussion at the September meeting. Smith hoped that Rhodesia might be included as 
an independent agenda item, but after the customary discussion of world affairs. He felt this 
configuration might allow African, Asian, and Canadian opinion to coalesce, thereby increasing 
the chances of a productive discussion on Rhodesia.
56
 As with his own vision for the 
organisation, Smith sought to find a balance between expansionist and restrictionist perspectives.   
Smith’s thinking was reflected in the drafts of the agenda circulated by the Secretariat. The 
provisional agenda circulated in mid-July included Rhodesia as a standalone item first on the 
agenda, but included a note that the prospective order was not necessarily final.
57
 In late August, 
a more developed draft agenda included Rhodesia after the discussion of world affairs, yet still as 
a stand-alone item.
58
 In discussions with senior Commonwealth officials to finalise the agenda 
shortly before the Prime Ministers’ Meeting began, Smith trod a middle line and recognised both 
British arguments, and the arguments made by members in the Global South. Smith noted the 
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merits of ordering the agenda in accordance with both perspectives.
59
 By this time however, the 
order was functionally set. Following the merger of the CRO and CO in August, the British 
preparatory briefs had been reorganised by the new Commonwealth Office along the lines of the 
Secretariat’s July draft agenda that had been based on southern members’ input rather than on the 
1965 model proposed by the former CRO.
60
 Thus in British internal circles, those preparing for 
the meeting had already conceded the issue of agenda order. The British and New Zealand 
Governments continued to advocate for a later discussion of Rhodesia at the September officials 
meeting but ultimately decided not to press the agenda issue in the face of an overwhelming 
consensus among the members in the Global South.
61
 Again, pressure from the newer members 
ensured that the British Government did try to reclaim responsibilities from the Secretariat. 
Whitehall could not impose British preferences on the shape of the meeting.    
British officials were ultimately willing to accept the order of the agenda along the lines 
proposed by the newer members. They had initially opposed Rhodesia as first on the agenda to 
lessen its prominence in the proceedings. The British Government was still keen not to be 
criticised by former colonies with a greater stake in the Rhodesia issue. However, Whitehall 
increasingly worked with the Secretariat to devise other ways to calm the potentially volatile 
meeting. For instance, as leader of the host government, the British Prime Minister would 
traditionally be expected to take the role of meeting chairman. Leading up to the conference 
however, Sir Saville Garner proposed that Lester Pearson chair the sessions discussing Rhodesia, 
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whatever the order of the agenda.
62
 This would appeal to both the newer members’ trust in 
Canada as a mediating figure within the Commonwealth in addition to Guyanese calls to re-
evaluate whether the host government should necessarily provide the chairman.
63
 While the 
British opposed Arnold Smith stepping in as a chairman (to which Smith agreed in order to avoid 
allegations of partisanship), this was a significant change in British policy.
64
 British concessions 
over the agenda were facilitated by concessions over the chairmanship of key sessions. The 
debates over the chairmanship of the Sanctions Committee earlier in the year illustrated how the 
expansionist members could apply effective political pressure on the British and other 
restrictionist governments. The struggles over the chairmanship of the Sanctions Committee 
eased the transition for other, larger meetings like the September Prime Ministers’ Meeting. 
Whitehall was increasingly willing to work with the Secretariat to address concerns about the 
agenda and chairmanship of Commonwealth meetings and the Secretariat was coming into its 
own as the central body of the organisation.  
In the final days before the September Prime Ministers’ Meeting began, Smith continued to 
mediate between member perspectives. He reminded Commonwealth officials that the agenda or 
the session chair need not be finalised until the prime ministers themselves convened and 
confirmed that he had proactively discussed the matter with Pearson, who was willing to chair 
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the sessions on Rhodesia.
65
 Ultimately, the Secretariat facilitated newer members’ preferences in 
the agenda order while working to maintain flexibility and introduce positive elements to the 
upcoming meeting. Smith used his Canadian connections to help bridge the perspectives of the 
old and new Commonwealth, both of which considered the Canadian Government to be an ally. 
He skillfully used his connections and networks within the Commonwealth to broker a feasible 
outcome which kept all parties at the table, in addition to cementing the Secretariat’s role as a 
useful central body for both planning and mediating Commonwealth meetings.  
Commonwealth Cooperation 
During the meeting itself, Smith and the Secretariat continued working to introduce positive 
aspects of Commonwealth cooperation into the discussion both to address previously raised 
member concerns and to break up the divisive discussions on Rhodesia.
66
 Secretariat efforts 
reflected the Commonwealth as an international organisation by emphasising multilateral efforts 
based on both general and specific member needs. Foremost among the Secretariat’s efforts was 
a proposal for a centrally coordinated, multilateral Commonwealth aid and technical assistance 
scheme.  
In the most immediate sense, the Secretariat proposal would help address the Rhodesian crisis by 
facilitating technical training efforts for Rhodesian Africans. Representatives from the 
Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) had personally called on Smith to request that the 
Commonwealth do more to provide training and education for Rhodesian Africans. They hoped 
to coordinate these efforts with the Zambian Government, the Zimbabwean African Peoples’ 
                                                             
65 TNA: DO 161/398, Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, London, September 1966: Minutes of a Meeting 
of Senior Officials held in the Chairman’s Committee Room, Marlborough House, London, on Monday 5 
September, 1966, at 11.30 a.m. 
66 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 1, File 22, Diary, Thursday, 8th September, 1966.  
192 
 
Union (ZAPU), and the wider Commonwealth to ensure a more stable government and society 
once Zimbabwean independence was achieved.
67
 Groups of Black Rhodesian students and 
members of parliament also called on Smith in hopes that the Commonwealth could better 
coordinate training efforts, particularly after the Rhodesian Government began arresting 
dissenting parliamentarians and students and sanctions began cutting off Commonwealth 
scholarships.
68
 For these individuals, Commonwealth technical assistance would provide the 
educational basis to ensure a viable Zimbabwean Government in the future and the scholarships 
and funding to ensure that education and training took place in the meantime. The Secretariat’s 
technical assistance proposal would therefore contribute to solving the Rhodesian crisis by 
facilitating opportunities for Rhodesian Africans on one hand and by providing constructive 
material to ease tensions between Commonwealth leaders.  
The Secretariat proposal also responded to a number of wider Commonwealth economic issues 
that had been recurrent themes in both Prime Ministers’ Meetings and other ministerial 
gatherings over the past several years.
69
 As detailed in the Secretariat proposal, Commonwealth 
consultation on a wide range of aid and development problems topics had been limited with no 
efforts to routinize or centrally coordinate such initiatives that did exist in the Commonwealth.
70
 
A multilateral scheme for Commonwealth aid could combine efforts in aid, development, 
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economic planning, and technical assistance, thus increasing the efficiency and efficacy of 
Commonwealth development initiatives.  
Development-related concerns were often raised by the newer members of the Commonwealth, 
and Smith had been working on the Secretariat proposal for some time. While an aid and 
development initiative would enjoy wider support from the new members and would be a 
positive element to balance the difficult Rhodesia discussions, the proposal could not have come 
at a worse time for coordinating with the British Government. The British were suspicious of 
both the wider Commonwealth membership and the expansion of the Secretariat and were facing 
perceived economic downturn at home and difficult negotiations with the European Economic 
Community.
71
 The British Government and other restrictionist members had ensured that the 
Agreed Memorandum stipulated that the Secretariat should only have an advisory role in 
development and that the Secretariat would do nothing that might affect existing channels of 
economic and technical assistance.
72
 The Secretariat proposal circulated in August 1966 called 
for a modest beginning to the aid scheme and stayed well within cited parameters of the 
Secretariat’s functions. Smith’s reliance on the accepted documentation was noted by the British 
Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) which systematically sought out loopholes to 
undermine the proposal. Officials in the ODM regarded Smith’s proposal as beyond the 
legitimate limits of the Secretariat and inviting “nothing but chaos” at the Prime Ministers’ 
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 The reassignment of Arthur Bottomley, one of the Secretariat’s strongest opponents 
in the CRO, as Minister of Overseas Development following the amalgamation of the CRO and 
CO the same month did not help the Secretariat efforts. Bottomley reflected the Wilson 
Government’s cautious approach to aid spending in the 1960s and was one of many individuals  
from the colonial apparatus who now worked in international aid.
74
 Bottomley’s reassignment to 
the ODM was the beginning of the end of his career as a minister giving him all the more 
personal reason to oppose the Secretariat. In the meantime, he continued to oppose Secretariat 
expansion.    
However, Secretariat staff were aware of British financial concerns and resisted the “wet 
blanketting [sic]” their initial drafts received from British representatives.
75
 While noting that the 
British had taken the narrowest possible interpretation of the Secretariat’s mandate, Secretariat 
staff nonetheless pursued the aid proposal for inclusion at the September Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting. The British Government was the chief contributor of Commonwealth aid and would not 
agree to commit to the proposal in either principle or detail. However, in order to avoid 
additional conflict with the newer members, Whitehall did not object to the Secretariat 




The Secretariat proposal was barely discussed at the September 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting. 
The lack of British support and the division over Rhodesia led to an underwhelming discussion 
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even among the newer members who most strongly supported the idea. While newer members 
initiated discussion of the aid proposal, there was not enough momentum to achieve results. 
Jamaican and Singaporean representatives for instance, raised questions of nomenclature 
regarding “developing” countries and the Nigerian delegation called on members able to give aid 
to channel it through the Secretariat.
77
 This discussion was limited by the restrictionist members. 
Bottomley, speaking for the British delegation, outlined British economic difficulties and 
affirmed British commitment to aid in existing bilateral channels but refused to raise “false 
hopes” about increased aid or expanded programs through the Secretariat.
78
 Indian 
representatives also expressly opposed the expansion of the Secretariat into this realm and 
affirmed their commitment to existing channels of aid while stifling discussion of new 
multilateral methods.
79
   
The aid proposal came to an impasse between the expansionists and restrictionists. Once again 
Smith’s connections in the Canadian Government helped break the deadlock. The Secretary-
General had been asked to organise a meeting of Commonwealth Planners by the end of 1966.
80
 
Because the Secretariat proposal for multilateral aid and technical assistance came under the 
broader umbrella Commonwealth economic planning, Lester Pearson suggested that the proposal 
be deferred to the Planning Conference that Smith had already been asked to arrange.
81
 The 
prime ministers agreed and the Secretariat proposal was effectively postponed. As Smith later 
recalled, the Secretariat proposal had run into “heavy weather” and did not see any tangible 
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Wider economic discussions in September 1966 also reached an impasse. The newer members 
worried about the stalling of the United Nations’ “Development Decade” as well as the 
uncertainty of Commonwealth trade amid unclear British intentions towards the EEC.
83
 These 
were not small issues yet the discussions were cursory at best. Most economic discussions 
echoed outlines provided by the Commonwealth Trade Ministers’ Meeting earlier that year, or 
were deferred to the upcoming Finance Ministers’ Meeting later that month. The discussion that 
did take place was descriptive rather than prescriptive.
84
 The meeting took note of economic 
problems and gave lip service to the potential for Commonwealth coordination but deferred 
those issues for future discussion.
85
 Both the Secretariat aid proposal and the wider economic 
situation were subordinated to discussions on Rhodesia and deferred to other meetings of 
Commonwealth officials. The September 1966 meeting demonstrated that the work of ministerial 
meetings was becoming more important to the operations of the Commonwealth (and more akin 
to the specialised conferences of the UN). There was not enough time or momentum for the 
prime ministers to address those issues in depth, and the growing scale of the Commonwealth 
necessitated a greater distribution of tasks among its leaders. The restrictionist members opposed 
Secretariat expansion into an economic role including aid and development, but were willing to 
defer discussion to ministerial meetings organised by the Secretariat.  
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In this sense, the meeting was a qualified success for the Secretariat. While the Secretariat 
proposal for multilateral aid and technical assistance was not approved, the Secretariat was 
tasked with organising a greater number of meetings to address a greater number of economic 
topics. The Report of the Review Committee, which officially recommended the amalgamation 
of the CEC and CELU into the Secretariat was also reviewed and accepted at the meeting.
86
 The 
report received little attention from the prime ministers apart from a stamp of approval. The 
prime ministers were again willing to entrust the work to a dedicated committee, just as they 
entrusted economic issues to other ministerial meetings. The approval of a Secretariat economic 
branch was a watershed point of approval for the expansion of the Secretariat but was 
accomplished with little fanfare.  
The same was true for other topics related to the Secretariat’s work. For instance, at the 
September meeting, there was some debate over rotating meetings throughout the 
Commonwealth. The idea was accepted in principle and the prime ministers tasked the 
Secretariat to coordinate meeting rotation on a loose pragmatic basis that very much echoed the 
status quo.
87
 The restrictionists opposed any concrete rules about meeting rotation that would 
formalise the Secretariat into an executive entity. However, by opposing hard and fast rules 
about meetings, they gave the Secretariat a greater discretionary power to oversee, coordinate, 
and organise meetings.  
In a similar sense, the Secretary-General’s annual report was reviewed and accepted by the 
meeting. Smith hoped that his report could be published for public information, but all 
restrictionist governments opposed its publication. British, Indian, and Australian delegations in 
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particular felt that the report was an effort of self-aggrandisement on Smith’s part. In contrast, 
most Afro-Caribbean members either supported the report’s publication or were too focused on 
the Rhodesian issue to particularly care about the report.
88
 In consequence, the report merited 
little attention and the prime ministers agreed that the Secretariat could publish the report 
independently, but not on the authority of the assembled prime ministers.
89
 Sir Saville Garner 
later recorded “with some measure of glee” the lukewarm reception of the Secretary-General’s 
report, in addition to the rejection of his proposal on Commonwealth aid, (among other features 
of the meeting) were “hard knocks” that seemed to have personally hurt Smith.
90
 Garner and 
other British officials hoped that “the lesson” would sink in regarding the role of the Secretariat, 
but had to concede that Smith had earnestly and genuinely tried to be helpful regarding the 
operation of the Commonwealth. They further noted that there had been no complaint about the 
Secretariat among the delegations from newer Commonwealth members.
91
 The Secretary-
General’s report was opposed by the restrictionists in a bid to limit the Secretariat, yet by 
withholding their blessing of the report they enabled the Secretariat to publish the report 
independently of the prime ministers.  
The September 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting was a qualified success for the Secretariat despite 
the subdued treatment of Secretariat issues in the meeting and the snide British perceptions of 
Secretariat activities behind closed doors. Contrary to Garner’s estimations the Secretariat aid 
proposal was postponed rather than rejected, the expansion of the Secretariat in the economic 
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realm had been approved, and many members were impressed with the success of the Secretariat 
in servicing its first full scale Prime Ministers’ Meeting.
92
 Restrictionist opposition over the 
Secretariat proposal, economic topics, the location of Commonwealth meetings, and the 
publication of the Secretariat report, all inadvertently strengthened the Secretariat by reinforcing 
the Secretariat’s capacity for independent action and even expanding its role managing 
Commonwealth meetings.  
Rhodesia 
The groundwork to make the September meeting happen in the first place had been expeditiously 
carried out by the Secretariat and the discussion had not reached a deadlock over the pressing 
issue of Rhodesia. Avoiding deadlock at the meeting was an improbable outcome that attests to 
Secretariat initiatives in moving the meeting ahead. As with Secretariat efforts to facilitate 
Commonwealth cooperation, there was no clear success at the September meeting. However, the 
conduct and planning of the meeting itself helped solidify the central role of the Secretariat and 
was a qualified success for Smith and his staff. The process behind the meeting moved the 
Commonwealth onto a footing more akin to an IO than a club, and ensured that the 
Commonwealth did not disintegrate over the Rhodesian crisis in 1966. The survival of the 
organisation was not a foregone conclusion and the processes behind the meeting were just as, if 
not more important than the talks at the meeting itself.  
As the preparations for the timing and location of the September meeting attest, the likelihood of 
deadlock over Rhodesia was high. Leading up to the meeting the British Government felt that the 
pressure being exerted on Whitehall from other Commonwealth members was unsustainable and 
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that the resolution of the Rhodesian crisis on British terms and continued association with the 
Commonwealth seemed incompatible.
93
 While Smith continued to argue that the Commonwealth 
was not an exclusive organisation and should complement, not compete with other international 
organisations, it was clear that some agreement about Rhodesia was needed if the British were to 
continue with the Commonwealth association. This imperative was complicated by British 
policy. Because the British Government viewed the Rhodesian issue as a domestic problem, 
Whitehall had not been forthcoming about the details of the crisis and had made no commitment 
to majority rule. Nor would the British Government consider the use of force to resolve the 
crisis. Apart from kith and kin arguments against military action, British officials argued that 
intervention would result in a full scale, open-ended war, contrary to other colonial “security” 
operations which were not against a state apparatus and therefore had a defined scope.
94
 This 
position had little basis in the context of the vast amounts of military aid distributed globally 
during the Cold War, but nonetheless shaped British policy on Rhodesia.   
With no settlement in sight and military action ruled out, sanctions became the main British 
strategy to resolving the crisis. However, by September 1966 British sanctions policy was also 
becoming tenuous given their questionable efficacy. British officials preparing for the September 
meeting anticipated significant debate on the efficacy of sanctions in Rhodesia, noting that the 
British delegation could expect “some pretty rough patches given the depth of resentment and 
suspicion of our motives.”
95
 Such suspicion was well warranted. Not only was the British 
commitment to NIBMAR questionable, but sanctions were not quickly taking hold. The poor 
performance of the sanctions was partly due to the scale of the UK’s continued trade with 
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Rhodesia. In 1965, out of a total of £85.4 million of Rhodesian exports, South Africa and Britain 
had accounted for £76.6 million of sales with the entire rest of the Commonwealth accounting 
for a further £8.8 million. When asked to find deficiencies in other Commonwealth members’ 
application of sanctions to Rhodesia to support a British defensive brief, one staffer in the 
Commonwealth Office simply concluded that “there is insufficient evidence to provide a useful 
brief on the deficiencies of [other] Commonwealth countries…in applying sanctions against 
Rhodesia.”
96
 Other Commonwealth members were effectively administering sanctions in 
contrast to the “considerable” ongoing British trade with Rhodesia. If pressed the British 
delegation was prepared to defend their ongoing trade with Rhodesia on humanitarian grounds to 
support the Zambian economy and the day-to-day lives of Rhodesian Africans. However, the CO 
also shifted the British Rhodesia brief from defensive to offensive in order to push conversation 
away from the ineffectual application of British sanctions. Rather than focusing on sanctions, the 
British delegation would attack other members over deficiencies in their support for Zambia.
97
    
Even though the diplomatic outlook for the conference was not good, Smith maintained his 
belief in the organisation. Smith was confident in the support of the newer members and felt that 
the British would not “sell out” and go back on the commitments they had supported in Lagos 
(namely the potential use of force, the implementation of sanctions, and a commitment to 
majority rule). Smith again employed his Canadian connections and asked Pearson to try to help 
him persuade Wilson to give a clear statement on Rhodesia. Smith hoped that even if Wilson did 
not explicitly endorse NIBMAR policy, he would at least confirm to the other members that the 
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United Kingdom would stand behind the Lagos agreements.
98
 Smith also included the Lagos 




Despite a lack of British statements indicating any commitment to the Lagos agreements and the 
racially charged arguments justifying the lack of concerted British action, Smith was correct in 
his estimations. British material interests in the Commonwealth and the United Kingdom’s 
international reputation and standing in the United Nations were at stake. Ultimately, the British 
Cabinet resolved that they were willing to “pay a price” over Rhodesia to maintain their 
Commonwealth connections which were far more politically valuable than sustained trade with 
Rhodesia.
100
 British officials still did not view the Commonwealth as an international 
organisation and continued to think of Commonwealth and other international bodies as mutually 
exclusive. However, this concession demonstrated that the weight of value had shifted between 
visions of the Commonwealth. The Rhodesian Government was an aspiring member of the old 
Anglo-Saxon club and was rejected by the new members of the modern Commonwealth, just as 
South Africa had been. By 1966, the British Government was increasingly willing to forego 
connections with Rhodesia along the old club model in favour of connections with other 
Commonwealth members under the new IO model. The willingness of both parties to stay at the 
table through the transition was facilitated by the Secretariat.  
In the subsequent discussions at the meeting itself, much to the dismay of the Old 
Commonwealth, the Afro-Asian members created a caucus system echoing their caucus in the 
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 The caucus routinely adjourned to discuss British proposals among themselves and often 
delaying the meeting schedule for hours in the process. Ironic given the tradition of exclusive 
Old Commonwealth meetings, the older members expressed dislike at being “summoned” to 
discuss caucus decisions and regretted the division of the Commonwealth on new/old and racial 
lines.
102
 The British were especially perturbed by “the continuous and offensive derogation of all 
things British, and the general discourtesies to which we have become enured” in addition to 
debate over the British Prime Minister’s personal sincerity.
103
  Once losing his temper, Wilson 
burst out that Britain was “being treated as if we were a bloody colony.”
104
 Afro-Asian members 
noted that the caucus procedure was indeed difficult but defended the procedure as one that 
enabled the narrowing of differences between views on Rhodesia to the extent that they might 
reach an agreement. These differences remained the three key issues of NIBMAR, sanctions, and 
the use of force.
105
  
Smith’s work at Secretariat capacity building, keeping all parties at the table, and coordinating 
with the Canadian Government were central to bridging these differences. As the caucus and 
wider conference reached the possibility of drafting an agreed communique specifically on 
Rhodesia, the Secretariat was available to write drafts and papers on short notice, and ultimately 
produced the first draft of the Rhodesia communique over the conference lunch hour on 
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September 13. Lester Pearson then took over the drafting of the communique and used the 
framework provided by the Secretariat to create a composite draft balancing the views of the 
Afro-Asian caucus and those supporting Britain.
106
      
The resulting communique was widely regarded as a masterwork of tact and concession which 
did not resolve the overriding anxieties of the Afro-Asian membership but balanced British 
policies with a series of assurances demanded by the newer members.
107
 For example, the British 
desire to give the Rhodesian Government a final chance to negotiate a constitutional settlement 
was approved. Herbert Bowden, the new Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs was 
dispatched to Rhodesia within days of the meetings’ conclusion to call for a legal settlement.
108
 
However, the British desire to pursue a settlement was approved by the Afro-Asian members on 
the condition that any such settlement conformed to NIBMAR principles and that it should be 
pursued on a clear timeline (before the end of the year).
109
 Similarly, the Afro-Asian members 
agreed to fully support the British Government’s Rhodesia policies in the United Nations in 
return for the assurance that the British would pursue a heavier program of sanctions through the 
UN if the Rhodesian Government refused to negotiate.
110
 To achieve this compromise the Afro-
Asian members conceded that selective rather than comprehensive UN sanctions might be 
pursued in consultation with the Commonwealth, whereas the British Government reversed its 
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stance opposing a comprehensive oil embargo.
111
 The Rhodesia communique included support of 
further sanctions and the work of the Sanctions Committee and related proposals to increase aid 
to Zambia to lessen the economic damages of such sanctions.
112
 Although the discussions were 
tense, they illustrated the degree to which the newer members saw the Commonwealth as an 
international organisation. They also showed how Smith’s vision of the Commonwealth as one 
international instrument among many was applied by the newer members as they worked 
through different channels to pressure for a solution in Rhodesia.   
Outcomes 
While the meeting reached a consensus on the Rhodesia communique, very little had actually 
changed in terms of British policy. In spite of assurances given to the Commonwealth, behind 
closed doors British officials still considered a negotiated settlement with the Rhodesian 
Government short of NIBMAR to be a possibility. In preparation for the Secretary of State’s 
subsequent trip to Rhodesia, the Commonwealth Office made a point of conveying to the 
Rhodesian Government that Britain had defended Rhodesia from international wrath and had 
managed to keep the door open for an “honorable” settlement. Whitehall hoped to reach a 
settlement during talks aboard the HMS Tiger set for November. However, the United Kingdom 
was also on the brink of losing all influence within both the Commonwealth and the UN, and 
could not hold the floodgates indefinitely.
113
 In a post-mortem of the Prime Ministers’ Meeting, 
the Commonwealth Office considered that the Rhodesia Communique had been a “considerable 
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triumph” as the British had made no concessions about the use of force or mandatory sanctions, 
and had kept one last opportunity to negotiate a settlement with the Rhodesian Government.
114
 
They further concluded that the wording of the Communique ensured that if any Commonwealth 
member disagreed with British sanctions policy in the UN “we should then regard ourselves as 
absolved from the obligation in the communique.”
115
 Although they had conceded an assurance 
about their commitment to NIBMAR (though not explicitly), the British felt that this was the 
minimum price for retaining the trust of the Commonwealth and securing advantages in the 
United Nations.
116
 The British felt that they had successfully avoided the breakup of the 
Commonwealth without changing their policies and that the “traumatic” experience of the 
meeting among the emotional Afro-Asian members may have scared those members into 
realising the value of the Commonwealth to themselves and into learning some lessons for the 
future of Commonwealth coordination.
117
  
British paternalism, racism, and manoeuvring during the meeting were not lost on newer 
Commonwealth members. The Cypriot and Maltese presses were suspicious of British motives 
and saw British proposals as financially and imperially motivated. The Ugandan and Malawian 
presses supported the Afro-Asian caucus and called for stronger measures against the Rhodesian 
Regime.
118
 Opinion in other African nations was also quite skeptical. Though he had not 
attended the meeting, Julius Nyerere saw the British tactics at play. He noted in a statement to 
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the press that at the core of the discussion, Wilson had still not explicitly committed to NIBMAR 
and that Tanzania would therefore continue her diplomatic break with Britain.
119
 Sierra Leonean 
newspapers accused the British Government of avoiding action to end the crisis, summed up in 
the slogan “because the rebels are white their action is right.”
120
 In spite of an official delegation 
apology, Zambian foreign minister Simon Kapwepwe was unapologetic for his accusation that 
Wilson was a racialist and the Zambian press praised their delegation’s commitment to their 
principles and to “the solidarity of people of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Canada.”
121
  
The 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting did not solve the Rhodesian crisis and as Arnold Smith 
remembered it was a time of “severe testing” for the Commonwealth.
122
 The meeting was 
another step toward the newer members’ vision of the Commonwealth as an international 
organisation. Smith and the Secretariat worked tirelessly not only to plan the Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting in a practical sense, but also to keep members engaged with one another. Smith in 
particular employed his personal connections in the Canadian Government as well as his contacts 
in the wider Commonwealth to make a case for the revitalisation of the organisation through the 
Secretariat, and to facilitate the compromises necessary to generate consensus on the dedicated 
Rhodesia Communique. Regardless of their stances on the Secretariat, both the British 
Government and the wider membership felt that the Secretariat’s work had been well conducted. 
At the closing of the meeting the Secretariat received thanks and accolades from both the Indian 
and British delegations.
123
 Indian officials disagreed with British policy in Rhodesia and spoke 
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on behalf of the caucus to praise the Secretariat’s performance under the abnormal circumstances 
and extreme pressure of the meeting.
124
 The British and Indian Governments differed on the 
Rhodesian issue but were both committed restrictionists opposed to Secretariat expansion. Their 
accolades crossed the spectrum of the Rhodesian issue as well as the typical binary of 
expansionists and restrictionists.  
None of the major initiatives in Commonwealth cooperation or on the Rhodesian crisis 
succeeded at the meeting, but the September 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting had important 
implications for the future of the Commonwealth. Secretariat efforts ensured a Secretariat 
economic branch, enabled the Secretariat to publish reports independently, expanded the number 
and scale of meetings organised by the Secretariat, demonstrated the Secretariat’s ability to 
organise full-scale Prime Ministers’ Meetings, and shown its ability to mediate between 
members. Although there were no major policy changes at the meeting, there was increasing 
recognition of the Secretariat’s role and room for that role to expand in future.  
1969 London Prime Ministers’ Meeting 
The key points in planning meetings such as setting the dates and location, agenda and 
chairmanship, and coordinating logistics and press coverage, remained the same at the next 
Prime Ministers’ Meeting in January of 1969. The central discussion points of Rhodesia and 
Commonwealth cooperation were also carried over to 1969 after the lack of resolve in 1966. 
However, as the planning process began in 1968, the Secretariat had little opposition in planning 
the next Prime Ministers’ Meeting. Increasing Secretariat capacity was coupled with a 
corresponding decrease in British and restrictionist resistance to the Secretariat. Continued 




pressure from the expansionist members and the proven track record of Secretariat organisation 
facilitated the planning for the 1969 meeting.   
In spite of the ongoing Rhodesian crisis, the 1969 meeting was widely regarded as having 
reached a “new plateau of maturity” without bickering over logistics and with discussions that 
were much calmer than expected.
125
 By the time planning began in 1968 all parties were willing 
to cooperate through the central body of the Secretariat and were more open to Secretariat 
proposals on Commonwealth cooperation. Tracing the planning process and the continued 
discussion on Rhodesia and Commonwealth cooperation at the 1969 Prime Ministers’ Meeting 
illustrates the success of Secretariat efforts in fulfilling its mandate to plan and coordinate 
meetings. Furthermore, tracing these elements between 1966 and 1969 demonstrates how 
Secretariat success with meetings cemented its role in political affairs and opened the doors to 
expanding the organisation into the economic realm of development and aid. As one Secretariat 
official put it “it is only when the ‘bread and butter’ work of the Secretariat, required of it by the 
Agreed Memorandum, has been effectively discharged that we can have the acquiescence of 
(jealous) national diplomats in exercising the proper political role morally laid upon us.” He 
continued that in 1969 the Secretariat was “thoroughly on top of the whole complex mechanism” 
of Commonwealth meetings and was growing out of its original restrictive shell.
126
    
Timing and Location 
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Conventionally the Commonwealth prime ministers had met about every two years since the end 
of the Second World War. Even after the acrimonious 1966 London meeting the prime ministers 
agreed on the value of continuing their meetings on a biennial basis. They further agreed that for 
expediency sake the next Prime Ministers’ Meeting should again be held in the United Kingdom. 
After the September 1966 meeting the Secretariat began consultations for a conference in the fall 
of 1968 in keeping with the traditional schedule. In many ways the consultations for the 1969 
meeting date echoed those of 1966, but with the key difference that the role of the Secretariat 
was not challenged by the British Government to the same degree it had been in the past.  
As in 1966 Whitehall had reservations about the proposed meeting dates. In a conversation with 
Secretary-General Smith in June, Prime Minister Wilson expressed concerns about most of the 
proposed weeks in October as a Commonwealth meeting then would potentially conflict with the 
parliamentary schedule and the British Labour Party Conference. Wilson also noted that many 
British representatives would be busy with the anticipated merger of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Offices on October 1. In his conversation with Smith, Wilson was cognisant that 
adjusting the meeting dates to the fourth week of September might clash with the Finance 
Ministers’ Meeting and might require relocation to another city in the UK such as Edinburgh, 
and therefore noted his preference of the second week of October.
127
 In a Commonwealth 
circular issued on June 18, Smith outlined British difficulties in hosting an autumn meeting and 
noted that in feedback from other members, there were mixed preferences between October and 
January dates.
128
 Rather than sustaining a lengthy consultative correspondence between all 
member governments Smith called for a meeting of High Commissioners on July 9, 1968 to 
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finalise the date and venue in person.
129
 The July meeting of High Commissioners reached a 
unanimous decision to hold the next Prime Ministers’ Meeting from January 7 -15, 1969.
130
 
The British approach to the date for the 1969 Prime Ministers’ Meeting illustrates the 
consolidation of the Secretariat’s organisational role in two ways. Even though Wilson sought to 
delay the meeting (he was certainly not looking forward to another Prime Ministers’ Meeting 
after 1966), he could not do so without working with the Secretariat.
131
 Wilson frankly noted his 
preferences and willingness to make concessions with Smith and left the meeting organisation to 
the Secretariat. Unlike in 1966 there were no parallel British consultations, negotiations about 
assurances, or compromises on location and chairmanship to facilitate postponement. Second, 
the role of the Secretariat as meeting coordinator was more firmly established throughout the 
British Government. On June 11 British leader of the opposition Edward Heath met with Arnold 
Smith and alleged that Wilson’s preference of the second week of October was meant to frustrate 
the Conservative Party Conference planned for that week, though he did not think that Wilson 
would get away with it.
132
 Both the British Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition came to 
Smith to note their concerns about the date for the Prime Ministers’ Meeting. This illustrates the 
degree to which the Secretariat was recognised as independent and responsible for 
Commonwealth meetings within wider British political circles, as opposed to 1966 when British 
officials still struggled to view the Commonwealth as independent of the British Government. 
The practical handover of meeting responsibility gradually encouraged a change in British 
thinking about the organisation.   
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Logistics and Press 
In a similar sense, the Secretariat’s role in managing the logistics and press for the 1969 Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting was much less contested and continued more smoothly than at previous 
Commonwealth Conferences. On August 28, 1968 the Secretariat issued a circular calling for 
nominations for conference liaison officers, with liaison meetings beginning in October.
133
 By 
October 1, the Secretariat had finalised the timing and venue, completed a draft agenda and had 
background papers and coordinating host arrangements with the British Government well in 
hand.
134
 By the end of October the logistical arrangements including meetings, offices, 
communications, ceremonies, documents, transportation, security, social programmes, etcetera, 
were also completed and distributed to member liaison officers.
135
 The final agenda and 
background papers were distributed directly to the Commonwealth High Commissioners, who 
met in early December at the Secretariat’s behest to review the final arrangements.
136
  
To pre-empt the press leaks and extensive press speculation that had occurred in 1966, in 1968 
the Secretariat issued detailed instructions about the timing and content of press releases during 
the conference. This would help the meeting prevent the press from cross-questioning 
delegations in order to reconstruct the prime ministers’ confidential discussions, and to speculate 
on those incomplete talks.
137
 Tightening protocols for press management was particularly 
important at the 1969 conference which was set to have more press coverage than any other 
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Commonwealth meeting to date.
138
 In the lead-up to the meeting the Secretariat managed press 
speculation by denying false claims of leaked information and coordinated with members to 
promote a positive and constructive narrative before the meeting.
139
 During the meeting itself the 
Secretariat maintained punctual releases of meeting records as well as daily press releases about 
the broad topics being discussed by the prime ministers in each session.
140
 
The press arrangements for the 1969 meeting were reportedly strained but adequate for the 
purposes of the Secretariat.
141
 While the Secretariat no longer heavily relied on borrowed staff, 
they still required some (mostly from the UK) in order to serve as press officers during the 
meeting. As these staff were affiliated with national governments, they were both partisan and 
used to giving and sticking to a “line” as instructed by their home government or department.
142
 
In the Secretariat post-mortem of the 1969 meeting they concluded that they would no longer 
borrow press officers from members as the Secretariat itself enjoyed good press relations across 
the political spectrum and would ensure better, more factual coverage.  
After the conference, the Secretariat also worked towards refining its record keeping process. 
The scope of the meetings had grown so much that keeping verbatim records was increasingly 
difficult to do in real time.
143
 The British delegation even recommended that the Secretariat be 
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supported in expanding its capacity to keep conference records as member delegations could not 
ensure confidentiality or even distribution of documents. Nor could members ensure the quality 
of record keeping (such as training standards in shorthand and verbatim notes for record keepers) 
as well as the Secretariat could.
144
  By 1969, the Secretariat was engaged in fine tuning its role in 
planning and servicing the Prime Ministers’ Meeting rather than advocating for a full 
interpretation of its mandate. 
Agenda and Chairmanship 
The process of setting the agenda and selecting chairmen for the September 1966 Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting necessitated a great deal of political skill on the part of Arnold Smith. Smith 
had pursued a moderate course and employed his connections in the Canadian Government to 
facilitate consensus. In contrast, the Secretariat’s role setting the agenda in 1969 was much closer 
to the Secretariat’s functions set out in the Agreed Memorandum.
145
 The preparation of the 
agenda through 1968 showed an acceptance by the membership of the role of the Secretariat and 
even the expectation that the Secretariat take on a more active role moving forward. 
For instance, in contrast to the significant interest in the agenda content and order in 1966, 
through 1968 the Secretariat had to issue multiple follow up requests to the membership to 
obtain enough information to draft a provisional agenda.
146
 Commonwealth Heads of 
Government were responsible for proposing and approving agenda items but the 1969 agenda 
was largely a product of outstanding items from 1966 carried forward by the Secretariat. By the 
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time the agenda was finalised in December 1968, the Secretariat had been working on the agenda 
for ten months, had issued four circular letters, and had held a meeting of High Commissioners 
in addition to an informal luncheon meeting held by Smith at Marlborough House.
147
 The 
annotated agenda and background papers for the meeting were largely of the Secretariat’s own 
devising due to a lack of feedback through the consultation process.
148
 Member input on 
Secretariat agenda drafts was so scant that after the 1969 meeting Secretariat staff resolved that 
in future they would begin the process of agenda consultations with a meeting of High 




By the time the High Commissioners met in July there was a general consensus forming that the 
agenda should be a broad one that would include but not be dominated by Rhodesia as in 
1966.
150
 Other prominent items included world politics and economics, Commonwealth 
cooperation, and questions of citizenship and immigration within the Commonwealth.
151
 Many 
features of the agenda echoed the priorities of various members. The British Government was 
largely defensive, and sought to moderate discussion on Rhodesia, dependent territories, and 
UK-EEC relations, and to avoid discussion of immigration and economic issues which did not 
affect the United Kingdom (such as single-commodity agreements on tropical products like sugar 
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 The newer members were keenly interested in Rhodesia, British membership in the 
EEC, currency values, immigration, aid, and expanded Commonwealth services.  
The Secretariat was an important topic for African members in particular. Some proposed that 
Secretariat activities be treated as a stand-alone agenda item early in the meeting.
153
 The 
importance of the Secretariat to the newer members was clear not only in calls for Secretariat 
activities to be addressed in the agenda, but also in those members’ faith in the Secretariat to 
advocate for African interests. For example, the Biafran Crisis in Nigeria had escalated to the 
point that protests took place outside of Marlborough House on the last day of the conference.
154
 
Yet in contrast to the Rhodesian crisis, Biafra was not included on the 1969 agenda. Because 
Nigeria was already an independent member, there was little argument for intervention from 
either Britain or the newer members. However, at the invitation of the Nigerian Government the 
Secretariat had been asked to help facilitate peace talks and had been working on setting up 
negotiations through the winter of 1968-1969. The Secretariat had the confidence of the African 
members who also wanted to work toward a peaceful outcome. In drafting the agenda for the 
1969 Prime Ministers’ Meeting, Biafra was left off the agenda although Ugandan officials 
proposed that a report of the Secretariat’s constructive work toward peace negotiations be added 
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 During the meeting itself, Milton Obote handed a note to Smith 
asking his opinion on when Obote might propose an adjournment to allow representatives “to 
meet and exchange views on a tragedy confronting a member of this conference.”
156
 African 
members trusted the Secretariat to work towards a favourable outcome for the Biafran Crisis and 
worked with Smith to facilitate informal discussion without formally including Biafra on the 
agenda. This was in stark contrast to the Rhodesian crisis when African members demanded 
British accountability to the wider meeting.  
The expansionists’ faith in the Secretariat thus shaped their engagement with the 1969 draft 
agenda. In contrast, the restrictionist approach was to avoid discussions that might expand the 
Commonwealth Secretariat. By definition this defensive approach meant that there were fewer 
proposals from the restrictionist members than the expansionist members. As Commonwealth 
membership expanded, there were also more expansionists than restrictionists by the late 1960s. 
Secretariat staff sought to cement the Secretariat’s role and to reflect the concerns of the 
members. As a result of the expansionists’ numerical superiority, activist footing, and greater 
cooperation with the Secretariat, the 1969 agenda more heavily reflected the concerns of the 
newer, developing members. The 1969 agenda reflected both the newer members’ expectation 
that the Commonwealth function as an international organisation and Smith’s call to introduce 
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Secretariat staff introduced areas of potential Commonwealth cooperation into the High 
Commissioners’ consultations and prepared an extensive background paper on Commonwealth 
cooperation.
158
 Ultimately, the topics of Rhodesia and Commonwealth cooperation were carried 
over from 1966. However, these topics were managed in such a way that Rhodesia would not be 
overbearing and talks on Commonwealth cooperation would be more substantive. The balance of 
these issues was so successful in the lead-up to the 1969 meeting that in contrast to 1966 no 
members challenged the traditional right of the host government to chair the conference (though 
the Secretariat had prepared an alternative proposal if members rejected a British chair).
159
 The 
preparations for the 1969 Prime Ministers’ Meeting were a clear success for the expansionist 
members’ vision of the Commonwealth as an international organisation. Based on the 
Secretariat’s track record in 1966 and successful campaigning between the Secretariat and the 
British Government, in 1969 there was practically no opposition to Secretariat management of 
the meeting preparations. Secretariat staff were able to focus instead on fine-tuning their 
operations and more substantive policy issues such as the Rhodesian crisis and Commonwealth 
cooperation.   
Rhodesia 
Both expansionist and restrictionist members felt that the Commonwealth had approached the 
brink of ruin in September 1966. While the newer members continued to press for the Rhodesian 
crisis to be included in the 1969 meeting there was an early consensus that discussion of 
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Rhodesia in 1969 should take up less time than in 1966.
160
 The Secretariat again had an 
important role mediating the Rhodesian issue before the meeting itself began. After the Anglo-
Rhodesian talks aboard the HMS Tiger in November 1966 had failed, it seemed in 1968 that 
Wilson was again moving towards a non-NIBMAR settlement in breach of past assurances to his 
Commonwealth colleagues. After the failure of the Tiger Talks, with the support of the prime 
ministers and the more detailed recommendations of the Sanctions Committee, the British 
Government had sponsored comprehensive mandatory sanctions through the UN in May 1968.
161
 
However, in October 1968 Wilson had agreed to meet with Rhodesian representatives aboard the 
HMS Fearless for a resumption of talks regarding a constitutional settlement. The Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Affairs, George Thomson called together Secretariat officials and the 
Commonwealth High Commissioners on October 8 to inform them that the talks would begin 
aboard the Fearless the following day. While the British maintained that the talks would not 
undermine the British commitment to NIBMAR, the resumption of negotiations in the first place 




Addressing British back-tracking over NIBMAR, Julius Nyerere went so far as to propose an 
emergency Foreign Ministers’ Meeting to allow the British to “give this assurance and restore 
faith in her intentions over Rhodesia.” Nyerere had committed to attend the 1969 meeting after 
several years of boycotting diplomatic relations with Britain, and argued that a new British 
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guarantee was a necessary condition for holding another Prime Ministers’ Meeting at all.
163
 
Individuals within the British Government also expressed the view that if the Fearless talks 
resulted in a settlement, it would be very difficult to avoid a permanent falling out between the 
British and African members..
164
  
The risk to the Commonwealth posed by the resumption of Anglo-Rhodesian talks was 
exacerbated by the merger of the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices into the FCO on October 
17, 1968. With the merger, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs George Thomson was 
reassigned as Minister without Portfolio. Thomson had been a close ally of the Secretariat, 
believing in Smith’s vision for the organisation and helping as he was able during his tenure at 
the short-lived Commonwealth Office. In a conversation just over a week after Thomson’s 
reassignment Smith noted that quick action was needed to avoid an Afro-Asian walk-out at the 
upcoming Prime Ministers’ Meeting.
165
 Thomson expressed that even though his new position 
did not involve direct liaison with the Secretariat he would stay in touch with Smith and work to 
shift Wilson’s cabinet toward a solution in keeping with past British commitments to the 
Commonwealth. This was welcome help for Smith who found Michael Stewart, the new 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth affairs to be “more ignorant about the 
Commonwealth than I would have believed possible.”
166
 In Smith’s estimation Stewart seemed 
to understand the Commonwealth as an exclusive rather than complementary channel for 
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international relations with questionable cost effectiveness and no loyalty to the British. Stewart 
echoed the same British view of the Commonwealth that Smith had been combatting for years. 
Smith responded with some of the points of his ‘usual gospel’ and reminded Stewart that loyalty 




Tensions over Rhodesia persisted through the conference preparations particularly in the 
Sanctions Committee. As the committee prepared a report for the Prime Ministers’ Meeting, 
there was heated debate on the acceptability of the report for distribution to the prime ministers.  
Australian delegates argued that the report went beyond reporting on sanctions and went into 
making political recommendations. Australian officials voiced well-established restrictionist 
concerns and argued that because the report was prepared by the Sanctions Committee in 
conjunction with the Secretariat, a political report would overstep the bounds of both bodies. The 
Australian stance was roundly rebuked by Kenyan, Indian, and Jamaican representatives, who 
argued that the problem of Rhodesia was fundamentally a political one and that neither the 




Secretariat staff also worried about how Whitehall was treating the Commonwealth. In addition 
to the resumption of talks with the rogue Rhodesian Government, in early December the British 
Government submitted a minute to the Secretariat proposing a draft agreement on Rhodesia to be 
included at the upcoming conference. Creating draft frameworks for meeting communiques was 
not unprecedented in the planning of Prime Ministers’ Meetings. However, submitting a full 
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draft statement over a month in advance of the meeting was concerning to Secretariat staff. 
Furthermore, the British draft that was decidedly ambiguous, made no mention of NIBMAR, and 
in a circuitous manner echoed the terms offered by the British during the Fearless Talks.
169
 The 
Secretariat maintained reservations about the British paper and debated how to take British input 
seriously while maintaining the balance required for the meeting to go ahead.   
Conditions during the meeting itself also had the potential to exacerbate divisions over Rhodesia. 
The 1969 Meeting was set to be the largest meeting of Heads of Government since the San 
Francisco Conference in 1945 with all 24 heads of government in attendance, and 28 total 
members represented.
170
 The scale of the meeting also meant that there would be more press and 
therefore more speculation than ever before. This could generate potentially divisive rumours 
and raise the stakes of information security.
171
  
Fortunately for Secretariat planners and the Commonwealth as a whole, the Anglo-Rhodesian 
Fearless Talks broke down and perhaps ironically, the Rhodesian regime’s failure to accept 
British terms helped save the Commonwealth that was so intensely opposed to it.
172
 The 
breakdown of the Fearless Talks reassured other Commonwealth leaders that there would be no 
British sell-out for the time being. As more information about the nature of the talks and their 
ultimate breakdown became available, the Tanzanian High Commissioner wrote to the 
Secretariat on November 19 to advise that his government no longer insisted on an emergency 
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meeting of foreign ministers, and by the end of November the Tanzanians requested that the 
Secretariat shelve the proposal unless otherwise notified.
173
  
This change of fortunes was also assisted by the surprising dedication of Michael Stewart who, 
in spite of his apparent ignorance of the Commonwealth itself, was increasingly committed to the 
idea of the Commonwealth and to revitalising the Labour government’s approach to the 
organisation. Stewart had opposed the Fearless Talks from the beginning and in spite of 
Wilson’s actions worked to shift British policy and to provide personal assurances to Kaunda and 
Nyerere as well.
174
 In so doing Stewart was arguably responsible for returning the Rhodesia 
situation to the pre-Fearless status quo thus lessening tensions at the upcoming meeting and 
paving the way for more productive conversations.
175
 The newer members still pressured a 
hesitant British delegation to withdraw the Fearless proposals and to reaffirm the British 
commitment to NIBMAR. While British representatives refused to do so, they did commit to 
consulting Commonwealth members regarding future developments in Rhodesia. More 
importantly, British representatives committed to using a “test of acceptability” for any proposed 
constitutional settlement. Such a test would ensure that the majority of the Rhodesian population 




The Rhodesia discussions were again inconclusive but illustrated the central role of the 
Secretariat in ensuring productive conversations between Commonwealth members. Even though 
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the British Government was unclear about their intentions and warranted suspicion among other 
Commonwealth members, all members stayed at the table. Secretariat planning helped ensure 
that the meeting would take place. Secretariat agenda planning also ensured a more balanced 
approach to the meeting where the Rhodesian crisis was offset with productive topics meant to 
promote Commonwealth cooperation.   
Commonwealth Cooperation 
Discussions of Commonwealth cooperation were primed for greater success in 1969 not only 
because of the direction of discussions on Rhodesia but also due to the extensive planning done 
by Smith and the Secretariat. Smith pursued Commonwealth cooperation initiatives through the 
planning process, even calling extra meetings to discuss the Secretariat proposals with High 
Commissioners and key figures in the British Government.
177
 After 1966, British officials were 
keen to offset the impact of the Rhodesia discussions and were growing increasingly receptive to 
discussing multilateral aid and development projects.
178
 Shifts in the Labour government’s 
engagement with the Commonwealth were further facilitated by Charles de Gaulle’s veto of the 
United Kingdom’s second application for EEC membership in November 1967.
179
 Shifting 
British engagement with the Commonwealth coupled with the growing capacity of the 
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Secretariat helped replace the Secretariat’s reliance on Canadian contacts in advocating for 
expanded Commonwealth activities in 1969. The newly elected Trudeau Government in Canada 
was much more cautious about Commonwealth policy due to linguistic politics at home.
180
  
Smith’s persistence and the Secretariat’s early efforts to promote Commonwealth cooperation in 
conjunction with the failure of the Fearless Talks and the timely, if unexpected, support of 
Stewart, yielded extensive results during the Prime Ministers’ Meeting. Not only did the 
discussion of Commonwealth cooperation help mitigate the Rhodesia discussions, but it also led 
to the approval and inauguration of several fresh Commonwealth efforts. The meeting 
acknowledged growing Commonwealth cooperation in technical assistance, education, science, 
law, medicine, and related technical fields, and followed up approval of the Secretariat’s 
technical assistance proposal by commissioning a review of the program and report of its 
progress later in 1969.
181
 The Secretariat was also tasked with beginning studies on further 
cooperation in mass communications and media education as per a Pakistani proposal and was 
approved to hire an Information Officer to begin a Commonwealth Information Service per a 
Guyanese proposal.
182
 Building on proposals from the British delegation, a Secretariat Legal 
section was also approved and the Secretariat was tasked with initiating studies on regional 
education centres and the problems of Commonwealth youth. Feasibility studies for the 
Secretariat’s own book development and exchange programme were also approved at the 1969 
meeting.
183
 Overall the meeting recognised the contributions of the Secretary-General and 
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Smith’s view of the meeting was that it had been a success primarily in the avoidance of political 
explosions and had resulted in few concrete measures. While he had hoped for more decisive 
approval for the book development and youth projects the meeting had nonetheless been 
successful in tabling these and other projects and moving them to the next stage of preparatory 
studies.
185
 Most importantly to Smith, at the meeting “there was a strong impression of the 
growing appreciation among member governments and the responsible public of the effective 
role of the Secretariat in the evolution of the Commonwealth and in Commonwealth 
cooperation.”
186
 By the 1969 Prime Ministers’ Meeting, the Secretariat had successfully staked 
out its place in Commonwealth affairs and was increasingly recognised as the vital central body 
envisioned by its proponents over the previous five years. More than in previous years the 
Commonwealth was functioning as an international organisation.   
Outcomes 
The cementing of the Secretariat’s role at the center of the organisation was particularly striking 
in the weeks after the meeting. Feedback from across the Commonwealth was overwhelmingly 
positive, including among the traditionally restrictionist governments of the United Kingdom, 
Australia, New Zealand, and India. The widespread passive resistance to the Secretariat’s role in 
Commonwealth meetings that had characterised these members’ previous modus operandi had 
given way to an appreciation for the work of the Secretariat and the balance the Secretariat had 
achieved in handling politically charged topics. Following the 1969 meeting, New Zealander 
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officials described the conference as one of the most constructive in recent years and Indian 
representatives praised the warm and friendly atmosphere characterised by genuine desire to find 
solutions to Commonwealth problems.
187
 Members of the traditionally antagonistic Australian 
Government felt that the conference had been useful, well-run, harmonious, and well 
worthwhile.
188
 Although newly elected Australian Prime Minister John Gorton remained wary of 
Secretariat expansion, and reckoned that the use of the Commonwealth could not be reasonably 
judged for another twenty years, he concluded that in the long term the organisation had “a pretty 
good chance of proving worth while [sic].”
189
  
Changes in British perspectives were the most striking. Harold Wilson had called the 1966 
conference “the worst ever held” but considered the 1969 meeting “the most successful ever 
held.”
190
 Wilson even personally wrote to Smith after the conference to congratulate him and his 
staff, noting that the conference was the “most soberly constructive and positive of any in recent 
years.”
191
 Some of this change had to do with the shift to the left in Wilson’s cabinet and a 
corresponding emphasis on multilateralism and aid more closely aligned to the Secretariat and 
wider Commonwealth.
192
 However, Secretariat staff liaising with the British Government noted 
positive reactions to the 1969 Prime Ministers’ Meeting went across party lines, indicating that 
the shift in British attitudes was broader than changes in the Wilson administration alone.
193
  
The degree of change in British attitudes was in part due to the extensive reorganisation of the 
British departments that dealt most directly with the Commonwealth. With the merger of the 
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Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices in 1966 and the subsequent merger of the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Offices in 1968, the most established British resistance to 
Secretariat expansion was gradually disbursed. The CRO initially had the most to lose as the 
Secretariat was specifically mandated to take over secretarial tasks from the CRO. After the 
creation of the Commonwealth Office many former CRO staff and ministers remained closely 
affiliated with Commonwealth affairs thus prolonging a hostile culture toward the Secretariat. 
With the subsequent merger of the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices and the further 
reassignment of key individuals, that culture of resistance was further diluted. Individuals like 
Arthur Bottomley, who had consistently opposed or pushed for restraint in establishing the 
Secretariat, were replaced by more sympathetic figures like George Thomson and Michael 
Stewart. While newer officials like Stewart were not necessarily well informed about the 
Commonwealth, they did not have as much to lose with the merger of diplomatic departments in 
contrast to Bottomley, whose political career began to decline after he was sacked from his new 
position of Minister of Overseas Development in 1967.
194
 
While many of the changes in personnel reflected the ministerial shuffling and left-right 
struggles of the Labour party in the late 1960s, these departments were broadly staffed and were 
already part of  cross-party attempts to maintain the British Empire after the Second World 
War.
195
 The reorganisation of British diplomatic offices was part of a wider post-war search for a 
new international role. As with Edward Heath’s consultation with Smith in the lead-up to the 
1969 conference, changing engagement with the British diplomatic offices illustrates that by 
1969 the Secretariat played a central Commonwealth role in the thinking of British politicians 
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and staffers across party lines. In 1964 British officials demonstrated an inability to conceive of 
the Commonwealth as anything other than a British organisation. By 1969 British officials and 
ministers with this view had been sacked, reassigned, or converted by a strong Secretariat track 
record, and the threat of political pressure from newer Commonwealth members.   
Arnold Smith’s coordination with his connections in the Canadian Government to bolster the 
Secretariat’s capacity and independence from British departments underwent a corresponding 
shift by the 1969 Prime Ministers’ Meeting. While Canadian officials felt that the 1969 meeting 
had been a potential watershed moment for the Commonwealth and that in general the 
organisation seemed “back on the rails” after a rough period, Canadian coordination with the 
Secretariat was at a new low.
196
 The new Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau approached 
the Commonwealth pragmatically and cautiously and did not see the Canadian delegation as 
having the central mediatory role envisioned by his predecessor Lester Pearson.
197
 While Smith 
was disappointed in the lack of Canadian support, the change corresponded with decreases in 
passive resistance to the Secretariat among the restrictionist camp. Furthermore, active resistance 
from specific departments of the British Government waned as the Secretariat’s own capacity for 
independent action grew. Thus, the Secretariat did not need to rely on Canadian assistance to the 
extent required in its early years.  
Trudeau later reported to the Canadian House of Commons after the meeting that “the scope of 
the secretariat seems now to have been defined and its services identified.”
198
 Trudeau’s 
impression from his first Prime Ministers’ Meeting was also borne out in the Secretariat’s own 
post-mortem of the 1969 conference. Secretariat staff noted the now-general approval and 
                                                             
196 CSLA: 2001-101 (1), CPM Meeting (69), 25 February, 1969. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 28th Parliament, 1st Session, Volume 4, (21 January, 1969): 4459. 
230 
 
appreciation of their efforts and concluded that moving forward the Secretariat could “be more 
relaxed about our responsibilities, and should avoid the evangelical stance, since there is now no 
need for it.”
199
 Rather than seeking to fulfill its basic functions in planning meetings and 
defending its mandate from detractors, in 1969 the Secretariat looked to refine and expand its 
existing role. By 1969 the Secretariat was equipped to work on expansion and refining its 
planning procedures. This was facilitated by the security of being a recognised central body in 
the Commonwealth that was self-sufficient in its operations and able to resist what remained of 
opposition to the Secretariat itself, without the need to rely on diplomatic back-channels. In 
many ways Trudeau’s estimation that the 1969 Prime Ministers’ Meeting could be a watershed in 
Commonwealth history was accurate. The meeting had demonstrated that the Secretariat was 
fully operational and highly effective in one of its main roles which in turn, resulted in a 
suggestion to close the chapter on Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings. In response to the 
growing diversity of government structures among Commonwealth members in 1969 the 
Secretariat resolved to rename the conferences “Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meetings.”
200
   
The planning and servicing of Commonwealth meetings was a crucial feature of the Secretariat’s 
early responsibilities. Prime Ministers’ Meetings in particular spanned the various Secretariat 
responsibilities and were a means to embody the spirit of Commonwealth consultation while 
taking practical steps to meet the Secretariat’s mandate. Between 1965 and 1969 in pursuing its 
role the Secretariat faced widespread passive resistance in the restrictionist camp. These 
members gradually came to see the value of the Secretariat as it grew into a full interpretation of 
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its mandate. The stiff opposition of the CRO was also diminished by 1969 first by the merger of 
the CRO and the CO in 1966, and the further disbursal of the CRO’s old bureaucratic culture 
with the creation of the FCO in late 1968.  
Arnold Smith was able to use his personal connections in the Canadian Government and the 
broader support of the newer Commonwealth members to bolster the Secretariat’s independence 
before that capacity was achieved by the Secretariat itself. By the time Pearson retired and 
Canadian support began to ebb, the Secretariat’s own capacity was much greater and it was able 
to pursue its central role without such additional support. The expansionist members had 
supported the Secretariat through its early years and in numerous cases had applied diplomatic 
pressure on the British Government in support of the Secretariat. In logistics, meeting 
management, and topics like Rhodesia, the newer, developing members pressed the UK to 
accommodate the Secretariat. As the Commonwealth grew, British officials came to see more 
value in maintaining Commonwealth relations than in opposing the growth of the Secretariat. In 
this manner, both structurally with the Secretariat and functionally in meeting the demands of the 




Chapter Ten: Other Ministerial Meetings: Law and Health 
Introduction 
The Secretariat’s first forays into planning Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings illustrate 
the degree to which meetings provided the groundwork for Secretariat engagement in the wider 
politico-economic affairs of the Commonwealth. Beginning with the Lagos meeting the topics of 
Rhodesia and Commonwealth cooperation were intertwined with the planning process of each 
Prime Ministers’ Meeting in the late 1960s. Secretariat planning efforts supported the “bread and 
butter” work of the Secretariat in servicing meetings but simultaneously provided points of 
access for the Secretariat to expand into broader political and economic spheres.  
The Secretariat’s success in servicing the larger Prime Ministers’ Meetings supported a broader 
interpretation of the Secretariat’s mandate that included other ministerial and officials’ meetings. 
The officials who attended these smaller meetings more frequently saw the Secretariat as 
beneficial and helped generate support for the Secretariat within their home governments. The 
support of these mid-level officials helped influence the Commonwealth prime ministers to 
support expansion of the Secretariat even if those governments had reservations about the 
principle or cost of Secretariat expansion.  
Secretariat involvement in ministerial and officials’ meetings in areas like law, medicine, and 
education helped broaden organizational horizons and generate new ideas for Commonwealth 
cooperation.
1
 The Secretariat’s role in other meetings rapidly expanded to the point that even 
though there was no Prime Ministers’ Meeting in the 1967-1968 fiscal year, Secretariat spending 
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on conferences and meetings was second only to the wages of its growing staff.
2
 This process 
helped further cement the association between Commonwealth meetings, the Secretariat, and 
Commonwealth cooperation. While discussions of Commonwealth cooperation and 
organizational revitalisation predated the Secretariat these ideas were increasingly associated 
with issue-specific meetings. For example, in preparation for the 1969 Prime Ministers’ Meeting 
Secretariat background papers on Commonwealth cooperation focused on the number of official 
and ministerial level meetings that had been convened to promote greater cooperative efforts.
3
 
Both the 1966 and 1969 Prime Ministers’ Meetings relied heavily on background papers 
furnished by topical ministerial meetings. Such meetings were increasingly organised and 
serviced by the Secretariat. The Secretariat’s mandate to service meetings became an avenue for 
expanded Commonwealth cooperation and the closer association between the Secretariat and 
cooperative projects.  
This section explores Secretariat management of the Commonwealth Law and Health Ministers’ 
Meetings. This chapter excludes the Education and Trade Ministers’ Meetings which were 
nominally under the umbrella of the Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council (CECC). 
Secretariat management of the CECC is addressed in the following chapter. The newer, 
expansionist members expected the Secretariat to be involved in these areas just as the UN might 
be involved in a wide variety of fields. Pursuing a greater role in these meetings conformed to 
the expectations of the expansionist group and demonstrated several further themes about how 
the Commonwealth began to operate as an international organisation.  
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By effectively managing meetings of specialised ministers the Secretariat gained allies from 
epistemic communities within member governments. Such communities worked to forge 
professional exchanges between countries, both in the public and private sectors.
4
 In the context 
of the Commonwealth, these professionals helped lobby restrictionist governments to support the 
Secretariat and to facilitate Commonwealth cooperative efforts in their respective fields. 
Managing ministerial meetings also gave the Secretariat a legitimate avenue to pursue a greater 
role in Commonwealth affairs. Because the Secretariat was tasked with managing ministerial 
meetings (as appropriate), servicing meetings of law and health could support Secretariat 
expansion into these areas without bringing allegations of empire building from the restrictionist 
camp. Effectively managing such ministerial meetings also led to a closer association between 
the Secretariat and constructive projects of Commonwealth cooperation. Productive ministerial 
meetings organised by the Secretariat were concrete examples of Commonwealth cooperation 
during a period of deep organisational divisions. A greater role in law and health was a way for 
the Secretariat to expand its capacity while demonstrating the worth and utility of the 
organisation. Finally, Secretariat management of Law and Health Ministers’ Meetings helped 
standardise those meetings. Both meetings had precedents in previous Commonwealth efforts but 
had never been formalised or standardised. In contrast to the British propensity for ad hoc 
meetings which were prone to manipulation, Secretariat management created a basis of standards 
that resembled other international organisations and was transparent to the membership. 
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Law Ministers’ Meetings 
Commonwealth cooperation in the legal field illustrates the manner in which meetings paved the 
way for Secretariat expansion. From the earliest Secretariat involvement in the legal field in 
1966 Smith and his staff were able to build allies in member governments and expand the 
Secretariat’s role, particularly after the reorganisation of the CRO in late 1966. Secretariat 
management of the Commonwealth Law Ministers’ Meetings culminated with the formation of a 
Secretariat Legal Division in 1969-1970.  
In 1966, officials in the CRO still expected the Secretariat to play a secondary role to their own 
planning operations. The official view in the CRO reflected early British attitudes to the 
Secretariat that underscored a limited role to complement rather than replace British efforts. For 
instance CRO officials only began coordinating with the Secretariat for the 1966 Law Ministers’ 
Meeting after Smith specifically inquired about the meeting and well after the CRO had begun 
its own consultations about meeting logistics.
5
 In the CRO’s vision for the meeting, the British 
would plan and coordinate the meeting while keeping the Secretariat (perhaps selectively) 
informed and the Secretariat would provide the infrastructure and logistical support of 
Marlborough House with assistance from additional CRO staff as needed.
6
 In this vision, the 
Secretariat would literally service the meeting while the CRO conducted the important planning 
and organisational work including its coordination, the drafting of background papers, and 
establishing the content of the agenda.  
CRO officials expressed this division of tasks in both their correspondence with Smith and 
circular letters issued to the wider membership. Officials in the CRO felt they had grounds to 
                                                             




organise the Law Ministers’ Meeting. At the previous Law Ministers’ Meeting in Canberra in 
1964, delegates proposed that the next meeting be held in London in early 1966 and requested 
the British Government organise and host the 1966 meeting. While CRO representatives 
accurately noted that the British Government was following up on the wishes of the 1964 
meeting, they disregarded the Secretariat’s potential role in the meeting preparations. For 
instance, in 1966 the CRO had initiated consultations, proposed dates for the meeting, proposed 
to draft the agenda, and had already prepared key preparatory memoranda. The CRO couched 
Secretariat involvement in tenuous terms, stating that it believed it would be “appropriate if 
arrangements could be made for the Commonwealth Secretariat to service this meeting” and 
inquired of other Commonwealth Governments whether they would want the Secretariat to do 
so.
7
 Seeking other members’ approval for Secretariat involvement conformed to the letter of the 
Agreed Memorandum rather than to its overarching mandate. With the CRO having already 
claimed the role of coordinator, proposed the meeting dates and agenda, and prepared key 
briefings, there was little substantial “service” left for the Secretariat to provide apart from 
sharing space in Marlborough House. The CRO circular stressed the centrality of the CRO in the 
meeting preparation to the point that nearly every sentence of the two-page letter contained the 
word “British” at least once.
8
 
Had the Secretariat not been established, the CRO would be unquestionably acting on the wishes 
of the Commonwealth membership as both the prospective host and in the capacity of a 
surrogate secretariat (a role held by the CRO since 1947). The establishment of the Secretariat 
changed this dynamic in two ways. First, the facilities at Marlborough House, which by 1966 
were well established as a Commonwealth Centre, were now under the management of the 





Secretariat and not the CRO.
9
 Thus, the CRO would have to work with the Secretariat to use 
what had until recently been facilities under their own direction. Second, the CRO had to work 
around the text of the Agreed Memorandum which left the Secretariat’s role in ministerial 
meetings open to interpretation. The organisation of the 1966 Law Ministers’ Meeting was 
another field for the struggle between the Secretariat and the CRO over the nature of the former’s 
role and whether Secretariat participation in ministerial meetings was “appropriate.”
10
  
The limitations implicit to the CRO’s planning were not lost on Secretariat senior staff. While 
Smith was on a brief leave in February 1966, Deputy Secretary-General T.E. Gooneratne took up 
the correspondence with the CRO regarding the Law Ministers’ Meeting. Gooneratne wrote to 
Robert Walker in the CRO and noted that the Secretariat would be prepared to service the 
meeting if approved by Commonwealth governments and noted that the British would “no 
doubt” keep the Secretariat informed of member replies in that regard. While Gooneratne’s letter 
recognised the British role as per the previous Law Ministers’ Meeting and an interpretation of 
the Agreed Memorandum, it was also clear that he considered greater Secretariat involvement a 
foregone conclusion. He suggested that as soon as [not if] the member governments approved of 
the British dates “even if only tentatively”, and when [again, not if] they approved the 
Secretariat’s role even “in principle,” that communications and arrangements for the meeting 
should thenceforth be carried out through the Secretariat and not the British Government.
11
 He 
also thanked the CRO for the offer of loaned staff but trusted that the Secretariat would be better 
staffed by the time of the meeting and would need not avail itself of the CRO’s assistance in that 
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 Gooneratne advocated a full interpretation of the Secretariat’s mandate laid out in the 
Agreed Memorandum which included the management of ministerial meetings. 
Gooneratne went further in his discussion with the CRO and raised the topic of establishing a 
legal branch of the Commonwealth Secretariat. The idea of a Secretariat legal branch had also 
been raised at the 1964 Law Ministers’ Meeting as a way to reinforce Commonwealth legal 
coordination and to reduce the costs of such coordination. For the newer expansionist members, 
Commonwealth legal coordination including a Secretariat legal branch would provide an 
inexpensive means to exchange legal best practices. Coordinating on legal matters in a way that 
was not controlled by the British Government was a practical advantage to the newer, 
expansionist members. For the newer members, a Secretariat-managed legal entity would 
facilitate exchanges on legal practices between all members, as opposed to British emphasis on 
common law. As member legal structures diversified, legal exchanges facilitated by the 
Secretariat could provide access to both common law legal advice and South-South legal 
exchanges.   
The newer members’ expectation that the Secretariat manage Law Ministers’ Meetings informed 
Gooneratne's confident reply to the CRO and fitthe mould of newer members’ concerns about 
British management of Commonwealth meetings. As with other Commonwealth Meetings CRO 
officials had the tendency to insert British preferences into the meeting agenda. As CRO officials 
followed up on the 1964 meeting they paid selective attention to certain topics that the Law 
Ministers had proposed for future consideration. For example, based on the 1964 discussion of 
extradition treaties (a topic of particular interest to the British Government) the CRO proposed 
that the topic be included in the 1966 agenda, circulated a preparatory memorandum, and 




suggested that members include ministers familiar with the topic in their delegations. In contrast, 
CRO preparations completely omitted the topic of a Secretariat legal branch which had also been 
discussed in 1964.
13
 This CRO omission occurred even though the idea was supported by the 
British delegation in 1964.  This underscored the CRO’s propensity toward protecting their 
traditional authority, even if it involved contradicting the British delegation at the Law Ministers’ 
Meeting, whose members continued to support the prospective coordinating role of the 
Secretariat in 1966. 
Both the newer expansionist members and legal professionals supported the Secretariat role 
coordinating the Law Ministers’ Meetings. Smith and the Secretariat staff used this support to 
circumvent the CRO, as they did with the Lagos Prime Ministers’ Meeting (see Chapter Eight). 
Gooneratne suggested to CRO officials that discussing a Secretariat legal branch was a useful, 
timely, and important topic and proposed that it be added to the provisional agenda.
14
 Upon his 
return to Marlborough House, Smith and his deputies informed Commonwealth members that 
the Secretariat would be servicing the meeting and requested that any proposed agenda items or 
preparatory papers be sent to the Secretariat which would distribute them to both the membership 
and to the CRO as appropriate.
15
 By appealing to the wider membership the Secretariat was 
guaranteed greater support than by coordinating exclusively with the CRO.  
In the same manner that Smith had leveraged his  connections within the Canadian Government 
on many occasions, he also worked to shift coordination with the British Government to 
channels outside the CRO so far as possible. Smith pursued British cooperation to advance the 
proposed legal section via the Cabinet and court system. Smith particularly worked with the Lord 
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Chancellor Baron Gardiner, a noted Labour reformist. Secretariat staff increasingly worked with 
the Lord Chancellor to organise the meeting beyond the control of the CRO. In a private meeting 
on April 19, Smith and Gardiner agreed that the Lord Chancellor would chair the Law Ministers’ 
Meeting as host. The two discussed the meeting timetable, social occasions, press statements, 
and arranged a meeting of senior Commonwealth officials to finalise the agenda and meeting 
details.
16
 CRO officials received a record of Smith and Gardiner’s meeting but were not party to 
the discussions themselves.
17
 Smith also submitted the logistical arrangements directly to the 
membership for approval, and so bypassed the possibility of the CRO influencing the agenda.
18
  
By appealing to the wider membership and working with sympathetic British governmental 
departments the Secretariat seized the initiative for setting the agenda, drafting and distributing 
meeting papers, handling communications, and otherwise “servicing” the 1966 Law Ministers’ 
Meeting. As with other Commonwealth meetings, in 1966 the CRO was increasingly restricted 
to tasks pertaining to logistical arrangements for the British role as host government. Although 
the CRO had postured to shape the planning and agenda of the Law Ministers’ Meeting 
according to British preferences, this ran counter to the Commonwealth functioning as an 
international organisation and was unacceptable to the newer members. Smith and the Secretariat 
were able to use sympathetic connections within the British Government and the reliable support 
of the newer Commonwealth members to assert the Secretariat’s mandate in planning 
Commonwealth ministerial meetings. 
Towards a Secretariat Legal Section 
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The Secretariat’s work for the Law Ministers’ Meeting was a stepping stone to organisational 
expansion with a Secretariat legal section as another central Commonwealth service. Proposals 
for a Secretariat legal branch had been raised during the Meeting of Commonwealth Law 
Ministers in Canberra, as well as during two other meetings of legal professionals held in 
Australia in 1964. At both the third Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference in Sydney and 
the Commonwealth Conference of Chief Justices in Canberra, delegates suggested a Secretariat 
legal section would be useful for sharing legal information and best-practices throughout the 
Commonwealth. Acting in part on the recommendations of these Commonwealth professional 
associations, the law ministers themselves advocated for a Secretariat legal section among their 
home governments.
19
 The law ministers envisioned the legal section facilitating exchanges of 
information on law and legislation in the Commonwealth, providing information on legal matters 
of mutual interest, assisting with intergovernmental legal projects, facilitating Commonwealth 




In 1964 when the law ministers invited the British delegation to initiate consultations for the next 
Law Ministers’ Meeting in 1966, they also asked the British Government to facilitate 
consultations for the proposed legal section. The CRO had disregarded this request even though 
the British delegation of legal officials had supported it. When Secretariat staff took over 
preparations for the 1966 Law Ministers’ Meeting the proposed legal section was incorporated 
into both the agenda and the wider planning of the meeting. In April 1966, the Secretariat 
facilitated an additional preparatory meeting of Commonwealth legal officials to draft a detailed 
                                                             




proposal for the legal section which would then be submitted to the law ministers.
21
 The 
committee produced a report elucidating the functions of a modest legal section in addition to 
outlining the qualifications and budgetary requirements for hiring two legal officers for the 
Secretariat.
22
 The Commonwealth law ministers accepted the recommendations of the 
preparatory meeting. The law ministers themselves did not have the authority to approve 
Commonwealth initiatives but strongly supported the establishment of a legal section and 
formally recommended it to the Commonwealth prime ministers.
23
 Secretary-General Smith had 
already indicated the Secretariat’s willingness to take on the responsibility of a legal section if 




In order to avoid allegations of unilateral expansion the Secretariat issued a background paper 
that thoroughly grounded the idea of the legal section in the proposals from the 1966 Law 
Ministers’ Meeting. The Secretariat brief also traced the genesis of the idea to 1964 before the 
Secretariat had begun operations.
25
 Smith sought to avoid allegations of expansionism by 
stressing the role of the law ministers. For their part the law ministers ensured that the Secretariat 
legal section would be included on the agenda of the September 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting 
when they formally recommended it to the prime ministers. Because the idea was endorsed by 
the law ministers, the legal section could not be construed as an attempt at “empire building” on 
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23 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 1, File 13, Commonwealth Circular no. 54, 11 May, 1966.  
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Smith’s behalf. Rather, the topic fell under the organisation of Prime Ministers’ Meetings which 
was the most basic function of the Secretariat. The Secretariat’s role in managing 
Commonwealth meetings was an avenue for expansion into new fields. Law ministers from 
across the expansionist and restrictionist camps more readily supported the Secretariat as a 
Secretariat legal section would directly benefit the law ministers’ own projects regardless of their 
own governments’ views on the Secretariat.  
The September 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting was a qualified success for the Secretariat (see 
Chapter Nine). The proposed Secretariat legal section was deferred to a subcommittee and then 
postponed entirely without approval.
26
 However, the legal section had not been rejected and 
discussion was effectively pushed to the next Prime Ministers’ Meeting in January 1969. In the 
interim Smith continued to suggest the utility of a legal section to members and worked with 
other professional legal bodies to build support for the initiative. For instance, in June 1968 
Smith suggested to the Kenyan Minister of Economic Planning, Tom Mboya, that a Secretariat 
legal branch might be useful for sharing the experience of successful Kenyan constitutional 
reform which Mboya himself had helped design.
27
 In November 1968 Smith met with Sean 
MacBride, Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists and confidentially told 
him about the proposed legal section. MacBride supported the idea and offered to discretely 
promote it among his Commonwealth contacts.
28
 The delay between the Prime Ministers’ 
Meetings allowed Smith to build support through his personal contacts in the Commonwealth 
and in other international bodies.  
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By 1969 there was also greater support for adding constructive items to the 1969 agenda after the 
near destruction of the Commonwealth in 1966. Whitehall had devised a number of proposals on 
Commonwealth cooperation in education, on youth issues, and for legal matters.
29
 The 
reorganisation of the British diplomatic service and the promotional work of British legal 
officials helped shift Whitehall’s stance on Commonwealth legal cooperation between 1966 and 
1969. The Secretariat legal section became part of a package of cooperative proposals designed 
to emphasise cooperation that was supported but not run by the British Government. The British 
Government in turn promoted these ideas in the wider restrictionist group. For instance, in 
preparation for a visit by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to Australia in 
February 1967, British briefs were geared toward convincing the Australian Government to 
support the Secretariat legal section rather than the Australian Government’s traditional support 
for the British Institute of Comparative Law. The basis of the British position was that the 
Secretariat legal section could be modest and cost-effective, would complement the work of the 
British Institute of Comparative Law, “and would remove the apparent anglo-centricity of the 
present arrangements.”
30
 In light of the divisive discussions on Rhodesia in1966, emphasising 
the centrality of the Secretariat and British support for Commonwealth cooperation became more 
important than maintaining the status quo.
31
   
After more than three years in the works, the Secretariat legal section was approved by the 
Commonwealth prime ministers in January 1969.
32
 The addition of a legal section added another 
facet to the Secretariat and brought the functions of the Commonwealth more into line with the 
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expectations of the newer members. The genesis of the legal section illustrates that the 
management of Commonwealth meetings was central to the Commonwealth’s transition to an 
international organisation. Meetings were the initial access point for Secretariat expansion into 
the legal field. By effectively servicing meetings of Commonwealth law ministers the Secretariat 
made allies of legal professionals and ministers throughout the Commonwealth. These legal 
officials felt that the Secretariat would promote their own interests better than the CRO and 
supported the Secretariat (sometimes regardless of whether their home governments were 
expansionist or restrictionist). Although the Secretariat legal section was not approved quickly, 
by 1969 Commonwealth legal cooperation was a recognisably constructive project that was 
beneficial to both old and new members. 
Medical Conference 
The management of Commonwealth medical meetings was a stepping stone to greater Secretariat 
involvement in the medical field. Secretariat management of medical meetings conformed to the 
expectations of the newer members that the Commonwealth operate as a senior international 
organisation with services in a variety of fields. By successfully managing Commonwealth 
medical meetings the Secretariat also gained allies in the medical field who helped lobby their 
home governments in favour of the Secretariat, regardless of where their government sat on the 
expansionist/ restrictionist spectrum. 
Much like Commonwealth legal activities, Commonwealth medical coordination was also a 
practical manifestation of Commonwealth cooperation that had precedents before the 
establishment of the Secretariat. Medical cooperation had roots in efforts to revitalise the 
organisation in the late 1950s. As with Commonwealth coordination in other fields such as 
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education, efforts in health were built on the work of non-governmental Commonwealth 
associations, such as the Commonwealth Medical Association founded in 1952. The promotion 
of greater Commonwealth coordination was part of wider British efforts to encourage 
organisational innovation and cooperation in both governmental and non-governmental spheres. 
The British strategy of the 1950s included proposals for new Commonwealth associations, new 
and more frequent ministerial conferences, and the provision of Marlborough House as a 
Commonwealth centre. These proposals were meant to demonstrate British interest in the 
organisation, and to expand British influence via the Commonwealth. In consequence they 
focused on British promotion and management of Commonwealth initiatives and stopped short 
of advocating for a Secretariat that would move such projects beyond Whitehall’s control.
33
  
The Commonwealth Medical Conference was based on the success of the first Commonwealth 
Education Conference in 1959. The Education Conference had brought educational coordination 
to the governmental level and replicated the model of increasingly specialised ministerial 
meetings used in Commonwealth economics (see Chapter 12). The British Government proposed 
the first gathering of health ministers in 1964.
34
 The first Commonwealth Medical Conference 
took place in Edinburgh the following October and was widely hailed as a success. The meeting 
led to the addition of Medical Fellowships to the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship 
Plan as well as annual offers of postgraduate medical training for candidates from developing 
member countries.
35
 The health ministers in attendance found their discussions fruitful and 
requested that the British Government arrange a second meeting in 1968.
36
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The Secretariat was not involved in the preparations for the first medical conference in October 
1965 owing to logistical delays (see Chapter Five) and the initial priority of servicing Prime 
Ministers’ Meetings. Nor did the British Government envision sharing the meeting preparations 
with the Secretariat in any substantive way. British officials maintained that according to the 
letter of the Agreed Memorandum the Secretariat would only service ministerial meetings when 
“appropriate” with the tacit understanding that this would require the approval of all member 
governments. The most immediate opportunity to seek approval for Secretariat involvement in 
planning the 1968 Medical Conference was at the September 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting. 
CRO officials subsequently proposed that consultations for the Medical Conference be added to 
the agenda for the Prime Ministers’ Meeting.  
By 1966, the CRO had already acknowledged that the Secretariat was responsible for setting the 
agenda for the Prime Ministers’ Meeting (see Chapter Nine). This addition also came in the 
context of a meeting between Wilson and Smith that same week to discuss positive aspects to 
add to the meeting to balance the tense discussions about Rhodesia.
37
 However, it was clear that 
the British Government still took a narrow interpretation of the Secretariat’s role in the proposed 
Medical Conference. The British view was that the Secretariat should only deal with the Medical 
Conference in two capacities. First, the Secretariat would include the Medical Conference on the 
agenda for the September Prime Ministers’ Meeting. This involvement was assumed only 
because the Secretariat was responsible for planning the Prime Ministers’ Meeting, not because it 
was responsible for planning the Medical Conference. Second, the Secretariat would provide the 
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practical servicing of the meeting (as with the Law Ministers’ Meeting). The British Government 
itself expected to carry out pre-meeting consultations and any subsequent planning for the 
Medical Conference.  
British representatives sought to buttress their proprietary stance over ministerial meetings with 
support from the wider restrictionist camp. Officials in the CRO advocated for the next medical 
conference to be held in Australia. They argued that this would allow other members to benefit 
from the strong Australian medical field while providing an opportunity for the Australian 
Government to act as host.
38
 Apart from the Commonwealth Law Ministers’ Meeting in 
September 1965 there had been no major Commonwealth meetings in Australia for a number of 
years. However, holding the meeting in Australia would also ensure Australian chairmanship. 
While it was still unclear whether the relatively new Holt Government would oppose the 
Secretariat to the same degree as the “almost pathological” opposition of the Menzies 
Government, Australian antagonism to the Secretariat was well-established and was likely to 
support the restrictionist leanings of the British Government.
39
  
While British officials sought to restrict the Secretariat’s role in Commonwealth medical 
cooperation, Secretariat staff used their role preparing for the Prime Ministers’ Meeting to 
demonstrate their capacity to service the Medical Conference. The Secretariat went beyond 
simply adding the Medical Conference to the agenda for the September 1966 Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting, and prepared several detailed background papers and briefings on Commonwealth 
medical cooperation. Within those documents Smith and the Secretariat identified the 
recommendations made by the 1964 Commonwealth Medical Conference and proposed five 
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potential working groups to address those recommendations (including committees on public 
health, medical education, medical personnel, nursing, and informational exchange).
40
 The 
Secretariat worked to out-manoeuvre the restrictions imposed on it by the CRO by working to 
prepare the agenda for the Prime Ministers’ Meeting while demonstrating initiative in following 
up on the health ministers’ recommendations.  
The overwhelming focus on the Rhodesian crisis at the September 1966 Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting left little room for discussion of Commonwealth affairs including the Medical 
Conference.
41
 However, the initiative shown by the Secretariat was well received by the newer 
expansionist members. Before the British delegation could nominate Australia, the Ugandan 
Government offered to host the next Medical Conference on the condition they received 
organisational assistance from the Secretariat.
42
 The majority Afro-Asian caucus strongly 
supported the Ugandan proposal which was made-unanimous by the prime ministers in the latter 
stages of the meeting.
43
  
The British Government nonetheless pressed to restrict Secretariat involvement in the next 
Medical Conference. In spring 1967 officials in the new Commonwealth Office (successor to the 
CRO) maintained that the British Government should organise the 1968 Medical Conference and 
initiated an advanced planning meeting. The Commonwealth Office recommended that the 
planning meeting take place in Geneva in May 1967 and that the British Government convene 
and provide the secretariat for the meeting.
44
 The timing and location proposed by the 
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Commonwealth Office would be convenient as most Commonwealth members would already be 
sending health officials to Geneva for the meeting of the World Health Assembly (WHA) later 
that month. The WHA determined the policy and oversaw the finances of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and as such, joint Commonwealth action in the WHA could have tangible 
benefits for all Commonwealth members. Commonwealth leaders routinely met before sessions 
of other major international bodies to discuss their priorities and potentially develop joint 
proposals while economising on diplomatic travel. For example, finance ministers annually met 
the week before the International Monetary Fund convened (see Chapter 12), and 
Commonwealth permanent representatives in New York often met to discuss policy before 
meetings of the UN General Assembly. In this sense, the planning meeting proposed by the 
Commonwealth Office would be cost effective and would conform to well-established practices.  
However, the British Government had ulterior motives for proposing the May 1967 planning 
meeting. Whitehall had a long history of monitoring Commonwealth activities in other 
international bodies, particularly in the UN family of organisations.
45
 Maintaining control of the 
pre-WHA meeting fit into a pattern of British attempts to control Commonwealth engagement in 
other international fora. By following up on the Commonwealth Medical Conference British 
officials demonstrated that they still considered the conference planning to be a British 
responsibility despite the support voiced for the Secretariat at the September Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting. Much like the 1966 Law Ministers’ Meeting, British planners envisaged a secondary 
role for the Secretariat, restricted to servicing rather than planning the meeting. British officials 
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again sought help from the restrictionist Australian Government by proposing that the planning 
meeting be hosted and thus chaired by the Australian permanent mission in Geneva.
46
 
In the short-term, the British gambit in Geneva was modestly successful in preventing the 
Secretariat from carrying out the full preparations for the Medical Conference. The meeting 
produced a detailed agenda in addition to several dozen pages of preparatory documents. The 
draft materials again focused on public health, medical education, medical personnel, nursing, 
and informational exchange between medical professionals throughout the Commonwealth.
47
  
The work of preparing the agenda and drafting background papers was done by member 
representatives following British planning and under an Australian chairman. The process 
resembled past Commonwealth meetings before the formation of the Secretariat when the British 
Government provided secretarial services on behalf of the members. 
However, British success in denying the Secretariat this role in the Medical Conference was far 
outweighed by the wider implications of the planning meeting. While the Secretariat was not 
overly involved in the planning meeting, the assembled health officials relied heavily on 
materials drafted by the Secretariat for the September 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting and 
agenda suggestions the Secretariat had subsequently gathered through circular correspondence 
with member governments.
48
 The extra research work done by the Secretariat in preparation for 
the Prime Ministers’ Meeting led to greater Secretariat input into the planning process for the 
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Medical Conference, even though the British Government had organised and convened the 
planning meeting.  
The expectations of the newer, expansionist members also supported greater Secretariat 
involvement than envisioned by British officials. The Ugandan Government still expected 
Secretariat assistance and support for the Medical Conference. As with the 1966 Lagos Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting, the logistics under the purview of the host government would be organised 
between the Secretariat and host without any British involvement.  
The composition of the member delegations to the planning meeting further reduced political 
partisanship. The health ministers and attendant health officials focused on more technical 
subjects than the broader politics pursued by the prime ministers. At the Geneva meeting 
Commonwealth health officials recognised that the Secretariat would best advocate for increased 
cooperation in the medical field even if member governments opposed the expansion of the 
Secretariat. Based on the Secretariat’s good record of planning Prime Ministers’ Meetings and 
the utility of the Secretariat’s background research to the Geneva meeting, delegates went so far 
as proposing the Secretariat take on the documentation and planning of the next Medical 
Conference, in addition to all future pre-WHA Commonwealth meetings.
49
 Most surprising to 
Whitehall was that Sir William Refshauge, the Australian chairman, also welcomed the prospect 
of increased Secretariat participation in planning the Medical Conference. Despite British 
posturing to limit the Secretariat’s role, the assembled health officials were decidedly in favour 
of greater Secretariat involvement in Commonwealth medical cooperation.  
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When the Second Commonwealth Medical Conference convened in Kampala in September 
1968, the delegates welcomed the Secretary-General alongside the Assistant Director-General of 
the World Health Organization (WHO).
50
 The conference recognised the Secretariat’s work in 
logistical planning and as a contributor to the conference documentation which had “made 
possible a more comprehensive review of the existing facilities and potentialities for 
Commonwealth medical co-operation than had ever before been undertaken.”
51
 The 
Commonwealth health ministers specifically noted that even though the organisation had broader 
political differences over British policy in Africa, the Commonwealth family was fundamentally 
a good institution.
52
 Even the British Minister of Health, Sir Kenneth Robinson, made a point of 
saying that the United Kingdom was trying not to dominate the Commonwealth and would 
continue working to contribute as an equal partner.
53
 The conference formally recommended that 
a doctor be added to the Secretariat staff to function as a medical advisor, to help coordinate 
medical cooperation through the Commonwealth, and to help prepare annual pre-WHA meetings 
and triennial Medical Conferences.
54
  
In spite of early British posturing to prevent the Secretariat from taking a full role in ministerial-
level meetings, the preparation and execution of the 1968 Medical Conference illustrated several 
key features of the evolving role of the Secretariat. At the most basic level, the planning process 
demonstrated the degree to which the wider membership had accepted a liberal interpretation of 
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the Secretariat’s mandate that included full responsibility for official and ministerial-level 
meetings. This was largely due to the newer members’ confidence in the Secretariat, both in 
principle and in a growing record of well-managed meetings. For the next pre-WHA 
Commonwealth meeting in Boston in January 1969 the Secretariat initiated, planned, and 
convened the meeting without any external support and in a non-Commonwealth country 
(therefore without host assistance).
55
 The Secretariat’s good work in Prime Ministers’ Meetings 
paved the way to a greater role in medical meetings and ultimately to expansion of the 
Secretariat itself. 
The 1968 Medical Conference also demonstrated that more specialised ministers and officials 
saw more potential in the Secretariat and were less partisan than their home governments. While 
Whitehall postured to maintain an older style framework for Commonwealth Medical 
Coordination, their efforts were frustrated in part by support for the Secretariat within the British 
and Australian delegations. Health officials saw the value in medical coordination across the 
Commonwealth, and this priority superseded the views of their respective expansionist or 
restrictionist governments. They perceived that the Secretariat would best support their projects 
amidst turbulent international politics and that dedicated attention and multilateral coordination 
by the Secretariat would provide support on a scale previously unobtainable in their home 
countries. By effectively managing health meetings and advancing the ideas of health officials, 
the Secretariat gained allies within the medical community who lobbied their home governments 
in favour of the Secretariat.   
Commonwealth members increasingly accepted the recommendations of ministerial meetings at 
face value, including those ministers’ support for the Secretariat. The growing scale of the 
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Commonwealth meant that all matters of common concern could not be discussed during the 
traditional Prime Ministers’ Meetings. Commonwealth governments recognised this and 
increasingly relied on proposals and background papers provided by other ministerial gatherings. 
The weight of the health ministers’ recommendations therefore grew for practical reasons. 
Perhaps more importantly, medical cooperation like the 1968 Medical Conference was a true 
instance of productive Commonwealth cooperation during some of the organisation’s most 
divided years. The conference produced a variety of cooperative initiatives, was held outside of 
London, featured rotating chairmanships for different sessions, and generally exemplified the 
values-based rhetoric and vision of Arnold Smith and the Secretariat. The Secretariat’s practical 
ability to convene meetings was bolstered by a successful example of the oft-hailed but seldom-
seen commonality of the Commonwealth in the 1960s. It was an indication that the organisation 
could perhaps practice what it preached and that the Secretariat could help it do so.   
Conclusion 
The oft-quoted axiom that consultation was the life blood of the Commonwealth was 
demonstrated in how the Secretariat’s role organising and servicing Prime Ministers’ Meetings 
paved the way for Secretariat expansion into fields such as law and medicine. In these 
specialised fields the older Commonwealth members had considerably more developed 
professional communities, yet all members stood to gain from increased Commonwealth 
coordination. For member countries with more developed professional fields, Commonwealth 
cooperation was a means to promote their own models abroad and gain exposure to new ideas 
and practices from around the world. For the newer members coordinating with the 
Commonwealth was an opportunity to build capacity through training and exchange initiatives. 
In both cases, these professionals were early supporters of the Commonwealth Secretariat, 
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perceiving its unique ability to facilitate cooperation. For the newer members, an independent 
Secretariat would help ensure that any British initiatives (like the medical conference) were not 
part of a neocolonial agenda. For the older members, there were significant potential political 
dividends to constructive professional cooperation. Professional cooperation was one of the few 
quantifiable instances of Commonwealth cooperation in the 1960s. However, if the older 
members wished to capitalise on professionals’ interest in Commonwealth coordination as a 
means to gain influence in the wider Commonwealth, they would have to work with the 
Secretariat. 
For professional communities and specialised ministers within all member governments, the 
central role of the Secretariat also ensured that their interests and ideas were heard amid the 
macro-level politicking of the wider organisation. Within their first two official ministerial 
meetings, both the Commonwealth law and health ministers advocated for a dedicated branch or 
officer in the Secretariat to better address their concerns. The Secretariat’s efforts to standardise 
ministerial meetings as the Commonwealth grew also led to ministerial papers and 
recommendations being submitted to the prime ministers more readily. For specialised ministers, 
the Secretariat was more reliable than their home governments in ensuring their perspectives 
were heard. Furthermore, the Secretariat could encourage international cooperation and exchange 
on a greater scale than their home governments. In consequence, Commonwealth law and health 
officials supported a greater role for the Secretariat regardless of where their home governments 
sat on the spectrum of expansionists and restrictionists.  
Both restrictionist and expansionist Commonwealth Governments, as well as the professional 
communities within them, stood to gain from increased Commonwealth professional 
coordination. Yet the success of such coordination was firmly rooted in the Secretariat. The 
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Secretariat’s role in planning Commonwealth meetings opened the door to expansion into other 
areas by demonstrating the Secretariat’s capacity, by gaining allies in Commonwealth 
professional communities, by promoting genuine cooperation, and by implementing more 
standard protocols for meetings. The management of specialised ministerial meetings was 




Chapter Eleven: Economic Meetings 
Background 
The process of the Secretariat taking over management of Commonwealth economic meetings 
was again characterised by widespread passive resistance among the restrictionists, intense but 
short lived resistance from the CRO, and growing Secretariat capacity facilitated by networks in 
the Commonwealth (most notably the Canadian Government and the newer members with a 
vested interest in a given meeting). However, earlier developments in the Commonwealth’s 
economic machinery distinctly shaped the Secretariat’s role in economics as well as the 
handover of economic meetings. These earlier developments created economic machinery that 
was in theory, more independent of British administration and more akin to other international 
organisations. The following two chapters do not focus on Commonwealth economic issues 
themselves.
1
 Rather, they focus on the Commonwealth machinery designed to discuss economic 
issues, and how the formation of the Commonwealth Secretariat affected the structure and 
management of that economic machinery.  
Discussion about managing economic machinery was a significant concern in the 
Commonwealth of the 1960s. The existence of intermediate Commonwealth economic bodies 
raised the stakes concerning Secretariat engagement in Commonwealth meetings in several 
ways. Much like the CRO, the personnel of the British-designed and largely British-staffed 
Commonwealth Economic Committee (CEC) were anxious about reorganisation and job 
                                                             
1 For further information on those issues see: D.K. Fieldhouse, “The Metropolitan Economics of Empire,” in The 
Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume IV: The Twentieth Century, eds. Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger 
Louis, 88-113 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Paul L. Robertson and John Singleton, “The 
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Edition (Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 1983). 
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security. Though not as hostile as the CRO, the CEC was nonetheless another group of personnel 
who were unsure of the Secretariat and its future role in managing Commonwealth meetings. On 
a broader scale, for both the wider membership and the British Government, the stakes of 
economic meetings were higher than other Commonwealth ministerial meetings. Legal and 
medical coordination focused on sharing best practices in systems already thoroughly exported 
and inherited throughout the British Empire.
2
 Commonwealth engagement in these areas 
appealed to ostensibly shared Commonwealth values and had long-term professional and 
political value. Economic coordination on the other hand affected the potential cost and benefits 
of Commonwealth engagement in more clear-cut terms. The potential advantages of sharing 
medical or legal best practices could only be gauged over the long-term, as participants built up 
relevant professional fields. The comparatively tangible short-term economic calculations raised 
the stakes of economic coordination and thus the stakes of coordinating economic meetings 
where member governments or regions’ economic interests might be pitted against one another.
3
  
Commonwealth economics were of keen interest to all members in an era characterised by 
increasing international and UN economic interventions, British negotiations with the EEC, the 
politics of Cold War patronage, and growing allegations of neocolonialism through economic 
policy. For the British Government, Commonwealth economic meetings were bound up in 
systems of Commonwealth preferences and trade, managing balances of payment within the 
Sterling Area, ongoing British negotiations with the EEC and calls for increased aid to former 
colonies. For the wider restrictionist camp, central features of economic meetings were control of 
the purse strings governing Secretariat expansion and maintaining a small Secretariat. For newer, 
                                                             
2 While many Commonwealth members were actively diverging from the British style of parliamentary monarchism 
and democracy, many retained these systems in full or hybrid forms. In all cases, the personnel of many new 
postcolonial governments were trained in the British legal system.  
3 Tomlinson, “The Decline of the Empire,” 209. 
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developing members, economic leverage and calls for increased aid were at stake, in addition to 
the growth of the Secretariat that would advocate for such measures on their behalf. 
These diverse concerns were borne out in discussions about the future structure of the 
Secretariat’s role in economic affairs. The economic stakes of the Commonwealth were 
increasingly relegated to specialised economic conferences (soon to be the Finance and Trade 
Ministers’ meetings). As with other ministerial meetings (see Chapter 10) the growth of the 
Commonwealth meant that all issues of common concern could not be fully discussed during 
Prime Ministers’ Meetings. While the Secretariat and member governments prepared the 
background papers and materials for the political issues of the Prime Ministers’ Meetings, the 
finance and trade ministers submitted reports and recommendations on economic issues for 
discussion and approval by the prime ministers. The finance ministers held a great deal of sway 
on economic issues and in some cases had the authority to approve economic programmes 
themselves. Unlike strictly political issues, by the mid-1960s the core Commonwealth economic 
discussions were conducted at the ministerial and committee level in specialised conferences 
rather than at the Prime Ministers’ Meetings (the latter relying on the work of the former). Thus, 
the management of economic meetings became the main field in the struggle over the economic 
future of the Commonwealth including cooperation on international monetary policy, 
preferential trade agreements, economic aid, and the role of the Secretariat in facilitating such 
cooperation. 
Economic Machinery to 1965: The CEC and CECC 
In most cases the management of Prime Ministers’ Meetings was directly negotiated between 
parts of the British Government and the Secretariat. Meeting management was more complicated 
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in the realm of economics. The importance of economics within the Commonwealth had 
encouraged the specialisation of Commonwealth economic bodies earlier than in other fields. 
After the First World War the Imperial Economic Conference of 1923 was the first dedicated 
economic conference of Prime Ministers accompanied by economic advisors. The Imperial 
Conference in Ottawa in 1932 was also dedicated to economic issues with preferential imperial 
tariffs at the forefront of the discussion.
4
 During the interwar period, a range of economic bodies 
were also formed to carry out the quotidian economic work of the British Empire and early 
Commonwealth. Most notable were the Imperial Economic Committee (IEC), designed to find 
and expand markets for Commonwealth agricultural products, and the Empire Marketing Board 
(EMB), designed to promote the consumption of imperial and Commonwealth products in the 
United Kingdom. Both the IEC and EMB were formed on the recommendation of the 1923 
Imperial Economic Conference and included both colonies and self-governing Commonwealth 
members. The day-to-day workings of Commonwealth economic coordination were thus 
specialised into sub-organisations and precedent set for the specialised conferences that later 
informed the work of the prime ministers.  
The IEC became the largest piece of Commonwealth economic machinery following the Second 
World War, after which it was revived and redubbed the Commonwealth Economic Committee 
or CEC.
5
 By this time the CEC had absorbed the work of the EMB and through the 1950s the 
scope of the Committee’s functions continuously expanded to include marketing, research, and 
                                                             
4 For Background on interwar Commonwealth economic cooperation see: Preston Arens, “’Strictly Non-committal’: 
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5 Mohammad Ikramullah, “The Commonwealth Economic Committee and its Work,” Pakistan Horizon 16, no. 1 
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coordinating intelligence on a wide range of commodities. By 1963 the CEC had grown to be the 
only standing committee on economic matters in the Commonwealth.
6
  
Yet the CEC remained a largely British construct aimed at supporting Commonwealth trade on 
the older, hub-and-spoke vision of an imperial Commonwealth. While the meetings of the CEC 
gradually expanded with the growing Commonwealth membership, the Committee’s permanent 
staff remained predominantly British. The expansion of the CEC in the immediate postwar years 
culminated with the formation of the Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council (CECC) in 
1959. The CECC was formed on the recommendation of the Commonwealth Trade and 
Economic Conference held in Montreal in September 1958. The CECC marked the consolidation 
of existing Commonwealth economic machinery into one body intended to oversee 
Commonwealth economic activities more generally.
7
 The Council was comprised of the CEC 
and Commonwealth Education Liaison Unit (CELU) in addition to finance ministers, 
statisticians, and senior economic officials from throughout the Commonwealth.
8
 Trade ministers 
and aides were represented both at CEC meetings and as specialists within the wider council, 
though without a clear or permanent role at either level. The council itself was effectively made 
up of the Commonwealth finance ministers, who had seen the British proposal through the Trade 
and Economic Conference and now met under the auspices of the CECC.
9
  
                                                             
6 Ibid., 15. 
7 Ibid., 17. 
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Figure two: Composition of the CECC 
While framed as a constructive, cooperative project, the consolidation of the CECC in 1959 was 
a somewhat shallow effort. Echoing the post-1949 status quo, with the CECC proposal the 
British Government aimed to demonstrate their interest in revitalising the Commonwealth 
without changing its day-to-day functions. The rationale for the CECC was on the one hand to 
maintain British centrality, and on the other to appease the older Commonwealth members who 
remained suspicious of any centralised Commonwealth bodies which might infringe on member 
sovereignty.
10
 The CECC was more akin to a well-named cabinet committee which evoked new 
functions and directions without altering the attendance of the room. The CEC and CELU were 
the only well-defined and permanently staffed (by Britain) components of the Council. The 
various representatives and ministers included in the CECC (see figure two) were constantly in 
flux and held a variety of other roles at multiple levels without and within the CECC. While the 
                                                             

















CECC was comprised of finance ministers from throughout the Commonwealth the British 
controlled CEC provided background information to the Council, and the CRO organised CECC 
meetings and agendas. The information available to the Council was thus shaped and controlled 
by the British Government, belying the ostensibly democratic structure of the Council itself. 
Much like the pre-Secretariat Commonwealth, the CECC was more a concept than a structure. 
The organisation, and indeed Commonwealth economics on a broader level, functioned more 
like a cabinet committee than an international body, with fluid constituents operating under a 
broad hierarchy. 
However, while the CECC changed very little in terms of the economic functions of the 
Commonwealth, its formation set the stage for later debates on the Secretariat’s role in 
Commonwealth economics. First, the broader mandate of the CECC supported the expansion of 
the day-today functions carried out by the CEC, which remained the working core of the CECC. 
This expansion included a sizeable addition of (mostly British) CEC staff, the appointment of a 
permanent salaried chairman, and the establishment of a Commonwealth Centre at Marlborough 
House to house the CEC. The services provided by the CEC were also expanded, including the 
provision of factual, up-to-date economic information on a wider range of commodities and 
products, as well as the ability to carry out bespoke economic studies on behalf of member 
governments.
11
 The CECC structure also facilitated greater involvement of the Commonwealth 
trade and finance ministers in the economic workings of the Commonwealth. The new CECC 
was responsible for organising Commonwealth economic meetings in conjunction with the CRO 
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including routine CEC meetings and eventually specialised economic conferences.
12
 Thus, in the 
CECC there were inklings of an independent, member-run Commonwealth economic body based 
on the provision of information and servicing of meetings.  
The centrality of meetings was reinforced by the CECC, which encouraged greater specialisation 
of Commonwealth economic gatherings. While the council was composed of various bodies and 
classes of officials and ministers, the CECC leadership consisted of the Commonwealth finance 
ministers.
13
 The annual meetings of the CECC were effectively meetings of Commonwealth 
finance ministers and set the stage for dedicated Finance Ministers’ Meetings beginning in 1965. 
It followed that if the finance ministers would have dedicated meetings, the Commonwealth 
Trade and Economic Conferences could be further divided into dedicated Trade Ministers’ 
Meetings and other specialised economic gatherings distinct from the growing Prime Ministers’ 
Meetings. The growth of the Commonwealth in the early 1960s rendered the combined prime 
ministerial and economic conferences of the past too cumbersome, and the creation of dedicated 
conferences facilitated more in-depth discussion. 
The CECC encouraged specialisation of Commonwealth economic meetings and the relabelling 
of various economic gatherings. Yet the Council’s “on-the-ground” work was still based on an 
Anglo-centric vision of Commonwealth economics and its core constituent, the CEC, was largely 
staffed by British personnel. However, the formation of the CECC was an important conceptual 
step towards the decision to establish the Secretariat six years later. Not only was the 
organisation centrally located with both a permanent staff in the CEC, and regular if ad hoc, 
council meetings, but its main functions were to provide information services, to facilitate 
                                                             
12 MacLeod, “The Evolving Role of the Commonwealth in Canadian Foreign Policy,” 163. 
13 Ibid., 163, 178; Ikramullah, “The Commonwealth Economic Committee and its Work,” 16. 
266 
 
cooperation, and to organise relevant meetings. The formation of the CECC as a supervisory 
body in 1959 somewhat decentralised the economic functions of the Commonwealth, even if it 
was a politically motivated project that lacked substance at the time.
14
  
The Role of the Secretariat 
Building on the conceptual, if not concrete advances of the CECC, Secretariat involvement in the 
management of Commonwealth economic meetings was nigh a foregone conclusion by the time 
it was formed in 1965. Unlike with other areas, the role of the Secretariat was explicitly stated:  
the Agreed Memorandum stipulated that the Secretariat should take on the organisation of CEC 
meetings as well as the annual conference of the wider CECC.  
A comprehensive Review of Intra-Commonwealth Organisations conducted by an independent 
Review Committee was also mandated in the Agreed Memorandum. The memorandum further 
outlined that the Secretariat should work in close consultation with the CEC pending the report 
of the Review Committee.
15
 Discussion of the potential absorption of the CEC by the Secretariat 
had been tabled along with the Secretariat at the 1964 Prime Ministers’ Meeting.. The potential 
absorption of the CEC by the Secretariat would functionally disband the CECC by reallocating 
responsibility for the core component of the organisation and making-redundant the finance 
ministers’ roles as heads of the Council. The decision to make the Secretariat responsible for the 
annual meetings of the CECC immediately, rather than waiting for the findings of the Review 
Committee, reflected the council’s lack of substance and need for reorganisation. Even the 
possibility of a Secretariat takeover of the CEC pushed for the council to be reorganised and 
rebranded. Indicative of this change was that once the Secretariat was formed, annual CECC 
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meetings were renamed Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ Meetings’ (the first of which was 
held later in September 1965). The new structure of specialised Finance Ministers’ Meetings 
encouraged the parallel development of the first dedicated Trade Ministers’ Meeting in 1966.   
The effective disbandment of the CECC in advance of the Review Committee’s 1966 report 
reflected the ad hoc and shallow construction of the Committee. The reorganisation also played 
into debates about the servicing of Commonwealth ministerial meetings. The Agreed 
Memorandum left the question of ministerial meetings open to interpretation on a case-by-case 
basis, with Secretariat involvement “where appropriate” according to the consensus of the 
membership.
16
 In 1965 the text of the Agreed Memorandum did not explicitly grant approval for 
the Secretariat to participate in the planning of the new ministerial level economic meetings. 
However, the Secretariat was made responsible for economic meetings in general, would 
potentially absorb the CEC within a few years, and in the meantime was responsible for the 
meetings of the economic bodies (CECC and CEC) that would otherwise encompass the 
activities of both finance and trade ministers.  
The expectation that the Secretariat would assist in planning the new, specialised ministerial-
level economic meetings was bolstered by a long record of British attempts to influence 
Commonwealth economic activities to the benefit of the United Kingdom. Although all members 
naturally pursued economic self-interest in the Commonwealth, the neocolonial implications of 
British efforts and the Anglo-centricity of existing economic machinery were of particular 
concern to the newer members and Secretariat alike. The process of forming the Secretariat 
threw into relief British influence in the economic machinery of the Commonwealth and 
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encouraged newer members to support the expansion of the Secretariat in the economic realm, 
including the absorption of the CEC.  
British influence was particularly manifest in the CEC, which had been constructed and staffed 
on British initiative. After the Commonwealth Secretariat was proposed in 1964, the British 
Government envisioned the CEC and Secretariat working together. However, British officials 
expected that coordination would be carried out between the CEC, the Secretariat, and the British 
Government itself.
17
 In this manner the CEC would remain a tool for British influence and the 
activities of the Secretariat in the economic sphere would be mitigated by the existing machinery 
of the CECC. Soon after the proposal to establish the Secretariat was tabled in July 1964, the 
CRO advised Cabinet that the Secretariat might work alongside the CECC and its constituent 
parts, but that it was imperative “the Secretariat should not exert a stranglehold or interfere with 
the normal working of these bodies…”
18
 If the Secretariat absorbed the CEC and other 
administrative functions arrogated to the CECC, it would essentially replace the CECC as the 
Commonwealth’s central economic organ. The expanded role of the Secretariat would mean less 
ability for CRO staff to justify their own role coordinating economic meetings and less 
opportunity for the British Government to pursue its own interests by shaping Commonwealth 
economic activities. The specific risk to the CRO was compounded by the end of the British 
Overseas Trade Corporations scheme in 1965, which had been supported by the CO and CRO in 
the late 1950s as a means of encouraging colonial and Commonwealth investment.
19
 The end of 
the scheme effectively removed a subsidy for imperial and Commonwealth investment and 
reflected the waning commercial importance of such connections for the British economy. 
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Labour’s renewed interest in the EEC was a further indication that the CRO was losing economic 
arguments for its continued existence. The expansion of the Secretariat ultimately had the 
potential to threaten British sway over Commonwealth economic machinery, and the very 
existence of the Secretariat problematized that influence through the CECC.  
Yet in 1965 the prime ministers had made clear that they envisioned a greater role for the 
Secretariat in economic affairs. The Agreed Memorandum outlined the Secretariat’s prospective 
economic role. In November 1965, Samuel Odaka, the Ugandan Foreign Minister, even seemed 
surprised that the Secretariat would involve itself in political disputes such as the Rhodesian 
crisis rather than focusing on economic consultations.
20
 The newer members expected the 
Secretariat to have a more comprehensive role, particularly in economics. Subsequent 
developments with the Medical Conference and Law Ministers’ Meetings affirmed that moving 
forward the work of the Secretariat would include ministerial meetings. However, the degree of 
British interest in Commonwealth economics and the ambiguities of the CECC allowed 
opposition to Secretariat expansion to persist much later than in other areas such as health or law. 
British economic interests were fundamentally based on an older, imperial vision of 
Commonwealth economics. This was manifested in how the British Government dealt with 
changes in the CEC and proposals for Commonwealth aid.  
Through two case studies, the following section examines how the CRO and the wider British 
Government worked to maintain economic control and influence in the Commonwealth. British 
handling of issues of colonial representation at CEC meetings and questions of CEC efficiency 
and reform through 1964 and 1965 illustrate how British attempts to control Commonwealth 
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economic machinery in the CEC resulted in stronger support for the nascent Secretariat. Newer 
members, (particularly in the Caribbean) supported the expansion of the Secretariat into the 
realm of economic affairs. For the expansionist members, a greater economic role for the 
Secretariat would help them derive the most economic benefit from the Commonwealth. They 
believed the Secretariat would simultaneously advocate for their interests and ensure that 
existing programs were not manipulated by the British Government. Many of these economic 
concerns came to the fore during the 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting, which was the first since 
the formation of the Secretariat to include a full discussion of world affairs including economics. 
British attempts to maintain a degree of control over Commonwealth economics ultimately 
encouraged greater support for the Secretariat.  
Representation at the CEC 
The pushback over economic issues visited on the British delegation at the 1966 Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting was spurred by a lack of change despite the formation of the CECC seven 
years earlier. The CECC was ostensibly a jointly managed body under the direction of the 
Commonwealth finance ministers. However, its day-to-day operation was carried out by the CEC 
which remained a British-built and staffed entity. Preparations for the March 1964 CEC meeting 
illustrate the extent to which the British Government controlled the workings of the CEC before 
the establishment of the Secretariat.  
The 1964 meeting was envisioned as an opportunity for Commonwealth coordination at the first 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD I), which opened in March 
1964. As British officials began the planning process for the pre-UNCTAD meeting, the South 
Rhodesian Government (soon to be Rhodesia) requested to attend the UNCTAD meeting as 
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successor to the defunct Central African Federation (CAF) which had dissolved the year before. 
The constitutional problem with the Rhodesian request was that the constituent parts of the 
defunct federation (South Rhodesia, North Rhodesia, and Nyasaland) had reverted to colonial 
status after the federation’s demise. While the federation had been independently represented, its 
constituent parts had not. British officials concluded that they would follow UN protocols at the 
pre-UNCTAD meeting in order to ensure continuity in Commonwealth representation. Only full 
Commonwealth members were entitled to be represented at the pre-UNCTAD meeting, but the 
British Government would revisit this position depending on the findings of the UN.    
The question of whether Southern Rhodesia could attend ultimately depended on its status as a 
“state” in the eyes of the UN. There was a case to be made for this as Southern Rhodesia had had 
responsible government since 1923 and had generally been permitted a higher degree of self-
government than the other parts of the CAF because of its larger number of white settlers. 
Although Southern Rhodesian had not officially attained Dominion status and was technically 
still a colony like North Rhodesia and Nyasaland, it was treated as a de facto Dominion prior to 
the formation of the CAF. With this background in mind, the CRO felt that there was merit to the 
South Rhodesian query while North Rhodesia and Nyasaland were “certainly not eligible for 
attendance at either the UN conference or the preparatory Commonwealth meeting”.
21
 Carl 
Watts argues that in the early stages of the Rhodesian crisis the South Rhodesian settler 
government was pursuing a policy of “creeping sovereignty” to obtain international recognition 
and legitimacy through representation and exchange of representatives in the Commonwealth 
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and other international fora.
22
 South Rhodesian representation at either the Commonwealth or the 
UN meeting would help support such efforts to establish international legitimacy. Although the 
British Government was cautious in all colonial politics, the South Rhodesian Government had 
sympathy in the British Government, both in the CO and CRO, and across party lines. Hpwever, 
in the context of the UNCTAD meeting, South Rhodesian attendance depended on the Rhodesian 
Government’s ability to convince the UN that it were the inheritor state of the CAF. If the UN 
did not find Southern Rhodesia to be a state, it would have to be represented along with North 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland as colonies under the umbrella of the United Kingdom delegation.
23
  
The South Rhodesian Government was unsuccessful and found not to be a successor state by the 
UN and therefore only entitled to UNCTAD representation under the umbrella of the British 
delegation. According to British policy, South Rhodesia was therefore ineligible to attend the 
pre-UNCTAD Commonwealth meeting. However, the CRO was prepared to honour the 
Rhodesian request to attend the pre-UNCTAD Commonwealth meeting, regardless of the 
Rhodesian standing before the international community and regardless of its lack of 
Commonwealth membership. Though the CRO toyed with the idea of inviting North Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, they ultimately decided not to formally invite those two to the Commonwealth 
meeting, but to permit them to attend if they pressed the issue.
24
 The British found this a “rather 
ticklish issue” as it not only laid bare the racial and structural inequalities of the former CAF, the 
Colonial Office (CO), and the CRO, but it also opened the door for other colonies on the path to 
                                                             
22 Watts, Dilemmas of Intra-Commonwealth Representation,” 324.  
23 TNA: CO 936/884, Summary of Meeting held in the C.R.O. on February 14th 1964 to discuss the Central African 
Territories’ Membership of Commonwealth Organisations and Attendance at the U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development. 
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independence (in the most immediate cases, Malta and Guyana) to request conference 
representation as though they were already sovereign states.
25
  
The 1964 pre-UNCTAD Commonwealth meeting thus presented a series of problems for the 
British Government. Many of these problems were similar to those encountered by the CRO 
concerning Commonwealth membership applications (see Chapter Six). First was the issue of 
image, both in terms of structural racism and in the discrimination of representation among CAF 
successor governments. Second was the problem of maintaining British suzerainty up to the 
official date of independence and thus maintaining British sovereignty according to both British 
policy and international norms.
26
 Third was the potential opposition of recently independent 
colonies to British economic initiatives during the CEC meeting itself and finally, the literal 
problem of affording colonies a seat at the table (in addition to name cards, office space, flag 
poles, and parking spaces).
27
 By the time the CRO and CO began coordinating a common 
approach to the issue, the CO had already issued a public statement framing the meeting as a 
broader gathering that would include the central African colonies. While the CO and CRO 
resolved to consult closely thereafter, both departments considered the “damage done,” and 
turned to mitigating the outcome.
28
   
Having belatedly realised the multitude of issues deriving from offering South Rhodesia 
independent representation, the CO and CRO sought to exploit the flexible structures of 
Commonwealth economic coordination. Not able to back out of colonial representation at the 
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pre-UNCTAD meeting, they resolved “to blur so far as possible the usual distinction between 
independent members…and non-independent territories” and to drop the usual CEC designation 
in favour of calling it a “special” meeting.
29
 In so doing, the meeting would be rendered sui 
generis and therefore not threaten British control over colonial affairs. Reflecting on this 
development, British officials even considered that this “special” meeting affirmed their role in 
inviting select colonies to participate in Commonwealth economic conferences under the 
nominal umbrella of the British delegation (as they might in the UN). Reifying the central British 
role and creating competition among colonies for inclusion at Commonwealth meetings could be 
beneficial to UK interests. Such an arrangement would allow the British to selectively offer 
“enhanced status” invitations to colonies and thereby manipulate the number of attendees, affirm 
the subordinate constitutional status of colonies, and to simply not invite colonial territories 
opposed to British policies.
30
 This solution would simultaneously resolve the issues of image, 
sovereignty, and precedent-setting while ensuring an echo chamber of support for British 
economic policies. Officials in the CRO used this rationale during the planning of the 1964 pre-
UNCTAD meeting to specifically exclude British Guyana on the grounds of hostility towards the 
UK.
31
 As with the debates over representation in the Secretariat preparatory committee later that 
year (see Chapter Three), British handling of CEC meetings allowed British interests and the 
central role of the CRO to be obscured under the banner of providing secretariat-style services 
for both the Commonwealth and its affiliated organisations.   
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The advantages of controlling meetings, both for the CRO and for the wider British Government, 
fostered restrictionist attitudes when the Commonwealth Secretariat was proposed in the summer 
of 1964. In the long term however, British attempts to pursue their own interests under the guise 
of providing Commonwealth services encouraged rapprochement between the CEC and the 
Secretariat as well as wider support for the Secretariat among the newer members who remained 
suspicious of British intentions.  
CEC Efficiency 
After the decision to form the Secretariat in 1964, the CRO expanded its efforts to support the 
CEC and by extension, its own role in planning Commonwealth economic meetings. The 
imminent formation of the Secretariat in the summer of 1965 reinforced the possibility of the 
CEC being absorbed by the Secretariat and caused uncertainty and a degree of “malaise” in the 
organisation.
32
 Some of this anxiety was based on concerns of job security, wages, and whether 
the Secretariat would take over the CEC’s office spaces in Marlborough House.
33
 However, the 
dysfunction of the CEC also touched on deeper structural issues about the purpose of the 
organisation. The CEC had been formed to conduct market research and coordinate commodities 
intelligence in the Commonwealth thereby promoting organisational trade by matching buyers 
and sellers. Based on its roots as the Imperial Economic Committee, the CEC was designed to 
function in a colonial economic system with clearly defined producers and consumers for raw 
materials and manufactured goods. If Commonwealth trade had ever conformed to such a model, 
it had certainly ceased to do so by the mid twentieth-century. By the 1960s, the efficiency of the 
CEC was questionable at best and raised eyebrows in the Colonial Office, where one staffer felt 
                                                             
32 TNA: DO 215/196, Minute from H.A.F. Rumbold to Sir S. Garner, 2 April, 1965.  
33 TNA: DO 215/196, Minute from H.A. F. Rumbold to Mr. Keeble, 1 April, 1965.  
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In March 1965, C.J. Cruickshank, the Executive Secretary of the CEC, outlined these concerns in 
a letter to the CRO. While Cruickshank considered the potential merger with the Secretariat to be 
none of his business, he was keenly aware of the unrest amongst his CEC staff and the 
inefficiencies of the committee. In writing to the CRO, Cruickshank asked what the real purpose 
and objectives of the CEC were, whether the CEC was achieving those objectives in an efficient 
and cost effective manner, and whether that work was duplicating other international efforts such 
as UNCTAD or the GATT.
35
 In anticipation of the review of the intra-Commonwealth 
organisations, Cruickshank wished to proactively conduct an internal investigation of the CEC 
and to ask Commonwealth members whether they considered the CEC to be useful, whether it 




Cruickshank’s inquiry threatened to bring membership scrutiny of Commonwealth economic 
machinery. Such scrutiny would necessarily expand beyond the CEC to the wider umbrella of 
the CECC and expose the shallow, political nature of the organisation. The lack of efficiency or 
depth in the CECC’s work would invariably support the amalgamation of the CEC into the 
Secretariat and thus remove a key British tool of economic influence. Cruickshank’s letter 
threatened not only the viability of a vehicle for British influence, but would also support a 
stronger Secretariat beyond British control and would potentially expose the British initiative as 
shallow and based on ulterior motives. Officials in the CRO were alarmed and swiftly 
                                                             
34 TNA: CO 936/884, Minute from W.A. Morris to Mr. Christofas, 8 September, 1965.  
35 TNA: DO 215/196, Letter from C.G. Cruickshank to Sit Algernon Rumbold, 16 March, 1965; Jim Tomlinson, 
“The Decline of the Empire,” 213. 
36 TNA: DO 215/196, Letter from C.G. Cruickshank to Sit Algernon Rumbold, 16 March, 1965. 
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coordinated with the Chairman of the CEC to forbid the circulation of Cruickshank’s paper and 
to bar him from making any policy-related suggestions in future.
37
 In addition to preventing the 
circulation of the paper, CRO officials orchestrated “a paternal letter” to Cruickshank to outline 
that he had got off to a very bad start, was a poor “politician” and that he should be more careful 
and circumspect. In so many words the letter suggested that Cruickshank get on with his work 
“quietly and unobtrusively” and that “if he did not do better, it would not bode well for his future 
prospects.”
38
 While Cruickshank threatened to resign over the issue, by the first of April he had 




Cruickshank still had reservations about the effective functioning of the CEC but the CRO 
considered the threatening paper contained.
40
 Through a combination of official action, veiled 
threats, and payment, CRO officials had prevented an inquiry about the operation of the CEC 
and about its relationship to the Secretariat from being conducted, and more importantly, had 
prevented the question from being raised among the membership. The CRO and wider British 
government were keen to avoid questions about British intentions, given there were already 
suspicions of their motives amongst the wider membership in light of the deteriorating situation 
in Rhodesia. Extending the life of the CEC also gave the British Government the potential to 
continue to sway Commonwealth economic discussions for at least another year. In the context 
of British negotiations with the EEC, such economic options took on increased importance. 
Because the CEC conducted research on markets, commodities, and trade in the Commonwealth, 
the committee had the ability to shape the economic information submitted to the 
                                                             
37 TNA: DO 215/196, Note of Conversation between Sir A. Rumbold, Sir R. Hall and Mr. Keeble on 26 March at 
the Commonwealth Relations Office, 1965.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 TNA: DO 215/196, Letter from C.G. Cruickshank to Sir Robert Hall, 1 April 1965.  
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Commonwealth membership (including prime ministers and ministers of trade and finance). By 
maintaining control of the CEC the British Government retained the ability to shape that 
information and cast Commonwealth trade in whatever light was most favourable to British 
interests.     
Though Cruickshank’s paper was not publicised, he had identified some significant inefficiencies 
in the CEC and rendered-questionable its actual purpose. Responding to Cruickshank’s concerns 
in an outwardly conciliatory yet threatening letter, the CRO noted that the CEC had symbolic 
value distinct from what the Committee actually did and that this symbolic value could only be 
assessed at levels much higher than Cruickshank, the CEC itself, or even the CECC.
41
 While 
there was certainly symbolic value to such economic bodies, it was tokenistic at best.
42
 Freeman 
Stewart, head of the Commonwealth Education Liaison Unit (another constituent part of the 
CECC), confided in Arnold Smith during the latter’s first month as Secretary-General that the 
two of them were the only elected positions in the Commonwealth, “...since the other 
[organisations] were run more as British Government creations.”
43
 The CEC continued as a 
means for the British Government to generate and promote economic information most 
convenient to Whitehall, not the wider membership of the Commonwealth.    
The extent to which the CEC was a British construct was clear in the chain of command that 
Cruickshank followed when he began to question the functions of the committee. Cruickshank 
first consulted the CRO rather than anyone in the CECC, which was ostensibly responsible for 
the CEC (see figure two). The degree of British control over the CEC was also evident in the 
track record of the CEC chairman. The chairman position had only recently become a permanent 
                                                             
41 TNA: DO 215/196, Letter from Robert Hall to C.W. Cruickshank, Esq., 30 March, 1965.  
42 MacLeod, “The Evolving Role of the Commonwealth in Canadian Foreign Policy,” 163, 175. 
43 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 1, File 1, Diary Entry, Friday 3 September, 1965. 
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(and paid) position. In 1963, the first paid chairman Sir Mohammad Ikramullah of Pakistan, took 
pride that both historically and under his watch, “the Committee d[id] not hand out judgments on 
controversial matters.” Rather, it supplied basic information and left the reader to form their own 
conclusions. “On this basis it ha[d] succeeded in doing its work quietly and for so long without 
getting involved in controversy.”
44
 The chairman’s cooperation with the CRO the following year 
to block Cruickshank’s inquiry indicates how the structure of CEC leadership was based on 
deference to the British and maintaining an ostensibly non-confrontational but inherently Anglo-
centric bureaucratic culture. The CEC did provide some economic services to Commonwealth 
members but was growing inefficient as a constituent part of the chiefly symbolic CECC. The 
economic machinery of the Commonwealth had been built by the British based on a colonial 
economic system, and was maintained because it suited British interests.  
Ministerial Meetings 
The creation of the Secretariat in 1965 underscored the need to reorganise the economic 
machinery of the Commonwealth, which had previously been discussed at the 1964 Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting. The ambiguous organisation of the CECC and general lack of clarity in 
Commonwealth economics had facilitated British efforts to manipulate them (as outlined in the 
above case studies) and was unacceptable to the newer, recently independent members. The 
success of the Commonwealth Law Ministers’ Meeting in September 1964 and the meeting of 
health ministers in October 1965 were proof-of-concept that new ministerial meetings could be 
centrally organised by the Secretariat and provide useful information to support the traditional 
meetings of Commonwealth prime ministers.  
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The model of ministerial meetings was thus applied to the ambiguous CECC and facilitated the 
dispersal of the council, as well as the now-unwieldy Commonwealth Trade and Economic 
Conferences. In their place, the Secretariat oversaw standardised meetings of finance ministers, 
trade ministers, and education ministers. The balance of the CECC (largely the CEC) was 
absorbed into the Secretariat in late 1966.   
The nature of the CECC supported the Secretariat takeover in several ways. First, the economic 
functions of the Commonwealth had already been somewhat decentralised by the CECC. The 
Secretariat takeover of economic meetings was thus more easily accomplished than in other 
areas where the Secretariat was in direct competition with British departments (as with the Prime 
Ministers’ Meetings). Second, the CECC itself was effectively made up of the Commonwealth 
finance ministers and thus represented the whole of the membership. Because the Council was at 
the head of the CECC, Secretariat management of CECC meetings both democratised the 
management of economic affairs and reduced the ability of the British Government to control the 
flow of information to the council. Further, the closer relationship with the CECC gave the 




However, while the Secretariat takeover of Commonwealth economic meetings was relatively 
straightforward, the stakes of economic affairs fostered British resistance to Secretariat 
expansion that was manifested in other ways. The following section explores the Secretariat 
takeover of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ Meetings in dialogue with the origins of the 
Commonwealth technical assistance programme. This case study shows how the management of 
Commonwealth economic meetings was a crucial site for building support for Secretariat 
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proposals and for advocating for newer members’ vision for the organisation. The first step in 




Chapter Twelve: Finance Ministers’ Meetings and Commonwealth Aid 
The key to rebuilding Commonwealth economic machinery around the Secretariat was the 
management of the CECC meetings, newly rebranded as the Finance Ministers’ Meetings (see 
Chapter 11, Figure Two). Amid suspicions of British influence on the functioning of the CECC 
the prime ministers of newer member states made early calls for the management of CECC 
meetings to be reallocated to the Secretariat. Newer members expected the Secretariat to have a 
stronger economic role akin to other international organisations. While the core of the CEC 
would remain intact pending the findings of the Review Committee, the expectation that the 
Secretariat participate in the planning of the ministerial level economic meetings was built into 
the Agreed Memorandum and in the wider proceedings of the 1965 Prime Ministers’ Meeting.  
In their June 1965 eeting the prime ministers tasked the Secretariat with preparing for the 1965 
Finance Ministers’ Meeting, which was planned to take place in Kingston, Jamaica before the 
next International Monetary Fund (IMF) meeting that October.
1
 This call came within the first 
week of the Secretariat’s existence and long before an economic Deputy-Secretary-General had 
even been hired. The urgency with which the expansionist members pushed for Secretariat 
involvement in Commonwealth economic affairs attests to the importance of economic issues for 
those members and their confidence that the Secretariat would improve the Commonwealth’s 
economic machinery. The Secretariat’s subsequent role in the Finance Ministers’ Meeting 
marked an important conceptual shift in the workings of Commonwealth economics. While the 
Agreed Memorandum outlined that the Secretariat would organise the meetings of the CECC and 
ministerial meetings where appropriate, CECC meetings were already de facto meetings of 
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Commonwealth finance ministers. Previous Commonwealth meetings in anticipation of the 
annual IMF meeting had been held as CECC meetings. Thus, the annual gathering of the CECC 
was simply relabelled in 1965 as the first Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ Meeting.  
While seemingly a point of nomenclature, the relabelling of CECC meetings greatly reduced the 
ambiguities of the CECC and its operation and brought the Finance Ministers’ Meeting into line 
with other newly organised ministerial meetings. Because the Secretariat had been so recently 
established, its role in the 1965 Finance Ministers’ Meeting was limited. Staff of the CEC and 
CRO had already begun planning the meeting in conjunction with the Jamaican Government 
earlier that year. With limited staff and resources, Secretariat personnel worked to draft 
background papers for the meeting in spite of having only begun operations three  weeks before.
2
 
The background papers furnished by the Secretariat were largely based on recent British and 
American publications about the world financial situation and reflected the Secretariat’s limited 
capacity to assist with the meeting.
3
 
The Secretariat’s limited work for the 1965 Finance Ministers’ Meeting conformed to early 
expectations outlined in the Agreed Memorandum. It stipulated that initially the Secretariat 
should preferably rely on outside economic publications rather than engaging additional staff.
4
  
This was to be a temporary measure while the Review of Intra-Commonwealth Organisations 
completed its report. It was likely the Review Committee would recommend the CEC be 
absorbed into the Secretariat as an economic branch, thus removing the need for more staff. In 
                                                             
2 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 1, File 1, Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council Draft Communique, 23 
September, 1965; LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 1, File 1, Commonwealth Circular no. 7, 17 September, 1965.   
3 CSLA: 1997 – 12 “Meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers, Sep 1965: Background Papers 17 Jun 1964 – 21 
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the meantime, while cost-effective, this arrangement reduced the Secretariat’s capacity to service 
economic meetings before the completion of the Review Committee’s work. For the time being 
this arrangement appealed to both restrictionist preferences for a small and easily managed 
Secretariat, while leaving the door open to Secretariat expansion in the future. However, in terms 
of the practical preparations for the meeting, CRO and CEC staff had already planned the bulk of 
the meeting in addition to preparing instructional briefs for the Chairman and the Secretary-
General regarding scheduling, protocol, and agenda items.
5
 The Secretariat’s role was restricted 
both as a reflection of its limited capacity and because the CEC and the CRO envisioned the 
Secretariat in an auxiliary role regardless of the expectations of the wider membership. In this 
scenario the Secretariat would provide supplemental information only, rather than planning the 
meeting which would threaten the established roles of the CEC and CRO.  
Secretariat staff fulfilled this limited role in 1965. The Finance Ministers’ Meeting was one of 
the first in which the Secretariat had any role and Secretary-General Smith personally attended 
the meeting in Kingston. Secretariat involvement in the Finance Ministers’ Meeting set an 
important precedent for the future workings of Commonwealth economics. In the context of 
other new ministerial meetings, the 1965 Finance Ministers’ Meeting made clear that the 
ministerial-level meeting could be organised by the Secretariat rather than British personnel. The 
direct liaison between the Secretariat and the finance ministers also set the basis for consultation 
between representatives of all Commonwealth members and the Secretariat, without the 
involvement of the CRO and with much less ambiguity than the previous workings of 
                                                             
5 CSLA: 1997 – 25 (1) “Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ Meeting, Montreal, September 1966 – 29 Apr 1966 – 11 
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Commonwealth economics. This reduced the ability of British officials to exploit the flexible 
structures of the Commonwealth to mask economic manipulation.  
Perhaps more importantly, by working directly with member representatives, the Secretariat 
would organise the meetings and prepare the background information for the finance ministers. 
Under the old system of Commonwealth economic machinery, while the CECC itself was 
comprised of finance ministers from throughout the Commonwealth, council meetings were 
organised by the CRO and informed by the British-staffed CEC. Thus, the British Government 
retained a great deal of control over the workings of the organisation including the timing of 
meetings, the content of the agenda, and the composition of background papers and reports. With 
the new Secretariat British officials would not have the same ability to influence meetings of 
Commonwealth economic ministers.  
The Secretariat’s new role servicing meeting of Commonwealth finance ministers impacted other 
economic problems such as the question of Commonwealth aid and development assistance. 
Calls for increased aid were a persistent feature of the Commonwealth through the 1960s and 
were as consistently raised by newer Commonwealth members as they were denied by the 
British Government. With the formation of the Secretariat these calls shifted to the Secretariat, 
which was able to more effectively advocate for the membership in the face of British control of 
the Commonwealth’s economic machinery.  
Whitehall’s opposition to calls for greater aid and technical assistance in the Commonwealth was 
a long-standing trend across party lines. Leading up to the formation of the CECC in the late 
1950s, the Conservative Cabinet under Anthony Eden reasoned that because other 
Commonwealth members derived benefit from Britain’s colonies “in terms both of material 
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strength and influence in the world,” that it was not unreasonable to ask that they assist the 
British in finding solutions to colonial problems and that “the United Kingdom Government 
should not be expected to bear alone the full burden of those problems and of the criticism to 
which they give rise.”
6
 In practical terms the British expected Commonwealth support in the 
United Nations and that other wealthy Commonwealth members assist in paying for 
Commonwealth initiatives, including aid and economic development.  
A Commonwealth programme of multilateral aid and technical assistance, coined The Special 
Commonwealth African Assistance Plan (SCAAP), was subsequently established in 1960 but it 
was limited in scope. It had been approved in principle by the prime ministers in May 1960 and 
was further considered by the CECC in its meeting later that year.
7
 The plan was designed on the 
basis of using the CECC as a means of matching donors and recipients within the 
Commonwealth. “The essence of the Plan [wa]s therefore not the co-ordination of assistance 
from different countries but the expansion of the total through negotiations between 
Commonwealth countries in Africa requesting assistance and Commonwealth countries offering 
it.”
8
 Behind closed doors however, officials in the CRO admitted that “the African scheme [wa]s 
designed to prevent the Commonwealth governments in Africa from turning to undesirable 
sources e.g. Communists, for the technical help they want in building up their armed forces.”
9
 
The scheme was imbued with overtones of the Cold War and came at a time when the British 
                                                             
6 TNA: DO 121/246, Smaller Colonial Territories: Draft Report of the Official Committee on Colonial Policy, 13 
June, 1956.  
7 “Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 1960 (London, 3-13 May): Final Communique,” in The 
Commonwealth at the Summit: Communiqués of Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings, 1944-1986 
(London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987), 62. 
8 Commonwealth Secretariat: Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council: Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ 
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9 TNA: DO 164/55, Minute from A.W. Snelling to General Price, 10 September, 1962.  
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Government was “doing [its] best to promote sales of war material to the Commonwealth.”
10
   
The plan also conformed to the Conservative economic thinking of the 1950s in the sense that it 
did not advocate increased Commonwealth aid and sought to distribute the burden of such aid 
among the older more developed members of the organisation.
11
  
The Labour government that came to power under Harold Wilson in October 1964 did not 
necessarily share its conservative predecessors’ desire to outsource colonial responsibilities, but 
it did share the inherent British concern for keeping Commonwealth costs at a minimum. To that 
end the Wilson Government chiefly supported internal British initiatives for bilateral aid that 
either maintained equilibrium or decreased financial commitments to the Commonwealth. Such 
bilateral efforts had been extensively negotiated by the Macmillan Government with the 
introduction of the British Overseas Service Aid Scheme in 1961 and were continued by the 
Wilson Ministry.
12
 Bilateral agreements allowed greater conditions to be attached to aid and 
greater credit to be taken by the British Government.
13
 Part and parcel to this policy, the Wilson 
ministry consistently opposed initiatives that might result in central Commonwealth oversight or 
increased financial commitments to Commonwealth aid. For example, in November 1964 Prime 
Minister Eric Williams of Trinidad proposed a special Commonwealth ministerial meeting to 
specifically address issues of Commonwealth economics. Williams called for the recently 
proposed Secretariat to prepare and present “formal papers within a formal agenda as distinct 
                                                             
10 TNA: DO 164/55, Note on Links between U.K. and Commonwealth Forces, 29 September, 1960; Stockwell, The 
British End of the British Empire, 87.
 
11 These expectations echoed the establishment of the Colombo Plan in 1950. While the plan was proposed by 
Indian representatives it was initially established on the basis of shared cost in the Commonwealth, and later shared 
cost beyond the Commonwealth. Further, the programme also aligned to British policy goals in Southeast Asia with 
its emphasis on development as a means to counter the spread of communism in the region. 
12 Stockwell, “Britain and Decolonization,” 79. 
13 Brinley Thomas, “Intra-Commonwealth Flows of Capital and Skills,” in A Decade of the Commonwealth, 1955-




from slip-shod and ad hoc discussions” to date. Williams sought an agenda addressing 
Commonwealth trade (including preferences, commodity agreements, and terms of trade), 
immigration, and economic aid and technical assistance.
14
 Addressing these concerns would help 
meet the needs of the Trinbagonian economy and those of other developing nations with 
economies largely dependent on conditions in industrial countries.
15
 Williams also pointed out 
that a meeting discussing these ideas would fit within the Labour Party’s own recent election 
programme.
16
 However, Wilson returned a “sympathetic but temporising reply” to Williams, 
indefinitely delaying any such discussion because his government felt that both the timing and 
methods were wrong.
17
 In a similar sense in the first year of the Wilson ministry expenditure on 
the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan began to decline as did the number of 
Commonwealth trainees covered by the the United Kingdom’s Overseas Service Aid Scheme.
18
  
The Wilson Government instead focused on the newly created Ministry of Overseas 
Development (formed in November 1964) as its primary method of distributing aid funding.
19
 By 
September 1965, just before the First Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ Meeting, personnel in 
the Colonial Office noted that most of their dealings with Commonwealth organisations 
(including for aid distribution) had already been reallocated to the ODM. The exception to this 
transfer was the CEC in which the CO retained a particular interest that they felt should be better 
                                                             
14 TNA: T 312/707, Letter from Eric Williams to Harold Wilson, 26 October, 1964.  
15 Eric Armstrong, “Projections of the Growth of the Economy of Trinidad and Tobago,” Social and Economic 
Studies 12, no. 3 (September 1963), 283. 
16 TNA: T 312/707, Letter from Eric Williams to Harold Wilson, 26 October, 1964. 
17 The British also suspected that this was a veiled form of pressure against British policies in the UN conference on 
Trade and Development. See: TNA: T 312/707, Proposal from the Prime Minister of Trinidad for a Commonwealth 
Economic Seminar: Minute from W.A. Nield to Mr. Caulcott, 13 November, 1964; TNA: T 312/707, Draft Reply to 
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18 Commonwealth Secretariat: Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council: Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ 
Meeting 1966, 1. 
19 Tomlinson, “The Decline of the Empire,” 209-210. 
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coordinated with the CRO.
20
 By the autumn of 1965 British interaction with Commonwealth aid 
and development was fully transferred to the ODM while general economic dealings were 
centred through bilateral trade agreements or through the CEC for more specific programs.  
The interplay between British departmental re-organisation, Commonwealth aid and 
development funding and the Secretariat’s role in the Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ 
Meetings came to a head in September 1966.
21
 At the September 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting 
(see Chapter Nine) Secretary-General Smith advanced a plan to increase Commonwealth aid 
coordination in response to the desires of the newer members and as a bid to boost 
Commonwealth cooperation in an otherwise divisive year. Smith saw this as a way to strengthen 
the Commonwealth by providing an opportunity for constructive cooperation and went so far as 
to specifically note this potential benefit in his proposal.
22
 The Secretariat proposal explored a 
variety of Commonwealth aid possibilities but in order not to infringe on existing channels of 
bilateral aid or duplicate multilateral UN programmes focused in particular on technical 
assistance.
23
 In the proposal Smith reasoned that because of the shared language and 
administrative methods of many Commonwealth members, cooperation in technical assistance 
and training would likely be the most effective and cost efficient way for the organisation to help 
its developing members.
24
 Cooperation in technical assistance could be boosted with a modest 
budget of one half of one percent of members’ existing aid budgets and if approved in principle 
by the prime ministers, could be explored further by a dedicated meeting of relevant experts.
25
 In 
the meantime, the proposal outlined several possible ways to boost Commonwealth aid in 
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technical assistance. These included better coordination with third party technical assistance 
bodies, new regional Commonwealth plans echoing the SCAAP or Colombo Plan for the 
Caribbean or Mediterranean members, or using the Secretariat to boost technical assistance. The 
latter suggestion could be supported by creating a Secretariat-based technical assistance service, 
using the Secretariat to manage individual large-scale development projects, or creating a 




The Secretariat proposal was modest and stayed well within cited parameters of both the 
Secretariat’s functions and Commonwealth aid coordination as stipulated by the prime ministers 
in the Agreed Memorandum and subsequent Commonwealth meetings. Yet the older, 
restrictionist Commonwealth members generally (including Australia, New Zealand, and India) 
and Britain in particular were resistant to the idea of committing to a wide-reaching program that 
might expand the Secretariat and impose third party direction over how such aid funding was 
used.
27
 Unlike nongovernmental organisations or bilateral aid channels, the Secretariat was 
beholden to the Commonwealth members. Under a multilateral aid programme managed by the 
Secretariat, aid recipients had more of a say in the management of that aid, which NGO and 
bilateral programs had greater potential for limits and strings attached by donor nations. For the 
restrictionist members not to overtly support Commonwealth aid would be politically damaging, 
and so the restrictionist governments supported the idea of Commonwealth aid in principle, but 
with significant reservations and little action.  
                                                             
26 Ibid. 
27 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 1, File 18, Note of the Meeting between the British Prime Minister and the 
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291 
 
Behind closed doors, the British Government again wrote off the idea of further aid coordination, 
this time considering it to be “a determined effort at empire building on Smith’s part and that it 
stretched beyond legitimate limits the functions for the Secretariat which were laid down in the 
Agreed Memorandum.”
28
 The role of the Secretariat was a central point of contention in the 
British Government. The first copy of the Secretariat’s proposal sent to Sir Saville Garner on 
August 9 had every reference to the lack of Commonwealth aid coordination underlined and 
marginally noted with “criticism not accepted.” Also underlined were any references to a 
centrally organised Secretariat effort to fill the apparent gap in Commonwealth aid 
coordination.
29
 The initial British reaction was to defend the existing Commonwealth aid 
arrangements and oppose any further role for the Secretariat. Central to this response was the 
wider stance of the Wilson Ministry “that there would be no additional money available from 
Britain.” The British made clear to both Smith and Deputy Secretary-General Gooneratne that “it 
was most unwise to make this proposal.”
30
 In the meantime, the ODM, now under the leadership 
of Arthur Bottomley, one of the Secretariat’s old opponents, systematically sought out loopholes 
to undermine the proposal draft.
31
  
While some officials in the new Commonwealth Office (CO) would have preferred to “have it 
out privately with the Secretariat now rather than to duck it altogether until the Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting,” the topic of aid was nonetheless broached during the conference.
32
 Arthur Bottomley 
(formerly of the CRO) attended in his new capacity as Minister of Overseas Development and 
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defended British efforts. Bottomley asserted the British commitment to aid and development, but 
found it difficult to endorse the Secretary-General’s proposal, stating that the British 
Government could not pledge any further funds, and that it would be wrong to raise false hopes 
in that regard.
33
 Similar to Prime Minister Wilson’s reply to Eric Williams two years earlier, 
Bottomley gave a “temporising” answer, and suggested that both the timing and method of the 




Arnold Smith had been campaigning widely on behalf of the newer members for a better 
organised programme of Commonwealth aid and development assistance. In addition to the 
strong support of the Canadian Government, Smith had discussed the matter widely including 
with Eric Williams in March of that year, as well as beyond the Commonwealth with Marcel 
Landey, the UN chief economic commissioner for Africa.
35
 Ceylonese representatives were also 
supportive and congratulated Smith on his proposal during the conference, while also calling on 
Bottomley to view the proposal with sympathy and understanding towards the wider 
Commonwealth.
36
 The Secretariat proposal had come at the “worst possible timing” in terms of 
British economics, policy, and attitude toward the Commonwealth, in addition to the deep 
divisions in the organisation itself.
37
 On a politically defensive footing and feeling the adverse 
effects of an economic downturn, the British delegation had gone into the meeting committed in 
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neither principle nor detail to the proposal and remained so through the proceedings.
38
 In order to 
break the resulting deadlock Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson suggested that the topic be 
deferred rather than abandoned and “the Meeting agreed that the proposals in the Secretary-
General’s memorandum should be put on the Agenda of the Planning Conference, which the 
Secretary-General had already been asked to arrange.”
39
  
While the Secretariat proposal carried through the September 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting, 
the focus on Rhodesia and “the cautious negativeness of bureaucrats” were not a constructive 
climate for such projects, even with the general support of the newer Commonwealth members.
40
 
Harold Wilson and the British delegation were willing to broadly discuss economic issues at the 
Prime Ministers’ Meeting, but that discussion was based on the work already done by the trade 
ministers at their meeting the previous June and deferred many outstanding issues to the meeting 
of finance ministers in Montreal the next week.
41
 Smith’s proposal was effectively tabled and 
only “survived” the 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting.
42
   
However, while the Secretariat proposal received little attention from the prime ministers amidst 
divisive political discussions in early September, the proposal received explicit endorsement 
from the Commonwealth finance ministers when they met in Montreal the following week. As 
the Secretariat grew from 1965 to 1966 to fully service Finance Ministers’ Meetings, the finance 
ministers came to support Secretariat initiatives in the realm of Commonwealth aid. The support 
of the finance ministers was important in raising the profile of aid issues (beyond the central 
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political issues of the day) and garnering support from throughout the Commonwealth and from 
within the various members’ governments.  
By 1966, although its capacity to service meetings was still being built, the Secretariat had taken 
on a much greater share of preparations for Finance Ministers’ Meetings. The September 1966 
Finance Ministers’ Meeting in Montreal was fully serviced by the Secretariat both in terms of 
information (background papers, agenda items, and memoranda) and practical logistics. After the 
Lagos Prime Ministers’ Meeting the 1966 Finance Ministers’ Meeting was the second 
Commonwealth meeting outside of London fully organised by the Secretariat. The expansion of 
the Secretariat staff and the experience of having serviced a number of meetings including two 
larger Prime Ministers’ Meetings had greatly increased the Secretariat’s capacity to field the 
meeting. However the Secretariat’s central role in the 1966 Finance Ministers’ Meeting was also 
facilitated by the changing stance of the CEC and the contributions of the Canadian Government, 
which ensured that the Secretariat would not be reliant on the British in general and the CRO 
(later CO) in particular.   
The Secretariat’s role in the 1966 Finance Ministers’ Meeting was also facilitated through 
Arnold Smith’s personal connections in the Canadian Government. In a visit to Ottawa in March 
1966, Smith asked Prime Minister Pearson if the Canadian Government would consider hosting 
the September Finance Ministers’ Meeting. At the 1965 Finance Ministers’ Meeting the Nigerian 
Government had offered to host the 1966 gathering, but the coup d’état just after the Lagos 
Prime Ministers’ Meeting that January had removed Lagos as a viable option though Nigeria 
remained in the Commonwealth. Amid the tensions over Rhodesia that were likely to continue in 
the September Prime Ministers’ Meeting, Smith also found the idea of hosting the Finance 
Ministers’ Meeting in London to be ill-advised. Because Canada enjoyed a good reputation with 
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both old and new members of the Commonwealth, Smith hoped the Canadian Government 
would offer to host the Finance Ministers’ Meeting which would be perceived as a neutral 
location. While the Canadian Government did not have any particular desire to host a meeting in 
light of the deep ongoing tensions in the Commonwealth, they agreed to do so if the Secretary-
General found that most members would support a meeting in Canada.
43
 This would also ensure 
that as host, the Canadians would chair the meeting and thus reduce the likelihood of a partisan 
chair creating antagonism between Britain and the newer members over financial policies 
touching Commonwealth programmes, sanctions in Rhodesia, or aid and development.  
As Smith suspected, after initial consultations, the wider membership strongly supported the 
Canadian Government hosting the Finance Ministers’ Meeting which subsequently took place in 
Montréal from September 21-22. The Secretariat serviced the majority of the meeting but the 
Canadian Government also gave additional help in key areas such as drafting an extensive brief 
on the world’s industrial economies and loaning a number of staff to assist the Secretariat that 
was “slightly on the high side” even for a host government.
44
  
With the assistance of an increasingly friendly CEC, in addition to that of the Canadian 
Government under Pearson, the Secretariat was able to take over management of Commonwealth 
Finance Ministers’ Meetings without having to rely on British support, or even to refer to the 
CRO/CO in any way. The 1966 Finance Ministers’ Meeting was particularly successful for 
Smith who garnered majority support of the finance ministers for his program of multilateral 
Commonwealth assistance. While there was discussion of the situation in Rhodesia among the 
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assembled finance ministers, unlike at the Prime Ministers’ Meeting the week before, Rhodesia 
was not the central point of the meeting. There was thus a more balanced approach to a broader 
array of financial topics during the meeting, rather than the intense focus of the Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting. Similarly, there was less contestation over the workings of the meeting. There was no 
caucus of new members or clique of older members, nor was there CRO/CO posturing for 




With increasing assistance from the CEC and sustained support from the Canadian Government, 
the 1966 gathering of finance ministers was a much more balanced meeting. At the meeting the 
assembled ministers made clear that they saw the problem of aid and development in the context 
of wider economic challenges facing developing countries.
46
 Aid could therefore not be relegated 
to the margins in favour of talks on trade or international finance. This approach cast Secretariat 
aid coordination in terms of cost effectiveness, efficiency, and a bigger economic picture. While 
the prime ministers had deferred consideration of the proposal to the meeting of Commonwealth 
economic planners, the explicit support of the finance ministers lent a much stronger basis for the 
Secretariat proposal for Commonwealth aid and technical assistance. 
In spite of the wider member support through the finance ministers, the restrictionist 
Commonwealth governments (United Kingdom, Australia, India, and New Zealand) remained 
reluctant to cooperate with the Secretariat concerning aid and technical assistance. In February 
1967, Smith called a meeting of Commonwealth High Commissioners at Marlborough House to 
discuss prospective agenda items for the Nairobi Meeting of Commonwealth Planners Smith had 
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been asked to organise by prime ministers in 1966.
47
 In short order representatives from the 
Commonwealth Office wrote to Smith suggesting that the agenda be adjusted to put more 
emphasis on general economic planning rather than Commonwealth assistance. The stance of the 
CO was that the former topic was of greater importance and therefore the prospective timing of 
the meeting should be adjusted so that a full week be devoted to economic planning with aid 
experts joining the meeting at an unspecified later stage.
48
 A letter from Australian High 
Commissioner J.L. Knott was even more explicit about the place of aid and technical assistance 
on the agenda. Knott cautioned Smith that he “should exercise some restraint in organising the 
Nairobi meeting as to prevent the arousing of great expectations on the part of the uninformed 
about the likely outcome of the officials’ deliberations.”
49
  
Indian officials also wrote to Smith with a suggested agenda item. Elaborating on a past Indian 
proposal, the Indian Government proposed the establishment of a multilateral market 
development fund that would encourage development through export promotion and trade rather 
than technical assistance.
50
 The Indian proposal had the potential to diversify Secretariat 
operations and could complement a programme of aid and technical assistance. However, India 
was also more developed than the newer members, so the Indian Government saw less need for 
aid and technical assistance and could more readily afford to be wary of centralised projects. The 
Indian Government had benefitted from the Colombo Plan since 1950 and had also supported the 
SCAAP since 1960. India therefore had less need for aid and technical assistance, a long history 
of engaging with Commonwealth regional assistance programmes, and well-entrenched 
suspicion of external oversight. These factors contributed to Indian restrictionism regarding the 
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Secretariat proposal, albeit for different reasons than the other restrictionists. In the interim, by 
proposing that Commonwealth development could be accomplished through market 
development, the Indian Government echoed the previous functions of the CEC and the status 
quo of existing Commonwealth operations. Secretariat staff were apprehensive about the Indian 
proposal as it was “neither specific enough nor detailed enough to allow one to judge whether or 
not a workable scheme can be based on their outline.”
51
   
Further complicating the work of the Secretariat was British obstruction regarding past records 
of the CECC. As the incorporation of the former CECC into the Secretariat progressed through 
1967, Smith requested access to previous records and meeting documents which included CEC 
records, as well as information pertaining to the work of the Commonwealth finance ministers. 
Prime Minister Wilson’s Cabinet saw no harm in Smith himself accessing CECC records but 
granted him access only on a personal basis as a Canadian diplomat, rather than as 
Commonwealth Secretary-General. The British Cabinet refused to formally acknowledge 
Smith’s request and denied that he had any claim or right to access CECC documents in his 
capacity as Secretary-General.
52
 The denial of Smith’s request was justified by concerns of 
information security in the diversely-staffed Commonwealth Secretariat. However, by 1967 the 
Secretariat had already formally taken over the management of CECC meetings and was in the 
process of amalgamating the entirety of the CEC. British opposition went against the new 
structure of Commonwealth economic machinery in order to shield the British Government from 
the scrutiny of other members and to impair Smith’s ability to efficiently build the capacity of 
the Secretariat. 
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In the face of British obstructionism and the general opposition of the restrictionist camp, Smith 
endeavoured to diplomatically build support for the Secretariat proposal in anticipation of the 
Nairobi meeting. Again employing his connections in the Canadian Government, Smith wrote to 
K.B. Lall, the Indian Secretary of Commerce, to suggest a meeting between Lall and Maurice 
Strong, head of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
53
 In Smith’s 
estimation, the latter was “ a man combining idealism and great entrepreuneurial skill” who he 
hoped would be able to build support for the Secretariat proposal while travelling to India 
through his work at CIDA.
54
 Although Lall and Strong were unable to meet due to conflicitng 
schedules, Smith’s efforts again show his reliance on connections in the Canadian Government 
to help garner support for the Commonwealth Secretariat.
55
 
Smith also mounted a sustained effort to promote the Secretariat proposal by personally meeting 
with key British officials in early 1967. In a meeting with Sir Saville Garner in January, Smith 
pointed out that the idea of multilateral Commonwealth cooperation was originally a British idea 
that once enjoyed support from the British Government.
56
 He reasoned that even though present 
economic circumstances in the United Kingdom might preclude major British financial 
contributions, this was no reason that the Secretariat proposal could not move ahead.
57
 “In an 
attempt to weaken the opposition of British officials to the proposals ahead of the meeting” 
Smith also met with Harold Wilson in April. Smith complained of “considerable opposition in 
the Ministry of Overseas Development and in certain other of the developed Commonwealth 
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 Smith also noted the considerable support the proposal had garnered from the 
developing members and reminded Wilson “that the Prime Ministers had directed him to study 
ways of providing aid to the developing countries on a multi-lateral basis” and that he would 
pursue that directive.
59
 Pursuing that directive, Smith requested that Wilson include Dr. Thomas 
Balogh of the ODM and Sir Donald McDougall, the Director General of the British Department 
of Economic Affairs, in the United Kingdom Delegation to Nairobi.
60
 Smith considered both of 
these men to be competent and sympathetic to the Secretariat and hoped their inclusion might 
diffuse some tension with the Wilson Government by engaging with key economic departments 
while also building Secretariat support at the meeting itself.  
Smith’s remarks at the opening of the Nairobi meeting on May 24 reflected a measured approach 
towards the restrictionist members as well as the support he enjoyed among the newer, 
developing members. Smith referred to his vision of the Commonwealth as an instrument for 
international cooperation rather than a bloc and evoked the need to revitalise Commonwealth 
cooperation in the face of neo-isolationism, disenchantment, and public apathy.
61
 Smith 
reminded the planning experts in attendance that since the idea of a multilateral Commonwealth 
aid and technical assistance programme had been tabled three years earlier no action had been 
taken. He went on to note the benefits of a multilateral approach including greater capacity to 
provide services, the ability to match recipients and donors, the benefit of more diverse 
viewpoints and members, and less partisanship among technical experts working through 
multilateral framework. Finally, Smith reassured the delegations that the Secretariat would work 
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to avoid wasteful duplication of existing technical assistance services and would use the shared 
language and administrative practices of the Commonwealth to ensure maximum efficiency for a 
small starting budget.
62
 Smith’s opening speech expressed his vision for the future of 
Commonwealth cooperation and trod a line between reassuring the older members concerned 
with cost and Secretariat expansion, and supporting the idea and initiatives of the newer 
members. Smith’s speech echoed his vision of the Secretariat as a versatile international 
instrument that would complement, not compete with other international organisations.  
At the Nairobi meeting the early suggestions of the Secretariat for ways to boost Commonwealth 
aid and technical assistance were condensed into two distinct actionable programmes. The first 
was the recruitment of “a headquarters group of about six staff (development economists, 
statisticians, public administration experts) who could respond quickly to requests to visit 
countries, identify problems, and recruit specialists who could deal with them.”
63
 This small 
team of experts would act as consultants focused “on meeting the planning, rather than 
operational needs of governments” including national and sectoral planning, development project 
preparations, statistics, and financial and public administration.
64
 The second was the 
establishment of a fund for technical cooperation designed to support the recruitment and 
deployment of technical experts, the so-called headquarters group to meet member requests for 
assistance. The newer, developing members were particularly supportive and worked with the 
Secretariat to advance the aid proposal through the meeting. Indian officials later congratulated 
Smith on his skillful role guiding the proceedings, even though they themselves did not wholly 
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support the Secretariat programme.
65
 Smith later recalled that Philip Ndegwa, one of Kenya’s top 
officials in economic planning and chair of the meeting, “made a superb speech castigating the 




The first part of the proposal (the establishment of a Special Commonwealth Technical 
Assistance Programme), was formally recommended to member governments by the Nairobi 
Conference. However, the concerns of the older members heavily curtailed the Secretariat 
proposal. While the Secretariat would be able to recruit a small team of experts, the Australian 
delegation refused to commit any funds and those available from New Zealand were small. The 
bulk of the program relied on the support of Britain and Canada, who agreed to fund the hiring of 
two experts each.
67
 Any such hiring was to be was to be done on lines of credit provided by the 




The second portion of the proposal (the establishment of a central development fund) was 
advanced to a feasibility study but was not formally recommended to member governments by 
the Nairobi Meeting.
69
 The qualified success noted by Smith was that the principle and personnel 
had been approved while direct funds had not. Concerns over Secretariat expansion and financial 
commitments persisted in the weeks following the meeting. Australian representatives inquired 
directly with Smith about Secretariat hiring and estimated costs (even though the Australian 
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Government did not commit any funds) and members in the British House of Commons asked 
about how the costs would be shared among Commonwealth members before papers from the 
Nairobi Meeting had even been officially distributed.
70
  
Smith remained optimistic about the outcomes of the meeting, anticipating that the member 
governments would ultimately approve the qualified proposal.
71
 In a general sense the Nairobi 
meeting had approved incremental steps towards a development fund and a programme of 
Commonwealth aid and technical assistance. More importantly the outcomes of the meeting 
were significant because “the developing members of the Commonwealth were closely involved 
in the formulation of the schemes.”
72
 Although the Secretariat proposals had been quite limited 
in the process, the support of the newer members both in the meeting and among their home 
governments was guaranteed.  
Secretariat staff were able to further strengthen this support at the 1967 Finance Ministers’ 
Meeting, hosted by the Trinbagonian Government that September. In light of the previously 
rejected bid by the Trinbagonian Government to call a meeting specifically on Commonwealth 
aid, and the regional concern of Caribbean states for the representation of the associated states, it 
is perhaps not surprising that the Trinbagonian Government offered to host the meeting. The 
Secretariat had a strong ally in the Trinbagonian Government not only as a host, but also as a 
supporter of Smith’s vision for a multilateral programme for Commonwealth aid. Now with the 
capacity to fully and independently organise the Finance Ministers’ Meetings, the Secretariat 
                                                             
70 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 2, File 10, Record of Conversation between the Secretary-General and Mr. L. 
Engledow, Assistant Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, on Monday, 26 June, 1967; Hansard, 
Commonwealth Planners Conference, Nairobi, (HC Deb 27 June 1967 Volume 749 c248). 
71 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 2, File 10, Notes for address by Mr. Arnold Smith, Commonwealth Secretary-
General, to the Annual Conference of the Commonwealth Press Union, Marlborough House, London, 13th June, 
1967. 
72 LAC: MG 31 E 47, Volume 3, File 1, Meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers and Senior Finance Officials, 
Port of Spain, September, 1967: Minutes of Third Plenary Meeting, Thursday, 21 September, 1967 – 9:30 a.m.  
304 
 
was able to include on the agenda a “full discussion of the problems of development” including a 
review of the Secretary-General’s report on the flow of Commonwealth aid and other 
Secretariat-drafted background papers on aid specifically.
73
 The Secretary-General’s report 
echoed the finance ministers’ previous statements by framing Commonwealth aid in the context 
of global economic affairs, but made a specific point of noting that the Nairobi proposals went 
beyond anything offered by previous regional Commonwealth aid programmes (such as the 
SCAAP).
74
 The report illustrated how the Secretariat had the capacity to bridge regional 
Commonwealth projects and the global economic issues being discussed by the finance 
ministers.  
At the opening of the 1967 Finance Ministers’ Meeting, the Governor General of Trinidad and 
Tobago, Sir Solomon Hochoy, stressed that in spite of other concerns among the developed 
countries, the increasing economic gap between developed and developing countries was of vital 
importance to the majority of the member countries in attendance. In his remarks he emphasised 
the need to find a solution to the problems of development and noted the important role of the 
Secretariat in advancing Commonwealth cooperation, providing expertise, and serving as a “the 
non-national focal point” of the organisation.
75
 Upon his election to the chairmanship of the 
meeting, Eric Williams (who was both prime minister and finance minister of Trinidad and 
Tobago), was even more explicit about the imperatives of the meeting and the central role of the 
Secretariat. Williams stated that “the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of the less-developed 
areas of the Commonwealth and of the World...are based to a large measure on the creation of a 
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stable yet flexible international monetary situation and a mechanism… above all that promotes 
the growth of trade on mutually advantageous terms and the flow of development capital to the 
less-developed countries.” He continued to welcome Smith and his staff, lauding “their attitude 
and their approach to their tasks [through which] they have succeeded in giving a new meaning 
to the concept of the Commonwealth.”
76
 Trinbagonian officials made clear the importance of aid 
and development to the wider membership and emphasised the value of the Secretariat in 
advocating on their behalf. 
During the conference itself, Canadian and British delegates took a measured approach while the 
Australian delegation expressed concerns with the Secretary-General’s report on Commonwealth 
aid. However, the developing members strongly supported the Secretariat’s efforts. Jamaican and 
Tanzanian representatives called for follow-up action on the Nairobi recommendations, 
including a scheme to fund the administrative centralisation of development aid in the 
Secretariat.
77
 Trinbagonian representatives noted that the technical assistance provided by the 
Secretariat had already boosted developing members’ ability to absorb and effectively allocate 
capital aid. They called for further investigation into the technical development fund and other 
types of capital aid tied to finance rather than just personnel.
78
 At the conclusion of the meeting 
the finance ministers ultimately expressed their support for the Secretariat proposal and the 
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outcomes of the Nairobi meeting and hoped that the feasibility study about the technical 
assistance fund would yield positive results.
79
  
The support of the finance ministers in 1966 and 1967 helped advance the Secretariat proposal 
and subsequent recommendations of the Nairobi meeting. By the end of the 1967 Finance 
Ministers’ Meeting, enough member governments had approved the recommendations of the 
Nairobi meeting to ensure that the Special Commonwealth Technical Assistance Programme 
would come into effect.
80
 The Secretariat-based headquarters group of four technical assistance 
officers (financed by Canada and Britain) was subsequently recruited over the winter and 
became operational in July 1968.
81
 While the programme fell short of the initial Secretariat 
proposal, with the help of the finance ministers the concept of Commonwealth technical 
assistance could at least be implemented.  
The interplay between the organisation of the Finance Ministers’ Meetings, the development of 
the Secretariat’s capacity to service such meetings, and the growth of the Special Commonwealth 
Technical Assistance Programme between 1965 and 1968 illustrate the importance of meetings 
in the evolution of the Commonwealth organisation. The support of the newer member 
governments and Smith’s personal contacts in the Canadian Government facilitated the 
Secretariat taking on the servicing of Commonwealth ministerial meetings. With these supports, 
the Secretariat was less reliant on an inconsistent British Government pursuing diverse policy 
goals, and composed of a range of departments with attitudes ranging from friendly to hostile. 
This independence fostered good relations with the Commonwealth finance ministers and 
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improved management of Commonwealth economic meetings as the Anglo-centric yet 
convoluted structure of the CECC was reorganised. The effective management of the Finance 
Ministers’ Meetings helped garner support for the Secretariat’s technical assistance programme. 
Advances in Commonwealth technical assistance were steady through 1967 and 1968 despite the 
divisive proceedings of the 1966 Prime Ministers’ Meeting, and the lengthy pause before the 
next gathering of prime ministers in 1969.  
The central coordination of Commonwealth meetings through the Secretariat, rather than the 
British Government, allowed these advances without interference. For instance, the 
recommendations of the Nairobi meeting in 1967 were submitted directly to member 
governments. Those recommendations were not submitted to any British department, nor did 
they have to wait for the approval of the assembled prime ministers or even the finance 
ministers.
82
 Under the old system of the CECC, discussion on aid and development would either 
be handled by the CEC in conjunction with the CRO (passing them through the unreliable filter 
of the British Government) or would be submitted to the finance ministers as the de facto 
members of the CECC. The simplification of Commonwealth economic machinery with the 
Secretariat allowed maximum support for aid initiatives to be built without referring to the 
British Government or relying on less frequent gatherings of Commonwealth prime ministers. 
The streamlining of this process and its implications for Commonwealth aid and technical 
assistance was particularly clear at the 1968 Finance Ministers’ Meeting.  Logistically, while the 
meeting took place in London and was hosted by the British Government, the majority of the 
proceedings took place at the neutral location of Marlborough House. Because of the location of 
the meeting and because the CRO had long-since been reorganised, most preparations for the 
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1968 Finance Ministers’ Meeting were carried out by the Secretariat. Deputy Secretary-General 
Gooneratne headed up those efforts, including carrying out the consultations for dates, the 
meeting agenda, and setting officials’ meetings to work out the logistics.
83
 The British 
Government provided a social programme as well as facilities to host the largest sessions that 
had outgrown the space available at Marlborough House but little else. Meanwhile, the 
Secretariat was responsible for many functions that had in the past been areas of friction between 
the Secretariat and the British. For instance, the Secretariat oversaw press arrangements, 




During the 1968 Finance Ministers’ Meeting itself, Secretariat efforts received further support 
based on “an impressive early record” of the technical assistance programme.
85
 The programme 
had completed a number of projects at a scale greater than national organisations could 
accomplish, and at a speed far more effective than the United Nations and other large 
international agencies.
86
 Arnold Smith reported a 54% increase in flows of Commonwealth 
agricultural development funding, a 10% increase in intra-Commonwealth development loans, a 
9% increase in technical assistance funds, a 14% increase in technical advisors posted throughout 
the Commonwealth, and an 11% increase in student and trainee exchanges.
87
 Taken together, 
these gains represented a 4% overall rise in intra-Commonwealth financial and technical 
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assistance. Representatives from Botswana (one of the first members to receive technical 
assistance under the scheme) congratulated the Secretariat on making development aid such a 
high priority and lauded the outcomes of the Nairobi meeting and the technical assistance 
programme at large.
88
 Canadian representatives continued to support the Secretariat programme 
and called for full support of the Nairobi recommendations.
89
  
This support continued beyond the 1968 Finance Ministers’ Meeting and influenced the 
subsequent planning for the 1969 Prime Ministers’ Meeting. In an informal meeting of 
Commonwealth Representatives on November 19, developing members asked that a draft 
Secretariat background paper on Commonwealth co-operation be revised to include more 
emphasis on economic aid and technical assistance. “It was in this direction that the developing 
members in particular would look to see proof of the value of the Commonwealth.”
90
 Arnold 
Smith hoped to follow up on the recommendations of the Nairobi meeting and the positive track 
record of the technical assistance programme to get approval of the prime ministers for the 
multilateral aid and technical assistance fund proposed in 1967.
91
 Pursuing that aim, Smith 
sought to coordinate with the British and Canadian Governments in the lead-up to the 1969 
Prime Ministers’ Meeting.  
In a meeting with Sir Arthur Snelling, the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Relations (of the newly amalgamated Foreign and Commonwealth Office or 
FCO), Smith advocated for the value of a multilateral approach and for at least token support 
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from the British. Snelling “feared that there might be a risk of some clash of views over this” at 
the meeting as “both in terms of political kudos and balance of payments” he thought bilateral 
aid to be a more beneficial system.
92
 While Snelling agreed to review the proposal with the 
ODM in light of Smith’s arguments, in private he noted that “we [the FCO] and the ODM regard 
it as empire-building on his [Smith’s] part and are opposed to his somewhat grandiose and 
expensive ideas.”
93
 British officials again viewed Smith’s activities as personal aggrandisement 
rather than a genuine effort to provide services to member governments. As in other areas of 
Commonwealth management (like the membership question or Prime Ministers’ Meetings), 
British officials had difficulty considering the Secretariat to be a legitimate Commonwealth 
body.   
In the interim, coordination between the Secretariat and the Canadian Government was initially 
more promising. While in Ottawa earlier in 1968, Smith had again spoken with Maurice Strong 
who offered a sum of 10 million dollars of the CIDA budget to jump-start the Commonwealth 
technical assistance fund. This funding was conditional on the approval of the newly elected 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau who promised Smith “sympathetic consideration to the idea.”
94
 
While Trudeau appeared to be committed to this plan, he also expressed fears that funding the 
Commonwealth and not a Francophone international organisation would exacerbate growing 
tensions between English and French Canada.
95
 Smith argued that the Canadian Government 
should allocate funds equally between the Commonwealth and francophone international bodies 
so as to build support for the Canadian Federal Government in Quebec while also providing 
leadership within the Commonwealth. However, fears over Canadian domestic unity prevailed. 
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While Trudeau had prepared a speech announcing the $10 million pledge from CIDA, on the eve 
of the 1969 Prime Ministers’ Meeting, he withdrew the Canadian offer.
96
   
The expansionist members continued to press for a full-scale programme of aid and technical 
assistance along the lines of the Secretariat’s original proposal. However, without the decisive 
show of Canadian support, and with ongoing resistance from the restrictionist delegations of 
Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and India, the proposal met a stalemate during the Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting. While follow up action to the Nairobi proposals was not ruled out, neither 
were any firm decisions taken.
97
 The conference communique included statements in support of 
existing methods of bilateral aid as well as statements in support of a multilateral 
Commonwealth programme.
98
 The communique reflected the general course of the meeting, the 
success of which the Secretariat regarded as “of a negative nature, since much of it can be 
described as success in avoiding what might have been a more acrimonious and explosive 
Meeting.” The Secretariat post mortem noted that “in positive terms, there was limited, if any, 
success achieved in the discussion of the most political controversies…[and] in the non-political 
sphere, it could be said that some room was left for more success in respect to some of the 
schemes for Commonwealth cooperation which had been put to the Meeting…”
99
 
However, while the 1969 Prime Ministers’ Meeting slowed the implementation of the technical 
assistance programme the gathering was nonetheless a further qualified success for the 
Secretariat. Smith had made a number of suggestions for ways to follow up on the Nairobi 
proposals and the prime ministers agreed to an extension of the technical assistance programme 
pending a comprehensive review later in 1969. While far short of the original CIDA proposal, 
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the Canadian Government nonetheless pledged to contribute 40% of an initial technical 
assistance fund to a maximum of $350,000 pending review of the programme.
100
 The 
Secretariat’s review of member speeches later listed separate statements of support for expanded 
technical assistance (including the establishment of a technical assistance fund) from nearly all 
developing members. Of the statements included in the review, 15 specifically noted support for 
technical and development assistance, which included lip service from the British Government, 
versus three (Australia, New Zealand, and India) specifically opposing the idea.
101
 Ultimately, 
the Commonwealth was in better shape and the Secretariat enjoyed a better reputation than it had 
at the last Prime Ministers’ Meeting in 1966. The majority of the membership supported further 
advances in Commonwealth technical assistance and as expressed by the Canadian Government, 
looked forward to the review of the Nairobi Scheme later that year.
102
    
The 1969 Prime Ministers’ Meeting again illustrated the degree to which meetings of 
Commonwealth finance ministers affected the advancement of the technical assistance 
programme. As with the previous Prime Ministers’ Meeting in 1966, there was little 
advancement of the Secretariat proposal among member Heads of Government. The Secretariat 
proposal had been largely supported and developed in conjunction with member finance 
ministers in the intervening years, and was again deferred to the judgement of the finance 
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ministers, as the review of the Nairobi scheme was scheduled in conjunction with the next 
Finance Ministers’ Meeting in Barbados that September.
103
  
By 1969 there was no contestation over the Secretariat’s role in planning Commonwealth 
meetings. The planning process was well-honed, and by August of that year the Secretariat had 
prepared detailed administrative arrangements for three consecutive meetings in Barbados, 
including the planning officials review meeting (September 22-23), a meeting of senior finance 
officials to finalise the agenda for the Finance Ministers’ Meeting (September 23-24), and the 
Finance Ministers’ Meeting itself (September 25-16).
104
 The administrative and logistical details 
of the meeting illustrate an important feature of the Secretariat’s management of economic 
meetings.
105
  The comprehensiveness and independence of the Secretariat’s arrangements for the 
three Barbados meetings show the extent to which economic meetings were firmly under the 
management of the Secretariat in 1969. No single piece of logistical coordination was in itself 
exceptional, but the management of each one had been contested in preceding years. After the 
1969 Prime Ministers’ Meeting ,the Secretariat ostensibly had less need for an “evangelical 
stance” to its work, as the handover of administrative functions was effectively complete.
106
  
Recognising that the management of meetings alone would not ensure success, Smith continued 
to work to increase the chances of adoption for an expanded technical assistance programme 
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including the fund for technical assistance. In July 1969, he proposed that the prospective fund 
for technical assistance be established with an initial sum of £500,000, half the sum of the 
original Secretariat proposal.
107
 Smith also sought further support from the Canadian 
Government. Writing to Ivan Head in the Canadian Prime Minister’s Office in early September, 
Smith  hoped  the Canadian Government would support the technical assistance programme as 
the review meeting neared. Recognising the Canadian Government’s earlier fears Smith argued 
that in addition to encouraging development and long-term international cooperation,  providing 
“somewhat parallel support for Commonwealth and Francophone programmes could…make a 
great deal of sense, politically, for a country such as Canada”
108
 As with the preparations for the 
1969 Prime Ministers’ Meeting (see Chapter Nine), the new Trudeau Government was less 
enthusiastic than the preceding Pearson Government and was in the midst of a comprehensive 
review of Canadian foreign policy.
109
 Maurice Strong’s $10 million proposal was never revisited. 
However, while reduced, Smith still enjoyed support from the Canadian Government for the 
revised £500,000 proposal in addition to the staid support of the developing members.    
The economic planners that met in Barbados that September were also impressed with the record 
of the technical assistance programme. Both in terms of the speed and the high quality of the 
projects undertaken, the review meeting lauded the Secretariat’s efforts. In the 14 months since 
commencing operations, the programme’s four-man headquarters group had completed no less 
than 30 separate missions to 13 countries, territories, and regional agencies. The review meeting 
strongly recommended that the programme be expanded by recruiting at least seven new staff 
members to cover a widening range and number of assistance requests. The meeting also advised 
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that the proposed technical assistance fund be established.
110
 These recommendations were 
passed on to the Finance Ministers’ Meeting two days later. The majority of member finance 
ministers supported the Secretariat initiative and called for the technical assistance programme to 
be “expanded as fast as was feasible”
111
 The developing members in particular called for the 
Secretary-General to urgently work on establishing a technical assistance fund at the starting 
figure of £1 million per the original Secretariat proposal in 1966.
112
      
Despite the glowing review of the programme and the overwhelming support of the membership, 
British and other restrictionist representatives demurred. While the British delegation would not 
oppose the conference majority, they noted that accepting the principle of a technical assistance 
fund “would imply absolutely no commitment on Britain’s part to contribute to such a fund.”
113
 
While oppositional at the conference, Indian representatives more bluntly refused several months 
later with a press release stating that the Indian Government would not be contributing to the 
fund.
114
 Ultimately, in September 1969 the establishment of a technical assistance fund was 
approved in principle by the finance ministers and advanced to a feasibility study.
115
 However, 
British officials in the FCO privately noted with satisfaction that the fund, to which Arnold 
Smith was “passionately attached,” had been blocked.
116
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Officials in the FCO acknowledged that a shift in British policy over multilateral aid was 
possible in the coming years but worried over the potential costs, both in monetary terms and in 
terms of the expansion of the Secretariat.
117
 In the meantime, FCO staff agreed with officials in 
the ODM who refused to cooperate with the Secretariat during the first year of the technical 
assistance programme. Reporting to Arnold Smith in anticipation of Smith’s follow up to the 
finance ministers’ recommendations in January 1970, Gordon Goundrey, (Director of the 
Secretariat’s Economic Development and Research Division) complained of ODM 
obstructionism.
118
 Goundrey recounted his division’s “very unhappy” experience with the ODM 
which frequently underpaid (and thus disincentivised) technical staff eligible for Commonwealth 
deployment and refused to share information with the Secretariat.
119
 Furthermore, ODM officials 
felt the need to reconsider and reassess the recommendations of the headquarters group before 
accepting them. Goundrey noted that such “a re-examination of the technical assistance request 
to see if it is needed or would be of value calls into question the whole philosophy of the Nairobi 
Scheme and the competence of the Headquarters Group.”
120
  
In the case of the ODM, the restrictionism of the British Government was escalated to full efforts 
to undermine the success of the technical assistance programme. Those efforts were particularly 
stark in contrast to the work of the developing members. While the developing members stood to 
gain the most from the technical assistance fund, a number had already expressed their 
willingness to contribute to that fund and followed up with cash offers to make clear that self-
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help was an important element of the Commonwealth programme.
121
 As Smith put it in July 
1969, the philosophy of the multilateralism “removes the usual distinction between donor and 
recipient countries, and replaces this by a more profound concept of mutual assistance” meaning 
that “however small their size, or however limited their resources, all Commonwealth countries 
are potential donors in this programme, and have a real contribution which they could make 




The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Assistance was eventually approved by the finance 
ministers at their meeting in Cyprus in 1970 and was implemented following the Singapore 
Heads of Government Meeting in 1971.
123
 In the interim, many features of previous debates 
persisted. Smith again unsuccessfully appealed to the Canadian Government for a show of 
leadership that might “galvanise the whole thing into new and constructive directions, to which 
lip service has been paid…but this far little else.”
124
 There were further delaying tactics by the 
richer, restrictionist members of the organisation which slowed the implementation of the 
programme through multiple stages of approval and feasibility studies.
125
 The British 
Government continued to obstruct the expansion of the Secretariat in a general sense, with 
specific departments like the ODM making more concerted efforts. Finally, the newer members 
continued to support the Secretariat programme. Support from the expansionist members was 
made in the context of the wider UN “Decade of Development” and was a central priority for 
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 However, as the genesis of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Assistance 
illustrates, even with the appreciable changes in the economic workings of the Commonwealth, 
newer members had the most success advancing their priorities by working with the Secretariat 
through the forum of the Finance Ministers’ Meetings.  
The Secretariat taking on the management of the Finance Ministers’ Meetings was an important 
step to democratising the economic functions of the Commonwealth and building support for the 
technical assistance programme. Meetings of finance ministers were a useful forum for newer 
members to advance proposals in conjunction with the Secretariat, particularly as those proposals 
generally received more attention than at the larger Prime Ministers’ Meetings. Smith later 
recalled that the implementation of the technical assistance programme shifted the nature of 
ministerial meetings to be more action oriented. In his estimation, the development of the 
technical assistance programme in conjunction with the finance ministers set an example to other 
ministerial meetings (including health, law, education, and trade). Thereafter, other ministerial 
meetings began to receive more numerous requests and proposals from Commonwealth members 
for sector-specific actions and initiatives.
127
   
The increased emphasis on the Finance Ministers’ Meeting was indicative of a certain level of 
standardization in the new structure of the Commonwealth. New ministerial meetings had been 
added and the CECC had been dispersed into specialised meetings of finance, trade, and 
education ministers. By 1969 the economic workings of the Commonwealth more closely 
aligned with other areas of Commonwealth operations and all meetings were managed by the 
Secretariat under a standard format (see figure three). This standardisation reflected the growing 
                                                             
126 For example see:  “Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 1969 (London, 7-15 January): Final 
Communique.”; Commonwealth Heads’ of Government Meeting, Singapore 14 – 22 January 1971. Final 
Communique (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1971). 
127 Smith, Stitches in Time, 112.  
319 
 
capacity of the Secretariat (enabling for instance, the consecutive detailed plans for the three 
economic meetings in Barbados in 1969) as well as the Secretariat’s greater transparency. The 
clear procedures for Commonwealth meetings starkly contrasted the murky ad-hocery under the 
British Government in the early 1960s.  
 
Figure Three: Management of Commonwealth meetings in 1970.  
In the long-term, the growth and expansion of ministerial level meetings under the Secretariat 
had mixed results. Apart from greater transparency and effectiveness in meeting logistics, the 
genesis of the technical assistance programme demonstrated that ministerial meetings could be 
an effective way for members to advance projects of interest. Ministerial meetings were in many 
ways a preferable forum as they convened more frequently, had the authority to approve the 
recommendations of meetings of lesser officials, could make recommendations to the prime 
ministers, were not as inhibited by political concerns as the prime ministers, and were comprised 
of field-specific specialists. These advantages were used particularly by the newer, developing 
members to make sustained efforts towards building the Commonwealth technical assistance 











However, despite the opportunities inherent in such ministerial meetings, their efficiency also 
decreased with greater standardization. Restrictionist members were able to effectively delay the 
implementation of the technical assistance programme for example, using the process of 
feasibility studies and recommendations which were inherent to the structure of Commonwealth 
meetings. In this sense, the ministerial meetings came to replicate the political nature of the 
Prime Ministers’ Meetings. Delegations later in the 1960s were more prone to toe the line of 
their home governments than to engage as specialists. The standardised format and structure of 
Commonwealth meetings was met with standardised delegations armed with standardised 
policies. By 1970 the structure of the Commonwealth and the consultations at its core more 




Epilogue: Singapore 1971  
By 1970 the Commonwealth no longer resembled the imperial club of 1964.
1
 Secretariat staff 
noted that the most recent 1969 Prime Ministers’ Meeting made Commonwealth gatherings 
“resemble sessions of the U.N. General Assembly” rather than the old-style Commonwealth 
gatherings.
2
 In 1970, the Prime Ministers’ Meetings were also redubbed Commonwealth Heads 
of Government Meetings (CHOGM) to better reflect the diverse systems of government 
represented by the membership.
3
 The next CHOGM took place in Singapore in January 1971.  
The organisational changes begun by African membership and precipitated by the formation of 
the Commonwealth Secretariat had more or less stabilised by the time the Heads of Government 
convened  in Singapore. The Singapore meeting emphasized Commonwealth diversity and 
produced a new Declaration of Commonwealth Principles. The 1971 Singapore Declaration 
conformed to the Commonwealth modus operandi identified by John Holmes in 1962 (see 
Chapter One), namely, that “the Commonwealth has always developed by adjusting to 
circumstances and concocting its theory retroactively.”
4
 In keeping with this pattern, the 
assembled leaders in 1971 issued a declaration adjusting Commonwealth theory in response to 
the changes of the late 1960s, just as the assembled prime ministers in 1951 issued a declaration 
of shared values in response to the changes of the late 1940s.  
The 1971 Singapore Declaration set the basis for subsequent codification of Commonwealth 
values, which were elaborated in the 1991 Harare Declaration and the 2013 Commonwealth 
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 Philip Murphy describes this as “the slow and tentative process of defining a set of 
shared values,” often in the face of blatant contradictions in member states’ actions and domestic 
policies. Murphy notes that the values of the contemporary Commonwealth are so vague as to 
mean nothing and member states have come to ignore them accordingly.
6
 The codification and 
apparent ossification of Commonwealth values in more recent years has been covered 
extensively by scholars looking at the contemporary organisation. However, these problems of 
values predate the contemporary Commonwealth and are linked to the creation of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat in 1965. The Singapore Declaration facilitates tracing the changes in 
the Commonwealth over the decade of the 1960s. The 14 clauses of the Declaration exhibit the 
adaptation of older Commonwealth values to the new organisational realities, the influence of the 
newer expansionist members, and the novel influence of Smith and the Secretariat. The 
Singapore Declaration reflected the changes of the 1960s and established the ideational 
challenges of the modern Commonwealth identified by Murphy. 
Many of the clauses of the Singapore Declaration were familiar pieces of Commonwealth 
rhetoric. The first clause echoed the Statute of Westminster and underscored member 
sovereignty and that the Commonwealth was a voluntary association of states cooperating on 
matters of common interest. The fourth clause recognised that the shared principles of the 
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However, the Singapore Declaration also bore the indelible imprint of the newer members. For 
instance, the fifth clause echoed earlier declarations about the Commonwealth’s commitment to 
peace, security, and prosperity, but noted that supporting the United Nations was a key step to 
maintaining peace, and that the Commonwealth membership would continue to support the UN 
as a force for peace in the world.
8
 The second clause was a familiar celebration of 
Commonwealth diversity including geography, religion, tradition, cultures, and races. However, 
by 1971 the clause on Commonwealth diversity also included a diversity of languages and 
institutions whereas the past emphasis on shared working language, institutions, and 
administrative practices was gone.
9
  
The issue of race also bore the marks of new members’ perspectives and activism. For example, 
while the 1964 communique indicated race was one of the most significant problems in world 
affairs, the 1971 Declaration was much more explicit. The seventh clause called racial prejudice 
a “dangerous sickness threatening the healthy development of the human race” and racial 
discrimination an “unmitigated evil.” The eighth clause espoused the Commonwealth’s 
continued opposition to colonial domination and racial oppression. The Commonwealth would 
oppose the “evil policy” of racial discrimination both at home and abroad and deny any 
assistance that might help countries with discriminatory laws continue such policies.
10
 The 
vagueness of this pledge left such “assistance” to be defined by members’ own judgement. In 
practice the pledge criticised the British Government for the continued sale of arms to apartheid 
South Africa and the caveat allowed the British to justify those continued sales. However, the 
explicit wording of the clauses dealing with racial discrimination and colonialism was the 






consensus of the postcolonial majority, rather than the Commonwealth status quo of the 1950s. 
And so, these clauses reflect not only the evolution of the Commonwealth, but also the deep 
divides that existed within the organisation as it entered the 1970s. 
The sweeping vision of newer members and the obstructive caveats of the old Anglo-core were 
also clear in clauses relating to economics. The ninth and tenth clauses styled the disparity of 
wealth between rich and poor nations as “too great to be tolerated” and pledged the 
Commonwealth to cooperate towards overcoming poverty, ignorance and disease, and to work 
towards universally better, more equal standards of living. However, a limiting caveat was 
included in the ninth clause that called for that cooperation to pursue the “progressive removal” 
of economic inequalities, thereby allowing the wealthier members to interpret the imperative of 
economic development as they wished. A similar limit in the tenth clause juxtaposed the freest 
possible trade with the special circumstances of developing nations, and further juxtaposed 
public and private measures toward sustainable economic development.
11
 
The Singapore Declaration also echoed a number of perspectives advanced by Arnold Smith in 
his bid to create an accessible vision for the future of the Commonwealth. For instance, the third 
clause emphasised that Commonwealth membership was compatible with other international 
groups and alliances including the non-aligned movement. The eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth 
clauses all emphasised that the Commonwealth was an exemplary multilateral association and 
was one of the most fruitful means of facilitating international cooperation, and making real 
contributions to peace, freedom, and “the enrichment of life for all.”
12
 These ideas were core 





tenets of Smith’s “usual gospel” and his concept of the Commonwealth as an international 
instrument among many (see Chapter Four). 
The Commonwealth values espoused in earlier declarations were still evident in the Singapore 
Declaration but were modified to the shape of the new Commonwealth. More notable in the 
Singapore Declaration were the strong statements on race and economics. These statements were 
advanced by developing members in the Global South and were much more prominent than in 
any previous declaration. Such statements came in conjunction with statements outlining the 
vision of the Commonwealth put forward by Smith and the Secretariat. Overall, the concept of 
the Commonwealth as an international organisation working on behalf of its members and 
cooperating with other international bodies more heavily shaped the Singapore Declaration than 
any previous Commonwealth statements.  
Yet the Singapore Declaration also featured far more rhetorical to and fro and limiting caveats 
than previous declarations by Commonwealth leaders. Most Commonwealth gatherings had 
hitherto been able to achieve a good degree of consensus on all but a few issues. In contrast, the 
text of the Singapore Declaration included far more caveats that limited the idea that the 
Commonwealth was a major IO with an activist and executive Secretariat. The simultaneously 
activist and conservative rhetoric built into the clauses of the Singapore Declaration 
demonstrated the inherent tension between the restrictionist and expansionist visions for the 
organisation, and the reality that the Commonwealth was fundamentally different than before 
1965. By 1970, the Commonwealth was “a microcosm of the UN, though without 
superpowers.”
13
 There were more members than ever before and the number was expected to 
keep growing. The majority of members were former colonies in the Global South, with an 
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increasing number of small states in their ranks. Commonwealth meetings were conducted more 
along the lines of the UN General Assembly. Meetings were convened by the Secretariat and 
marked by the exchange of prepared statements rather than informal conversation. The meetings 
also saw increasing use of the bloc approaches successfully used by Third World members in the 
UN. The Commonwealth was quickly developing a family of affiliated professional 
organisations not unlike the UN, and there was arguably more work or practical value being 
carried out at this sub-state multilateral level than between member governments themselves. 
Ministerial meetings had also been standardised and member policies were increasingly 
homogenous across different Commonwealth fora.  
The crux of these changes was that the Commonwealth was no longer as Anglo-centric as before 
and was more firmly in the control of a Secretariat accountable to the wider membership, rather 
than to Whitehall. In order to maintain any sort of advantage or special relationship with the 
Commonwealth, UK policy was increasingly geared toward preventing the Commonwealth from 
exerting the same pressure that the UN had exerted on the UK over the past decade, rather than 
maintaining control of the Commonwealth itself. The values and structures of the organisation 
had been realigned to reflect the Commonwealth as an international organisation, rather than the 
club of old. Problems of racial politics, particularly in relation to Rhodesia and South Africa, 
continued to dominate Commonwealth activities for the next twenty years. But the to and fro of 
the Singapore Declaration set the stage for debates over the values, priorities, and direction of the 




From the Commonwealth’s earliest meetings in the late 19
th
 century, publicly stated values 
served both as aspirational ideals and measures to define and govern the organisation. The 
transformation of the Commonwealth from an imperial club to an international organisation 
involved reinterpreting those values to better suit the vision of the membership as to what the 
organisation was, and what it should be. More so than the 1951 Leaders’ Declaration or the 1949 
London Declaration, the Singapore Declaration reflected the new reality of a Commonwealth 
dominated by the concerns of the newer, developing members, but still marked by the reluctance 
of the older members.  
As a reflection of the Commonwealth’s values and structures, the Singapore Declaration was 
recognisably modern. The to and fro language of the Declaration reflected the Commonwealth’s 
unprecedented size and diversity. It underscored that consensus among members was not 
required, and was no longer assumed (the former was a longstanding idea, but the latter was 
novel) It also employed loftier language and was more formally crafted than previous statements 
and echoed the functional similarities between the Commonwealth and the UN. The Singapore 
Declaration marked the triumph of the expansionist vision of the Commonwealth as an IO over 
the restrictionist vision of the Commonwealth as a club.  
Faced with this unfamiliar milieu, the restrictionist governments progressively disengaged from 
the Commonwealth after 1971. They remained members but increasingly pursued their national 
goals through other associations and diplomatic channels. If nothing else, the restrictionists could 
rest in the knowledge that they were right. The expansion of Commonwealth membership and 
the formation of the Secretariat had irreversibly changed the organisation and the old club-like 
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atmosphere was gone. The restrictionist members now had to worry about Commonwealth 
interventionism and scrutiny in nearly all areas of international and domestic policy, including 
international politics, conflicts, immigration, colonial policy, and economic negotiations. For the 
British Government, the Commonwealth ceased to be the platform for British influence it once 
was. Fears in the CRO that their department would be made-redundant were entirely borne out, 
as with concerns in the CO and CEC about reassignment and general upheaval in the workplace. 
The principle of Commonwealth consensus and informal conversation was also gone as the 
Commonwealth became a large and somewhat unwieldy international body. The Commonwealth 
as an IO could be a frustrating place and by 1971 the organisation added more evidence to Cyril 
Northcote Parkinson’s only semi-humorous “coefficient of inefficiency” which argued that any 
decision making body becomes chronically inefficient once its exceeds 20 or so members.
1
 
The expansionists’ persistent efforts had supported the transition of the Commonwealth to an IO, 
and it was the expansionist members who benefitted most from the transition. The creation of the 
Secretariat and the Secretariat takeover of Commonwealth administration and services from the 
British Government had effectively decolonised the Commonwealth itself.
2
 By 1971 the newer 
members in particular could be less apprehensive about British neocolonial designs hidden in the 
operations of the Commonwealth. Despite the inefficiencies inherent to larger organisations, 
Commonwealth meetings were increasingly standardised and transparent. Ministerial meetings in 
turn generated support for practical initiatives like the Commonwealth Fund for Technical 
Cooperation, and other programmes with tangible benefits for the members. While the 
Commonwealth was perhaps less efficient as an IO than as a club, as a large IO it could 
                                                             
1 C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson’s Law and other Studies in Administration (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside 
Press, 1957), 37. 
2 Lloyd, Diplomacy with a Difference, 228. 
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accomplish more in terms of multilateral projects. After the formation of the Secretariat, the 
newer members saw a genuine growth in programmes beneficial to them as the new majority. 
Such pros and cons according to the expansionist and restrictionist perspectives are often lost in 
Commonwealth historiography. Recent trends of the New Imperial History often consider the 
Commonwealth as a derivative history of other fields and topics such as the British Empire, 
Rhodesia, decolonisation, etcetera, and presents a linear narrative of organisational decline. 
Apart from David McIntyre’s extensive bibliography (See Introduction) very few studies 
approach the history of the Commonwealth with a specific focus on the organisation itself, or 
with an eye to organisational evolution.. This thesis contributes to that modest literature by 
focusing on the organisational history of the Commonwealth. This thesis agrees that the 
Commonwealth’s transition from an imperial club to an IO hinged on the creation of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat in 1965. More importantly, by focusing on how that transition took 
place, this project supports an alternative focus and periodization of Commonwealth history 
centred on 1965, rather than 1949 or 1931. The organisational changes brought about by the 
creation of the Secretariat had greater implications for creating the so-called “modern” 
Commonwealth than did the London Declaration or Statute of Westminster. 
By focusing on the changes brought about by the formation of the Secretariat, this project also 
supports the consideration of a novel set of actors in Commonwealth history. The expansionist 
and restrictionist groups, and the mediating Secretariat are actors that have been noted by other 
authors but have not been employed as an overarching framework for understanding 
organisational evolution. These groups have particular relevance to the administrative history of 
the Commonwealth as they were the chief actors in determining how the evolution of the 
Commonwealth actually took place. This project makes a unique contribution to the field of 
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Commonwealth history by focusing on that evolutionary process and also opens up lines of 
inquiry for further study into Commonwealth engagement in the wider international context of 
the 1960s. As Akira Iriye argues about the 1950s, international organisations were actors in the 
drama of the Cold war, and often played roles antithetical to the main protagonists.
3
 By focusing 
on how the Commonwealth Secretariat operated as an actor in relation to the Rhodesian crisis 
and Commonwealth cooperation, this study foregrounds future research on the Secretariat’s role 
in the Cold War.   
Through this thesis I argue that the evolution of the Commonwealth occurred primarily through 
Commonwealth meetings, and more importantly, through the management and planning of such 
meetings. The management of Commonwealth meetings was a key field of struggle between 
differing visions for the future of the organisation. Tensions between the expansionists and 
restrictionists and the Secretariat trying to bridge those perspectives were not only played out 
during Commonwealth meetings themselves, but also in the preparation and administration of 
those gatherings. The Secretariat’s capacity to do so was bolstered by diplomatic back-channels, 
particularly in the Canadian Government under Pearson. The eventual waning of CRO 
opposition also facilitated the success of Secretariat efforts to take on the management of 
Commonwealth meetings.    
The topics discussed at Commonwealth meetings and the decisions of Commonwealth leaders 
through the 1960s are well documented. However, this study asserts that the planning of the 
meetings themselves was just as important in deciding the future of the organisation. Not only 
did the planning process ensure that the wider meetings of Commonwealth leaders took place at 
all, but the ongoing negotiations between the Secretariat and the British Government and 
                                                             
3 Iriye, Global Community, 65. 
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between the wider expansionist and restrictionist groups shaped the functions of the 
Commonwealth as it transitioned into an IO. Reading between the lines of major Commonwealth 
developments in the 1960s uncovers a rich administrative history that not only contributes to our 
understanding of the Commonwealth’s organisational evolution, but also to the wider history of 
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Appendix: Timeline of Postwar Commonwealth Membership (to 1970) 
 
1947 
August - India, Pakistan  
1948   
       February- Ceylon (Sri Lanka)  
1957  
March - Ghana  
August  - Malaysia  
1960  
October - Nigeria  
1961  
March - Cyprus  
April - Sierra Leone  
October - South Africa withdraws 
December - Tanzania  
1962  
August - Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica  
October - Uganda  
1963  
December - Kenya  
1964  
July - Malawi  
September - Malta  
October - Zambia  
1965  
February - The Gambia  
October - Singapore  
1966  
May - Guyana  
September - Botswana (Bechuanaland)  
October - Lesotho (Basutoland)  
November - Barbados  
1968  
March - Mauritius  
September - Swaziland (Eswatini)  
November - Nauru  
1970  
June - Tonga  
August - Samoa  
October - Fiji  
 
 
 
